Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, August 2, 1958—6:01 p.m.

110. Eban called his request Rountree August 2. Stated USSR had handed to Israel Ambassador Moscow on August 1 note containing strong protest re overflights by US/UK aircraft. Note stated this attitude of GOI made Israel immediate associate aggressive acts US/UK. USSR also deemed it necessary make clear to GOI that by placing airspace at disposal US/UK, GOI assumed responsibility for increased tension in ME which may develop into conflict bringing about particularly perilous consequences to national interest Israel itself.

Eban stated Israel had incurred protest from which [sic] country much larger than self. This strengthened Israel Prime Minister’s view US/UK had taken on greater responsibility Israel’s security. Urgent necessity US policy re independence integrity Israel be made known to USSR.

Israel did not regret what it had done in making airspace available but believed this action strengthened moral responsibility incurred by US/UK. Prime Minister wished President and Secretary be aware this belief. In replying to USSR, Israel planned say inter alia it could not accept charge of assisting in “aggressive acts” since UNSC by vote 10–1 had defeated USSR resolution calling US/UK action aggressive.

Rountree undertook convey GOI views to Secretary. He pointed out this appeared to be Soviet maneuver in context protests other countries such as Iran, West Germany. Eban replied USSR doubtless hoped by this act encourage elements in Israel who opposed use of airspace. Chief Soviet purpose, however, was intimidatory. Indispensable USSR be told US had vital interest independence, integrity Israel. Rountree commented that while no formal security arrangement Israel–US, we believed repeated statements US policy and indications US attitude this regard have left no doubt in minds USSR.

Conversation concluded with general discussion about prospects summit conference in SC on ME, during which Eban expressed following views:

1. This not useful forum for discussion Arab-Israel problem which matter for parties themselves to negotiate.

2. This proper place for expression broad principles security all ME nations and opposition to attempts to bring about forceful changes.

3. Israel highly suspicious any proposal for arms embargo to area and doubtful any arrangement could be achieved which would not run counter to Israel interests.

Eban gave impression Israel not anxious attend summit meeting. Would seek do so only in event its interests or security directly involved.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5411/8–258. Secret. Drafted by Bergus, cleared with Rockwell, and initialed for Dulles by Rountree. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Paris.