Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

339. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)¹

Washington, January 7, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Pakistan Military Aid—Request for Further Interim Program Approval FY 1959

Background

Some time ago, at your request, an inter-agency working group was established under State chairmanship to examine the question of military assistance to Pakistan in the light of the imminent completion of deliveries under the 1954 commitment. The working group early determined that it would not evaluate this question except in the context of certain major factors. These included inter alia the adequacy of NSC 5701, the implications of the study of the “Estimated Recurring Maintenance Cost of the Armed Forces of Pakistan” prepared by the Department of Defense costing team,² the deteriorating basic economic situation in Pakistan, re-examination of U.S. military objectives in Pakistan vis-à-vis need for internal security, protection against limited external aggression, participation in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO and India–Pakistan, Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. Additionally, of course, re-evaluation of the basic political situation in Pakistan and United States relations with the new government was necessitated by the October coup.

Much of the analysis of these factors has now been completed though the basic economic analysis is still in process. In the course of its deliberation, the working group has been able to reconcile basic initial differing views. It is now proceeding on a crash basis to complete the study and it is expected that by the middle of January its report will be ready for high level consideration. However, when the final report is submitted and the conclusions reviewed, consideration must be given to its impact upon the work being undertaken by the Draper Committee.³ It would seem desirable to avoid final conclusions, or at the minimum, commitments to the Government of Pakistan which might pre-judge the conclusions of that Committee.

In the meantime, quite understandably, pressures have been building by the Government of Pakistan (which is aware of the reexamination currently underway), and U.S. Embassy Karachi, for approval of the FY 1959 Military Assistance Program. Ambassador Langley feels very strongly that we should move forward at least with interim approval of a portion of the FY 1959 program (Tab A).⁴ The Department of Defense has from the outset proposed a matériel program for FY 1959 at a level of $61 million as MAP chargeable, plus $6.7m. as excess at no charge to program. For FY 1960 the Department of Defense proposals are at approximately the same level and directed essentially to end results equivalent to those of the FY 1959 program. Of the FY 1959 program, $23.7 million, covering the light bomber squadron, have been approved. In addition, Defense has been informally authorized to proceed with certain administration and change order charges in the construction program amounting to $3.2 million. Details of the proposed FY 1959 Pakistan MAP, identifying those items already approved, are set forth in the attached table (Tab B).⁵

Discussion

While all aspects of its examination have not yet been completed by the Working Group, certain basic conclusions have been agreed upon which are pertinent and which in our opinion warrant immediate interim approval of certain major components of the FY 1959 program. Some of these conclusions broadly stated are as follows: (a) the basic elements of NSC 5701, broadly interpreted, still provide adequate policy guidance; (b) United States interest still lies in supporting 5½ divisions in Pakistan; (c) while their economic burden on Pakistan is sizable, it is neither in United States political interest nor Pakistan security interest to attempt to persuade the Pakistan Government to eliminate the 2½ non-MAP supported divisions which Pakistan feels it essential to maintain, but these latter units should not be brought up to the military effectiveness of the MAP supported units; (d) it is neither in the political nor military interest of the United States to permit deterioration of the effectiveness of MAP supported units, and insofar as prevention of such deterioration results in modernization, such modernization should proceed, though improvement of force capabilities should be held within this criterion; (e) it is in United States interest, in the context of Pakistan participation in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, Pakistan relations with its neighbors, and in the light of the domestic program being aggressively undertaken by the new government, that we take no action which would imply a diminution of United States support; (f) these objectives can be achieved within the limits of economic and military assistance presently proposed for FY 1959 and FY 1960, though they entail a recognition of the fundamental premise of NSC 5701 that United States aid support will be required for Pakistan probably for an indefinite period.

In this connection it should be noted that the Government of Pakistan has indicated a strong intention to reexamine and to tighten up its financial position, including reexamination of military expenditures (Tab C).⁶

In light of the above, we feel it important that we not delay further implementation of the FY 1959 MAP and that approval be given for some $31.6m of the remaining 33.4 Department of Defense proposals. In so recommending we are proposing consideration of the program in the following terms:

(a) Approval of all items in the proposed FY 1959 MAP, other than the M47 tanks and the army ammunition storage igloos, approximately: $27.3m.

As will be noted in Tab B, $18.1m of this amount is for Jhellum 1st Corps Cantonment construction of barracks for 10,000 troops. This is a part of the basic five-year construction program discussed with the Pakistan Army for the building of barracks for 25,000 troops. The remaining construction items are further increments of already initiated projects of moderate dimensions. Additionally, the above includes training aids (and ammunition for training), minor amounts of modern electronic communications equipment, seven F–86F and two T–33A aircraft as attrition replacement, and tank transporters.

(b) Approval of provision of 72 M47 tanks and related equipment: $4.3m.

While it might well be concluded that the provision of these tanks represents a modernization of the forces beyond the 1954 commitment, on the other hand, it should be noted that these are essentially replacement items with the effectiveness of the present units deteriorating rapidly and with maintenance costs rising. The Pakistanis have long considered their present tanks as being a deficiency in the armored units we undertook to support. We have already delivered 72 M47 tanks under the FY 1957 Program, and we have assurance from the Embassy and the MAAG that they believe it feasible to insist that the units which the proposed tanks would replace will be scrapped. While adding to armored unit fire-power and effectiveness, the proposed units will replace existing items and will not impose any additional economic burden. Politically we consider it desirable to permit delivery of these units which the present government is aware have been under consideration for some time.

(c) Deferral of construction of 25 ammunition storage igloos: $1.8m.

These were initially pulled forward from the original FY 1960 Program and involve the problem of the extent of ammunition war reserves to be maintained. This item, we believe, should be deferred.

It should be noted that none of the above analysis includes the question of naval units to be supplied within or outside the 1954 commitment and, additionally, does not touch upon other major elements to which the Working Group is giving consideration such as Air Force modernization or the extent of purchases of military items by the GOP and our reaction to this problem. We are recommending moving forward with most of the FY 1959 MAP program on the basis that such action is clearly justified by the current situation and the conclusions to date of the interagency analysis.

Recommendations

It is recommend that you approve:

(a) the implementation of the remainder of the DOD proposed FY 1959 MAP other than the M47 tanks and ammunition storage igloos at a level of approximately $27.32 million.

(b) the implementation of the proposal for the provision of 72 M47 tanks from FY 1959 MAP valued at $4.3 million.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/4–1459. Secret. Drafted by L. Wade Lathram and concurred in by Dennis A. FitzGerald of ICA and Rear Admiral Bergin of DOD/ISA.
2. Not found.
3. On November 24, President Eisenhower appointed a special committee under the chairmanship of William H. Draper, former Under Secretary of the Army, to undertake an analysis of the military assistance aspects of the U.S. Mutual Security Program. A subcommittee of the Draper Committee, headed by George C. McGhee, Director of the Middle East Institute and former Ambassador to Turkey, and Admiral Arthur W. Radford (ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was scheduled to visit Pakistan, February 11–14; see Document 344.
4. Not attached, but reference is to telegram 1404 from Karachi; see footnote 2, supra.
5. Not attached.
6. Not attached, but reference is to telegram 1490 from Karachi, December 23, 1958. (Department of State, Central Files, 890D.00/12–2358)
7. Although Dillon did not initial his approval on the source text, a memorandum of April 14 from Bartlett to Rountree indicates that he did approve these recommendations. (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/4–1459) The Embassy was informed of this decision in telegram 1588 to Karachi, infra.