Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

37. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 22, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Israel Arms Request

Discussion:

Pursuant to Ambassador Eban’s July 21 conversation with you (Tab A)² the Israelis have presented a list of arms (Tab B)³ which, in the main, they hope to obtain either from us or from European stocks of U.S. manufactured items. They also ask U.S. financial assistance whether the arms are procured here or elsewhere.

They list tanks, anti-tank recoilless rifles, half-tracks, small submarines, helicopters and transport aircraft, signal equipment, trucks, and anti-aircraft guided missiles. They inform us they have also approached Italy, France and the United Kingdom to obtain tanks—Centurions from the British, and from the French and Italians M–47s supplied by us under military assistance. They have discussed submarines with the British and possibly elsewhere but with little success thus far. They do not ask for combat aircraft but inform us they hope to obtain them from the French.

The Department of Defense, in a letter of August 8 from Assistant Secretary Sprague (Tab C),⁴ informs us that all of the items on the list are available, under various priorities and delivery schedules, except for submarines and helicopters of the types specified, and a specific type of guided missile for which the Israelis can not qualify because of this weapon’s security classification.

The Israelis have given first preference to the anti-tank recoilless rifle which they describe as simple to operate, inexpensive and ideally suited as a weapon with which to arm Israel’s border settlements which they consider to be the country’s first line of defense. They are particularly desirable, according to the Israelis, as a defense against Soviet, U.K. and U.S. tanks now in the hands of the Arab states.

The Israelis ask financial assistance in arms procurement to protect their economic development program from the drain of military expenditure. They have cited favorable pricing, which they think is possible by procurement from U.S. military stocks rather than commercial sources, grant assistance for purchases here or offshore procurement, or possibly payment in Israel currency.

As in the past, we believe that political considerations militate against our being a large supplier of heavy military equipment to Israel. We prefer that the Israelis look elsewhere, particularly to the British and French, as they have in the past. We consider the quantities sought to be excessive in several categories.

Even if it were deemed advisable to introduce large quantities of arms into Israel, financial assistance (i.e., grant or credit military aid) of any significant magnitude to support this action would present certain difficulties at this time. As you are aware, no funding provision was made in the FY 1959 MAP program for Israel. Anticipated Congressional cuts in requested funds and a number of requirements which have arisen since the Congressional presentation have combined to create a situation where total requirements are in excess of the funds available to meet them. Nevertheless, if it were considered essential to provide for an Israeli program, this could be done through a diversion of funds from programs which we now contemplate meeting or by drawing on limited contingency funds. It would also be possible to make an advance commitment to fund such a program in FY 1960 by following the procedures set forth under NSC 1550 which requires that certain determinations must be made when future year funds are committed.

Grant military assistance would represent a major departure in our relations with the Government of Israel which might adversely affect delicate relations with the rest of the area. Payment in local currency is not attractive to us because our holdings of Israel pounds are far beyond any foreseeable need and would be tantamount to grant assistance since MAP dollars would have to be used to finance the transaction.

And if, as the Israelis report, France and Italy have M–47 tanks surplus to their needs, we would want to transfer them to programs of other countries which have high military priorities under the MAP.

Despite the continuing validity of most of these objections to supplying or financing large quantities of arms to Israel, the situation in the Middle East has been substantially altered since our last consideration of an Israel arms request. The Israel Government has been helpful to us in such matters as the recent overflights to Jordan and in its adherence to attitudes favorable to the U.S. position on recent developments in the area and the United Nations. Your letter of August 1 to Prime Minister Ben Gurion (Tab D),⁵ taking cognizance of these facts, expressed a U.S. belief that Israel should be in a position to deter an attempt at aggression by indigenous forces and informed Mr. Ben Gurion that we would look at a new Israel arms request with an open mind.

In the light of these considerations some alteration in our policy seems indicated. Sale of weapons which the Arabs would be least able to decry as increasing the danger of Israel aggression probably would be the most advantageous decision from the standpoint of U.S. interests. The strictly defensive anti-tank recoilless rifle seems most nearly to meet these criteria and it is probably the one most likely to compensate the Israelis for their disappointment over our decision not to make other items more readily available or to provide substantial financial assistance. The Department of Defense informs us that 100 recoilless rifles plus reasonable quantities of ammunition, spare parts, and an essential adapter kit would cost about $1 million. We might consider a credit element, thus providing some financial relief for the Israelis. However, such a credit would be a precedent in the case of Israel and it may be anticipated that it would result in Israel consistently including credit elements in its future requests for military equipment.

The Department of Defense has informed us that the proposed provision of this assistance has no significant military effect and that the $1 million to finance a credit arrangement could be made available, if political considerations make it advisable to provide the recoilless rifles, though this will of course necessitate a diversion of funds from other FY 1959 requirements.

Recommendations:

1. That we agree to supply the Israelis with 100 of the 350 antitank recoilless rifles and ancillary equipment⁶ under the U.S.–Israel Reimbursable Military Aid Agreement on credit terms customary in these transactions (Tab E).⁷

2. That we inform the Israelis we have no obligations to their buying such of their requirements as may be available from commercial sources. We would agree to license the export of reasonable quantities of such items, which might include half-tracks, trucks and signal equipment.

3. That we inform the Israelis that we are unable to provide the tanks, submarines and guided missiles they have asked us for.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/8–2258. Secret. Drafted by Hamilton on August 15; initialed by Rountree and Dillon; and sent to Dulles through W and S/S. Concurred in by James. M. Wilson, Jr., Reinhardt, and Leffingwell of the Department of Defense. On August 20, 1958, the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs passed responsibilities for relations with African nations to a new Bureau of African Affairs.
2. None of the tabs is attached to the source text. Tab A is printed as Document 29.
3. Tab B was a list of eight items attached to a letter from Eban to Dulles, August 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/8–158) A copy of the list was sent to Tel Aviv in telegram 118, August 5, with a request for the Embassy’s evaluation. (Ibid., 784A.56/8–558) Lawson replied on August 13 that limited sales of defense arms could be justified both politically and militarily. (Ibid., 784A.5/8–1358)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., 784A.56/8–858)
5. Document 32.
6. On the source text, Dillon underscored the word “ancillary” and wrote below: “This includes ammunition CDD.”
7. Tab E has not been identified; presumably it was a copy of the U.S.–Israel Agreement on Mutual Defense Assistance, July 23, 1952. (TIAS 2675; 3 UST (pt. 4) 4985)
8. Dulles initialed his approval of the three recommendations on August 22. On August 26, Rountree informed Eban of the decisions reached on the arms request. At the same time, they discussed Israeli efforts to secure equipment from other governments. (Memorandum of Conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/8–2658) Further discussion on August 26 concerned the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly, Nasser, and the new regime in Iraq. A memorandum of this part of the conversation is ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 60 D 580, Israel–UN Relations.