38. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 10, 19581
SUBJECT
- The Mid East Situation and Israel’s Arms Request
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador, Embassy of Israel
- Mr. Yaacov Herzog, Minister, Embassy of Israel
- The Secretary
- NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
- NE—William L. Hamilton
The conversation, which was at Ambassador Eban’s request, opened with an exchange of pleasantries about press reports that the Ambassador plans to retire to seek office in the Israel general election of November 1959. Ambassador Eban said he would not deny interest in the possibility, but described the stories as premature.
The Ambassador said that while developments in the Middle East are over-shadowed by events in the Far East, the former area is not quiet. There is no change in the basic objectives either of Nasser or the USSR, although Nasser had been forced into a less aggressive posture by the presence of the U.S. and British forces in the area which in [Page 92] Ambassador Eban’s view has created a new equilibrium of strength. Nevertheless, Nasser is not cooperating in a positive way and the Secretary General has found much to disappoint him in his efforts to implement the General Assembly resolution.2 Present developments in the area are justification for the skepticism with which Ambassador Eban said both the U.S. and Israel had regarded the resolution and its prospects.
Some slight gains had been achieved. Nasser has had to abandon force for the time being. He is apparently reconciled to some degree of independence for Lebanon, and his ambitions toward Saudi Arabia have received a serious check despite minor concessions given to him on purchases of oil with Egyptian currency. He is encountering resistance in the Sudan. Finally, the U.N. debate created a world-wide awareness of indirect aggression although it is not defined in the resolution.
The Secretary agreed that the concept is implicit in the resolution, although not explicitly expressed.
Ambassador Eban went on to say that world opinion, now aware of the dangers of indirect aggression, has placed Nasser under an inhibiting tactical influence, but has not persuaded him to renunciation of his dreams of empire nor his use of Soviet assistance and tactics. He has turned to a quieter subversion and there are disquieting indications that he is having some success especially in Iraq where the new regime is under considerable pressure, generated by Nasser, to turn to the Soviets for military instruction and weapons. He said that the Iraqi Chief of Staff has accepted the idea and it is only prudent to imagine that his desires might prevail with his Government.
Under the Secretary’s and Mr. Rockwell’s questioning, Ambassador Eban admitted that there is resistance to the suggestion within the Cabinet including the Foreign Minister, but he said real strength for it has developed in the army and as evidence he cited an Iraqi army order of the day which advised commanding officers of the possibility of the receipt of new weapons.
Mr. Rockwell commented that some American arms of obsolete type are reportedly going into Iraq either from Egypt or Syria although obtained elsewhere than from the U.S. He asked whether Israel would prefer to see the U.S. try to divert a possible Iraqi turn to the Soviets for arms by attempting to persuade the Iraqis to rely on continuing U.S. military assistance.
Ambassador Eban said such an alternative would place them in a dilemma, and he would like to consult his government on the suggestion.
[Page 93]It was recalled that a U.S. program of supplying jets to Iraq had been suspended at the time of the recent coup. Mr. Rockwell said the Iraqis have now come to us asking resumption of the program. Ambassador Eban asked if the Iraqis were also prepared to meet MAAG requirements, Mr. Rockwell replying that this was a question we would have to look into. Mr. Eban said it was not inconceivable the Iraqis would come to the U.S. with an arms request so extravagant we would have to decline, whereupon Iraq might follow Egypt’s example of 1955, declaring it had no recourse but to turn to Soviet sources.
Ambassador Eban said that in the light of these developments, it is obvious countervailing efforts cannot be relaxed and he mentioned: (1) Strengthening the non-Arab states in the area and improving their cooperation with each other. He expressed gratitude to the Secretary for U.S. interest in this concept [2 lines of source text not declassified]. (2) The preservation of the independence of Lebanon and Jordan. (3) The encouragement of a separatist tendency in Iraq and, finally, strengthening Israel’s defensive capacity. Ambassador Eban said his government welcomed what the U.S. had already done by its recent decision on arms for Israel and the understanding of Israel’s problem which was implicit in the U.S. decision. Serious problems still remain, however. A gross discrepancy is between the heavy tanks which can be numbered by the hundreds for the Arabs as against none at all for the Israelis. Israel’s once formidable tank force is now obsolete by comparison with the Stalin and Centurion tanks in the hands of the neighbors. His government is aware that Jordan wants a great increase in military strength which if granted might put the HKJ in a position not only to resist Egypt but to attack Israel. He said he recognizes U.S. reluctance to supply tanks but that France, with only a word from the U.S., is prepared to turn over M–47’s about which it is legally or morally bound to ask U.S. consent. Such a transfer, he said, is not like direct supply by the U.S. and has the additional advantage arising from the fact that the French have supplied so much to Israel that this new concession would not have a serious impact.
He said the 100 anti-tank recoilless rifles are insufficient operationally and his government would like the number increased. Israel also continues to look for ways to reduce the financial impact of its effort to redress the arms imbalance and and is preparing a memorandum which will suggest the relief the U.S. may be able to provide within the present legal framework of Israel–U.S. military supply relationships, which do not include grant assistance but permit Israel purchases on a reimbursable basis. The memorandum, which he stated would be presented to Mr. Rountree, would touch on the possibility [Page 94] of payment in Israel currency and arrangement for repayment over longer periods of time.3
Israel requirements are urgent as underscored by evidence of early reduction of Western forces now in the area; another threatening Soviet note which while it did not frighten the Israelis was a fact of life; and Nasser’s renewed attacks on Israel after a period of relative calm.
The Secretary remarked that Nasser is apparently not in a good frame of mind. It may be surmised, he said, that U.S.-British action has obliged him to slow down his program and that some other countries in the area have been encouraged to attach conditions and qualifications to their relationships with Egypt which are irritating to Nasser. The Secretary noted the great resentment which word of the U.S. arms concession to Israel had aroused in Nasser and commented that he assumes the Israelis wish the concessions had been on as large a scale as Nasser presumes they are. The Secretary agreed that Nasser is devoting more attention to Israel than for the past year or so. Perhaps this indicates his other means of achieving influence are not as strong as he had thought.
The Secretary commented that the Secretary General’s trip4 apparently is not as successful as he had hoped it might be in terms of establishing some dependable restraint on radio propaganda and a U.N. presence. The U.S. has had no direct report from the Secretary General, but there is at least some evidence, reasons for which we can only speculate about, that the good will era Fawzi talked of is not going to appear. The Secretary General may feel that he has been let down. Possibly this is because Nasser, in turn, has let down Fawzi whom he may have used merely to get over a bad moment in New York.
The Secretary agreed that we cannot expect to get out of the Middle East resolution all the results some governments hope for but some results are possible—focusing the attention of the world on the problem of indirect aggression and slowing down Nasser’s program of expansion. Nevertheless, the basic problem still remains which will have to be considered after Hammarskjold returns and makes his report.
[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]
Mr. Dulles said he could not give an answer off hand to Israel’s new arms request as outlined by the Ambassador but would consider it further.
[Page 95]The conversation on Middle Eastern matters closed with some consideration of Jordan. The Secretary said it would be necessary to do some very hard thinking on the problem after Hammarskjold has returned. Very difficult financial questions are involved for the U.S. which has had cutbacks in its appropriations making it very difficult to continue pouring money into Jordan on an emergency basis.
Ambassador Eban commented that the solution for Jordan would be closer cooperation with Israel which could give Jordan an outlet via the port of Haifa. The two governments would share the development of the Aqaba port area and the Jordan.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/9–1058. Secret. Drafted by Hamilton. A briefing paper for this conversation is ibid., 784A.56/9–1058. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 225, September 10. (Ibid., 784A.56/9–958)↩
- For text of Resolution 1237 (ES–III), August 21, see U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Third Emergency Special Session, Supplement No. 1, p. 1.↩
- On September 9, Lawson discussed Israeli arms requirements with Foreign Minister Meir along these same lines. The Ambassador summarized the conversation in telegram 247 from Tel Aviv, September 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/9–958)↩
- Hammarskjöld visited Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, and Jerusalem, August 27–September 12.↩
- During this conversation, Eban and Dulles also discussed economic aid to Israel for the oil pipeline from Aqaba to Haifa and for Jordan River projects. A memorandum of this part of the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/9–1058.↩