Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

363. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 30, 1959¹

Washington, July 30, 1959

SUBJECT

• The Acting Secretary’s Briefing of Ambassador Rountree Prior to the Latter’s Departure for Karachi

PARTICIPANTS

• Department
  • The Acting Secretary, Mr. Dillon
  • Ambassador William M. Rountree
  • U/MSC—Mr. John O. Bell
  • E—Mr. Thomas C. Mann
  • NEA—Mr. G. Lewis Jones
  • NEA—Mr. Donald D. Kennedy
  • SOA—Mr. Frederic P. Bartlett
• Defense
  • Mr. Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs
  • Mr. William M. Leffingwell, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Military Assistance Program
  • Colonel E. V. Sutherland, Assistant for South Asia, Near East, and Africa Region
  • ICA
  • Mr. James W. Riddleberger, Director
  • Mr. Albert E. Farwell, Chief, Near East and South Asia Program Staff

Mr. Rountree opened the meeting by indicating that the most important and immediate problem he would be faced with in his discussions with President Ayub and others upon his arrival in Karachi would be that of American military aid to Pakistan. Mr. Dillon said he realized this and that he had read not only the recent recommendations on this subject of the (State–Defense–ICA) Working Group on future U.S. Military Assistance to Pakistan, but the entire “book” which the group had prepared.² In the first place, we should bear in mind that our aid funds were not unlimited, although perhaps we might get more next year. Mr. Dillon believed that Mr. Rountree could help, when he got to Pakistan, however, by developing a sound rationale to justify Pakistan’s needs for military equipment. This could then form the basis for our next year’s presentation of Pakistan’s case to Congress. He noted that present Congressional criticism of military aid to underdeveloped countries tended to center around Pakistan, but actually affected Congressional attitudes toward military aid programs for other underdeveloped economies. Work on the suggested rationale should, Mr. Dillon recommended, be a major effort of the Embassy in Karachi.

In Mr. Dillon’s opinion, our military aid program for Pakistan was primarily political in character with one important exception, i.e., it had been in the past and could be militarily helpful to us in the future [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Thus, although one could not persuade the Congress that the five Pakistani divisions were directly necessary for the protection of the free world, military aid might be better supported in the Congress on the basis that we wished to retain the confidence of a friendly and effective government [1½ lines of source text not declassified], A second argument sometimes advanced in the past that, since the Pakistanis were good soldiers, there should be more of them in Pakistani divisions, did not seem very valid.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Dillon then turned to the recommendations of the inter-agency Working Group which he reviewed paragraph by paragraph:

1. Completion of 1954 Commitment—Mr. Dillon agreed that we should certainly complete our commitments under the 1954 aide-mémoire. He understood that the light bomber squadron was being taken care of and indicated that he was in favor of giving Pakistan the transport squadron. He believed he would have less difficulty with Congress in connection with such an item than with more exclusively military ones.

Mr. Rountree expressed his appreciation and urged that provision of the transports be divorced from the 1954 aide-mémoire and be considered on its own merits since we did not wish to create another program commitment of the 1954 character. With this the Acting Secretary agreed. Mr. Knight noted that the Pakistan Air Force could go on for a while cannibalizing its Bristols and suggested that we phase in the new transport squadron in 1961 or 1962. It would be made up of C–119’s. These were large but not as big as the C–130’s. Mr. Bell suggested that the squadron might be funded in 1962, while Mr. Rountree argued that he believed the Pakistanis would actually need the planes in 1961 or 1962. Mr. Knight concluded that they might be phased in gradually, i.e., that it was not necessary to provide an entire squadron at one time.

Mr. Dillon then asked why an additional destroyer was needed since this would only add to Pakistan’s maintenance costs. Mr. Knight noted that Pakistan already had eight British destroyers but that the title to one of these was still held by the United Kingdom and this might have caused the confusion in the total number of destroyers needed by Pakistan.

2. Military Construction Program—Mr. Dillon agreed that this should be completed and was happy to have Mr. Bell’s assurance that it would be done with funds already provided out of fiscal year 1959 appropriations.

3. No Increase in Current MAP-Supported Force Objectives—Mr. Dillon stressed that we should certainly not plan for any increase in MAP-supported force objectives for Pakistan.

4. Continuation of Military Aid to Pakistan at Minimum Level Necessary to Prevent Deterioration of Military Capability—Mr. Dillon noted that as long as the Congress maintained its present attitudes towards military aid to Pakistan, we could not expect to obtain support forever for the present level of Pakistan forces. On the other hand, he realized that existing tensions between Pakistan and India made any attempt to secure a reduction at this time in Pakistan’s military capabilities most difficult. Possibly if there were a solid Indus waters settlement and if the settlement were successfully implemented, there might be some chance of reaching in the future a formal agreement between India and Pakistan that they would both at least hold to their present levels of military strength.

Eventually, Mr. Dillon hoped that Pakistan might even be able to cut its MAP-supported divisions to perhaps three or three and a half. On the other hand, he said, Pakistan would certainly wish to maintain the present level of non-MAP-supported forces deployed in East Pakistan, Kashmir and the tribal areas for a much longer time. Instead of trying to cut these forces, we should think first of reducing eventually the MAP-supported units. Although there were some signs that Pakistan-Indian relations were improving, Mr. Rountree questioned whether we could realistically foresee any cut in MAP-supported units for at least the next two to three years. Mr. Dillon explained that what he had in mind was that paragraph 4 of the Group’s recommendations was too “open-ended”. We would certainly have to help maintain the existing divisions for the next two or three years, although without any build-up.

As far as Baghdad Pact force goals were concerned, a subject raised by Mr. Bell, Mr. Dillon said that we were not in any position to recognize such goals if they exceeded the present number of Pakistan divisions. This was one problem which Mr. Rountree would continue to be faced with.

5. Moderating Demands of Pakistan’s Military Program on Its Available Resources by Increased Efficiency—Mr. Dillon had expressed earlier his belief that we should not press for any reduction at the present time in Pakistan’s non-MAP-supported armed forces. As for increasing the efficiency of the military organization’s logistical system, etc., this, Mr. Dillon said, was, of course, highly commendable.

At this point Mr. Rountree said that he wished for the record to express his personal opinion that India in a large measure was maintaining its present forces as a deterrent to Red China rather than only as a counter to the alleged military threat from Pakistan. Mr. Dillon replied that he did not envisage even with reduced India-Pakistan tensions any substantial reduction in Indian forces, but rather a drastic redeployment of them.

6. Annual Budget Review—Mr. Dillon’s comment on this item was “Very much yes!” He thought it an excellent idea and was happy when Mr. Bell explained that the procedure was already in effect.

7. Use by Pakistan of Its Own Limited Foreign Exchange Resources to Support Military Expenditures Not Covered by the MAP Necessarily Reduces Net Availabilities for Economic Development—This was, Mr. Dillon noted, unfortunately correct.

8. Study of Self-Help Actions Which Pakistan Must Take Toward Achieving Self-Generating Economic Growth—Mr. Dillon agreed with this recommendation but noted that it could not be done too quickly. Although the IBRD in a recent report had noted that agriculture in Pakistan was very lightly taxed, Mr. Dillon said that the Pakistan Finance Minister had emphasized that the Pakistan Government could not undertake any drastic tax reforms until the people had adjusted themselves to the recently imposed, substantial land reform program.

9. Reduction in Existing Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions—Mr. Dillon completely agreed with this as an objective for United States action.

10. Time Table for Persuading India and Pakistan to Accept an Arms Limitation—Mr. Dillon agreed that we should consider a more formal type of arms limitations agreement “as soon as possible”. In the case of India we would also like to see an eventual redeployment of its forces, just as mentioned earlier an eventual possible reduction in MAP-supported Pakistan units.

While Mr. Dillon was absent from the room, Mr. Knight noted that Secretary McElroy felt quite strongly that this was not the time to cut non-MAP-supported units. He himself, also, did not believe that we were yet at the stage where we could put Pakistan into the M–14 rifle manufacturing business. It would really be better if we could persuade Pakistan to accept M–1’s of which many were available. He asked Mr. Bell whether the Wah ordnance depot, which the Pakistanis wish to use for manufacture of the M-14’s, could not be used instead for civilian production. Mr. Bell replied that it would be difficult because of the lack of trained people, raw materials and a market. Just producing goods for local consumption would probably not reduce import requirements appreciably but would rather be additive, thus increasing the drain on Pakistan’s foreign exchange for the purchase of raw materials. Reverting to M-14’s, Colonel Sutherland explained that the Department of Defense had recently asked the Department of the Army to review the situation and to present recommendations. Mr. Rountree noted that the Department also was asking Karachi for a country team evaluation of the project.

Other points discussed while Mr. Dillon was present were:

1. DLF Program—Mr. Dillon suggested the desirability of developing a major Pakistan DLF program. In the past we had tended to concentrate this program on agriculture (tube wells, the power to run them, etc.). Perhaps now we should encourage a DLF program which would look to ways to promote industries which in turn might reduce import requirements or even provide export items. As long as we had P.L. 480 wheat to sell, agricultural development alone would not save foreign exchange for Pakistan. One reason why Mr. Dillon felt hopeful that such a new DLF program for Pakistan could be effectively developed was because of the competency and attitudes of the USOM staff in Karachi. Mr. Rountree said that he had had this in his own mind.

2. Talking Paper on Military Aid to Pakistan—Mr. Rountree read aloud the attached talking paper for his discussions on the above subject with Government of Pakistan officials. Mr. Knight’s reaction was that as long as Congress maintained its present attitudes towards military aid to underdeveloped countries, the “modernization” emphasis in the talking paper should be handled very carefully. Mr. Dillon agreed, noting for instance that he did not see much chance for our modernizing the Pakistan Air Force with F–104’s at the present time. Mr. Knight said that perhaps the talking paper could be re-worded to stress the aspect of “maintaining” current capabilities rather than “modernizing” them. Mr. Dillon suggested that Mr. Rountree might himself refrain from raising the modernization issue. This would permit him to handle it, if raised by Pakistan officials, on a case by case basis. Mr. Knight agreed, noting that General Lemnitzer had indicated that first things should come first in modernization and had put on the top of his list better communications.

3. Defense Support for Fiscal Year 1960—Mr. Riddleberger noted that there was a prospect of $80 million in defense support for Pakistan from fiscal year 1960 funds. Mr. Dillon agreed, adding that it might be possible to squeeze out a bit more toward the end of the fiscal year. Mr. Rountree urged that in any event defense support not be cut below $80 million which had been the original, base figure for fiscal year 1959. He wondered when we might be able to talk to the Pakistan Government on defense support availabilities. Mr. Dillon replied that it should be a week or so after the Mutual Security appropriation legislation was signed. Mr. Bell noted, however, that we would have to make an almost immediate partial release of $10 million in defense support because of Pakistan’s import licensing schedule. He did not believe that we could hold up this action, however, until Ambassador Rountree should arrive in Karachi. To this Mr. Rountree agreed.

4. Economic Development Study—Mr. Mann asked if the E area could help in the new study suggested by Mr. Dillon. Mr. Dillon replied that he appreciated the offer, but in the first instance he believed that it would be best to leave it up to the Embassy and the USOM mission in Karachi to make preliminary recommendations.

Attachment

July 29, 1959.

TALKING PAPER FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN OFFICIALS REGARDING MILITARY AID³

1. The U.S. intends to continue to furnish military and economic aid to Pakistan in accordance with our capabilities and world-wide commitments. In doing so, however, we feel certain that the GOP will wish to keep under constant review the question of achieving a proper balance between resources allocated to military purposes and those allocated to economic development.

2. The near fulfillment of our commitment under the 1954 aide-mémoire presents an opportunity both for Pakistan and the U.S. to review the military aid program so as to make it more consistent with the political and economic objectives shared by Pakistan and the U.S. This does not mean that we underestimate the importance of maintaining an adequate military establishment in Pakistan for purposes of internal security and defense against aggression. In recognition of the need to maintain the excellence of the military units in Pakistan which we now support, it is our intention to continue to provide military assistance to Pakistan which will logically include some modernization of equipment. This, however, should proceed in an orderly and gradual manner as a result of natural attrition and take into account absorptive capacity as well as financial limitations.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/7–3059. Secret. Drafted by Bartlett. Assistant Secretary Jones briefed Dillon for this meeting in a memorandum of July 30. (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/7–3059) Jones replaced Rountree as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on July 10. Rountree was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan on June 18; he presented his credentials on August 17.
2. The full report or “book” prepared by the Working Group is not printed; for the Group’s recommendations, see the attachment to Document 359.
3. Secret.