Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

338. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, December 16, 1958—5 p.m.

1437. Pass Defense. Reference: Embtel 1404.² Instructions to district engineer, trans-east district, include statement, “Pakistan FY 1959 program currently deferred pending clarification political situation in Pakistan.”

Instructions “request ur (district engineer) recommendations predicated on assumption that FY 59 MAP (except Kharian water) will be deferred altogether or until late this fiscal year.”

This first information Embassy has had of reason 1959 program delayed, and is most disturbing when every political consideration which is valid dictates no further delay in approval. New regime is accomplished fact. New regime has all the way insisted it would and has in fact honored its commitment to US. New regime has effected president-cabinet-secretariat form of government which is working and regime continues to be held in domestic esteem in general.

It is [in] interest US the new regime succeed and restore promised constitutional representative government, even though in limited form. It cannot succeed without continued US dollar aid, both military and economic, this FY. Further deferment approval 1959 MAP program can only be considered by new regime as slap in face which could produce most undesirable results with possible disintegration new regime, producing chaotic conditions bordering on anarchy in Pakistan.

In view current negotiation bilateral agreement in accordance with London declaration BP meeting and tentative ministerial meeting BP in Karachi month hence, refusal US to approve 1959 MAP program even more incomprehensible.

US professions of friendship for new regime meaningless without supporting action.

I am not hereby urging approval complete MAAG recommended 1959 program, but I am once more insisting a 1959 program should be approved immediately. Once more, too, no matter what US does now so belatedly it has already thrown away much of benefit accruing to it in good will.³

Langley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/12–1658. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris for EUCOM, USRO, and Thurston.
2. In telegram 1404, December 11, Langley reported that evidence was increasing that President Ayub and the new regime, especially its military component, was “greatly exercised and disturbed at failure US to approve 1959 MAAG [MAP] program.” He noted that fear was mounting in Pakistan that the U.S. failure to approve the 1959 program constituted a “sign of disapprobation of new regime which belies assurances otherwise given it of US support.” (Ibid., 790D.5/12–1158)
3. Langley called on Foreign Minister Qadir on December 20 and pointed out to him that although the military assistance program had not yet been approved the delay was not due to political reasons. The Ambassador reported that Qadir “welcomed my assurances political considerations not involved.” (Telegram 1474 from Karachi, December 21; ibid., 790D.5–MSP/12–2158)