Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

362. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, July 21, 1959—5 p.m.

177. For Jones from Langley. Re your 158,² adverse political effect of Ganges–Kobadak cumulative over many months and final act of rather abrupt termination by ICA of US participation will not seriously add to the already existing adverse impression. Shoaib has apparently accepted Killen’s decision. However, both he and Ayub will expect the US allocations for defense support and general economic aid to Pakistan to reflect Pakistani burden of Ganges–Kobadak.

Certainly we should not reopen issue. In no case should we involve ourselves in any additional surveys. We should get the pumps and any other committed items into Pakistani hands and close out our connection with project. So long as present regime is in power, controlled press will not attack US decision terminate project unless US economic aid should be sharply reduced.

While US vulnerable attack by East Pakistanis for preponderance US aid in West Pakistan, present regime will suppress any public criticism since US program largely follows government’s own development path.

Accordingly, I recommend we let decision stand but recognize that burden of Ganges–Kobadak likely to figure in future Pakistani requests for aid.³

Langley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 890D.211/7–2159. Confidential; Limited Distribution.
2. In telegram 158, July 17, Lewis Jones requested the Ambassador’s personal assessment of the possible reactions of Ayub and other key Pakistanis to the abandonment of the Ganges–Kobadak project. (Ibid., 890D.211/7–1759)
3. In telegram 219 to Karachi, July 24, the Department indicated that it concurred with the Ambassador’s recommendations that the Ganges–Kobadak issue should not be reopened. (Ibid., 890D.211/7–2159)