Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

358. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, June 23, 1959—5 p.m.

2809. Reference: Embtels 2802,² 2804.³ Ayub statement transmitted reference telegram, headlined all Pakistan papers June 23, constitutes prompt, carefully worded response to release congressional testimony on Pakistan military aid program. Pakistan press June 21 carried lengthy Reuters account testimony including statements by General White,⁴ Mr. Dillon and Mr. McElroy. Pakistanis headlined White statement “no better fighters than Pakistanis.” (We note Indian papers headlined same story “Pakistanis urged by US to cut army.”)

Despite favorable Pakistan headlines, Ayub statement appears designed quickly reassure army that he has no intention reduce strength of army as suggested by General White and others in testimony. Ayub emphasizes defense problems of northwest frontier without specifically mentioning Afghanistan or Soviets, but also makes clear that Indian threat a major consideration. At same time skillfully turns tables by pointing out Pakistanis are defending historic subcontinent frontier for India while Indians allegedly concentrating troops on West Pakistan border. Finally Ayub reiterated Pakistan desire for peace with India and claimed Pakistanis forced to maintain defensive forces in view of Indian “aggressive intentions and massive military buildup.” Latter point reinforces Indo-Pakistan “joint defense” concept and provides new ammunition for Aziz Ahmed who we gather pressing this line in Washington.

Apart from specific reaction to criticism, Ayub statement reflects continuing dissatisfaction of regime with what they consider lack of understanding by US leaders their problems and program. This point made very forcefully in Pakistan Times editorial today which in this case probably accurately voices Government reaction in more unrestrained manner than official statement. (Text telegraphed separately, Embtel 2804)

We judge Ayub statement drafted at least in large part by Ayub personally and in any case direct reflection his views. In Embassy view statement well-tailored to domestic needs without appearing bombastic vis-à-vis India. Release congressional testimony, and especially in censored form inviting speculation as to deleted statements, unfortunate at this time. Necessarily truncated version appearing Pakistan press (being pouched) presents US congressional leaders and decision making process in unfortunate light and cannot help but constitute irritation subcontinent relations. Advance copy or summary of released testimony would have permitted Embassy to soften reaction somewhat and place congressional statements in context. If available fuller classified version would be useful to Embassy for background purposes and for possible use with Pakistan leaders. Testimony appearing Pakistan press leads to public conclusion congressional leaders virtually without exception opposed to military aid to Pakistan. Our information indicates this not the case and we will use every opportunity to make this point.

Measure personal affront senior Pakistan officers nature of testimony is following parting comment to me last night by Admiral A. R. Khan who had obviously been annoyed by General White’s reference to Pakistan Navy. “Tommy White says we have a small but efficient navy. We too know it is small. Beyond that I cannot judge.”

Testimony and Ayub reply once again raise question US concept strategic role Pakistan forces vis-à-vis Soviet threat on which we have been seeking clarification several occasions, so far unsuccessfully. (See comments on OCB Paper Embassy despatch 509, December 4, 1958.)⁵

Langley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/6–2359. Confidential. Repeated to New Delhi, Lahore, Kabul, Peshawar, Dacca, and London.
2. Telegram 2802, June 22, transmitted the text of a press statement issued that day at Natniagali by President Ayub. In his statement, Ayub noted: “From press reports on Congressional Committee meetings, one gets impression that there is a feeling in minds of some influential people in United States that Pakistan is keeping forces in excess of its requirements for external defenses in event of a general war. It is stated that five and a half divisions in Pakistan is all that is necessary to meet such a contingency. Such an impression is totally erroneous and based on an incorrect appreciation of military requirement of Pakistan.” (Ibid., 790D.5/6–2259) The Congressional hearings to which Ayub referred were held April 23–May 14 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; they are printed as Mutual Security Act of 1959, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959).
3. Telegram 2804, June 23, transmitted the text of an editorial which appeared that day in the Pakistan Times on U.S.-Pakistani relations, with emphasis on the Congressional hearings. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/6–2359)
4. General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.
5. Document 337.