34. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
137. At 5:30 local time today, August 2, Comay, Assistant Director General Foreign Ministry, delivered most urgent message from Prime Minister to effect overflights by US planes must stop immediately. PM has made same démarche re UK planes to British Ambassador, who is informing London.
[Page 81]I pointed out to Comay overflights were scheduled for completion in few days and asked if they might continue at least to August 6. He replied B-G was insistent they be stopped immediately, meaning no flights even tonight, and asked me send urgent message to that effect. I promised despatch message at once but explained that, with planes presently poised for tonight’s flights, there was some doubt they could be stopped. Comay repeated B-G’s desire there be no more flights from moment of receipt my message but recognized practical difficulties. However, he emphasized B-G’s insistence on being able assure Cabinet meeting tomorrow morning August 3 (10 o’clock local time) there were in fact no overflights and none scheduled.
In reply my question as to basis this dramatic and urgent demand, Comay implied that on receipt Soviet protest note Ben Gurion had been on verge calling in British Ambassador and me to make this request because he felt (1) he could no longer submit [subject?] Israeli people to risks involved in overflights and (2) he had already exceeded authority extracted from Cabinet. Furthermore, he has no means evaluating present Soviet threat. B-G already drafting reply to Soviet note for presentation to Cabinet tomorrow morning by which time he feels he must be in position to state cessation overflights.
I asked why great rush in replying Soviet note, pointing out replies to similar notes sent other countries had usually taken several days. In reply Comay, who stated that he had not seen actual contents note but that it was firm and threatening, said he knew only that B-G was very insistent on need for speedy action and extremely serious re urgency matter.
I agreed send immediate message to Department and promised report Department’s reply without delay. I again underscored difficulties halting tonight’s flights in view technical and communications factor.
Comments: Embassy Air Attaché reports complete cooperation IAF as of 4 p.m. local time today, at which time he informed them of change in type of aircraft making overflights.
I have conferred with my British colleague who confirmed his visit to B-G, whom he found in very determined mood. Latter’s approach to him coincided with Comay’s delivery of message to me. British Ambassador also commented to B-G on unusual speed of action requested and questioned need for such precipitous reply to Soviet note on lines coinciding almost exactly with mine. He received no more convincing replies than I received from Comay, but B-G underscored problem he faced with Cabinet. British Ambassador also pointed out technical and practical factors working against cancellation tonight’s flights.
[Page 82]It is apparent B-G has reached point where he convinced urgency of needs of Jordan and troop supply does not justify risk he runs in permitting overflights and he does not feel he has firm basis to resist strong Cabinet and potential public opposition to overflights.
I will appreciate Department’s instructions by Niact.2