Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

337. Despatch From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

No. 509

Karachi, December 4, 1958.

REF

• Deptel 1299, December 2, 1958²

SUBJECT

• Progress Report on the Operations Plan for Pakistan and Comments on the Report on South Asia (NSC 5701)

In accordance with the Department’s instructions, I transmit herewith a further progress report on the Operations Plan for Pakistan, and another enclosure with comments and suggestions relating to the Report on South Asia (NSC 5701).³ Our examination was conducted throughout in the light of the recent change in the form of Government in Pakistan.

As I reviewed these documents, I was impressed by the desirability of engaging in some searching thought about basic considerations which underlie the reference NSC papers.

First, I would like to suggest that the Department of Defense conduct a thorough review of its purely military objectives in Pakistan. I can find no indication that such a fundamental strategic reappraisal in connection with the Pakistani military program—at least to the point of restated conclusions—has been conducted since the inception of our present course of action, which was inaugurated with the Aide-Mémoire of October 10, 1954.⁴ It would appear only reasonable to admit the possibility of desirable changes in the light of technological and other military developments which have taken place in the intervening years.

Subsequent to such a strictly military reappraisal, I assume that we would wish to inject political and economic considerations, some of which might be overriding.

As part of the political reappraisal, I would welcome a clarification in our thinking as to our precise objectives in Pakistan. Indeed, the initial general objective contained in the reference material is couched in such general phraseology that, without any change, it remains just as valid after the two coups d’etat of October 1958 as it was before.

In broad terms, and while recognizing the difficulties of reaching U.S. Government-wide agreement on such matters, in view of the many and genuinely interested Government agencies, I would like to see us address ourselves to questions such as these:

• —Is our main objective in Pakistan military and strategic?
• —Is Pakistan’s main value to the United States represented by its airfields with their SAC potential as important constituent parts or the widely dispersed and essential ring of airfields around the USSR, and therefore as important parts of the over-all deterrent to Soviet aggression?
• —For what specific purposes does the United States need Pakistan’s five and one-half divisions constituting the present basis for MAP support?
• —Have we sufficiently considered that these divisions—short of an iron-bound U.S. guarantee against India—would in their great majority remain pinned down along the Indian and Kashmir borders in case of hostilities, be they of a general or of a brush fire nature? (I state this hypothesis as a fact since it is primarily a matter for political rather than military determination.)
• —Are we instead assisting and participating in this ground forces program primarily as a price for the related SAC air base potential?

Or instead

• —Is our main objective in Pakistan political and psychological in essence?
• —Is our underlying purpose the defeat of communism on the subcontinent through insuring its development and viability by non-communist methods?

(Other questions could readily come to mind.)

I ask these questions fully realizing that our purposes are at times the product of complex circumstances and therefore can resist any analysis. Nevertheless, I believe positive answers to such questions, if possible, would greatly assist in further refining our planning and thinking for the years ahead. These answers might also help us to prepare some type of transitional program—if such is deemed advisable—which will prove both politically palatable to the Pakistanis and in harmony with our long-term goals.

If our basic purpose should be military, then our present type of yearly programs would appear to be adequate to perform what would essentially continue to be a holding operation. If, on the other hand, our main purpose is political and psychological, these much longer range objectives can hardly be achieved through our present approach or with present levels of aid. Likewise, it would be vain to address ourselves to such a vast undertaking except on the basis of a “subcontinental approach”, and, if at all possible, with the help of those European allies who, thanks to our enlightened post-war assistance, are now themselves in a position to give some help to others.

I realize that I may be raising more problems than I am solving, but I feel the need, after a year and a half in Karachi, for a reexamination from the ground up of our true objectives and assumptions with reference to Pakistan in particular and, with due regard for my sub-continent colleagues, with reference to the sub-continent as a whole.

James M. Langley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/12–458. Secret.
2. Telegram 1299, also sent to New Delhi, Colombo, and Kabul, requested contributions to the OCB Report on South Asia and any proposed revisions in the OCB Operations Plan. (Ibid., 611.90/12–158)
3. These enclosures, which totaled 32 pages, are not printed. For text of NSC 5701, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. VIII, pp. 29–43.
4. The aide-mémoire was actually dated October 21, 1954; see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XI, Part 2, p. 1869.