Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

389. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, September 9, 1960—9:16 p.m.

289. Your 465² and 473.³

1. Reftels indicate Souvanna is considering seeking take one or all of following steps in foreign affairs field to buttress his announced policy of neutrality:

a. Accredit Lao Embassy Paris to USSR and Soviet Embassy Bangkok to Laos.

b. Reduce GVN’s representation to Legation level.

c. Reduce GRC’s Consulate to commercial representation.

d. Perhaps establish consular relations with Peiping and/or Hanoi (though it not clear whether he has this move also in mind).

2. We do not believe any such step in real interest of Laos since it would only encourage further bloc demands for broader relations (diplomatic, cultural, economic, and eventually military). Such bloc representation would strengthen organized native NLHX party (against which there is yet no effective counter organization) and thus effect deepening Communist penetration of country. In its exposed position Laos would be hard put to resist such a drift of events.

3. Above is basic argument but following further argumentation may be used in discussing this subject:

a. Accreditation of Soviet Embassy would be first step toward further demands, e.g. request to set up information mission in Vientiane.

b. Once official relations established any change in such relations carries strong political connotation. Furthermore once established it is difficult to terminate bloc representation if RLG should belatedly decide it acting contrary to Laos best interests. Souvanna will remember how tenaciously Poles opposed his request to ICC to leave Laos.

c. Reduction Vietnamese and Chinese levels of representation would not alter Communist plans re Laos, but would be interpreted as unfriendly act by GVN and probably by RTG, neighbors with which Laos has had increasingly cordial and beneficial relations during past few years, as well as by GRC with which RLG has been developing fruitful exchanges.

d. This step would also discourage elements Chinese and Vietnamese communities which look to Taipei and Saigon and encourage elements looking to Peiping and Hanoi, leading to increased Chinese Communist and Vietminh subversion and thereby creating additional internal problems.

e. Effect of such steps would be that Laos would be considered as having moved toward bloc. It is questionable that this new position would satisfy bloc and on contrary might well encourage it to intensify its action toward fixed goal of taking over Laos. In fact it is doubtful that bloc pressures on RLG would diminish until Laos had submitted to bloc directions. Instead of achieving a peaceful middle situation, Laos would be precipitated into midst cold war.

f. Mere continuance GVN and GRC representation cannot legitimately be considered provocative. Even if it were, removal of alleged provocation would quickly lead to a new bloc allegation of provocation and redoubled pressures in attempt to exploit demonstrated softness of RLG to such tactics.

g. In summary we sympathize with Lao aspirations for peace and tranquility which are universally shared. Americans just as much as Lao would like to be free of burden of armaments and threats of conflict. But fact of this age is that organized international movement has set its goal as that of world conquest by whatever means feasible. Only way this movement has been stopped anywhere, any time is by confronting it with situation which it can alter only at risk great loss to itself. Lao should consider matter carefully before changing relations with tried friends in favor of relations with avowed enemies.

h. We of strong opinion that Laos best served by preserving its present international relations, continuing pursue policy bespeaking neutrality, and insuring its independence and territorial integrity through support of its traditional friends and UN. UN presence is in itself most important insurance of world-wide support.

4. If advice does not deter Souvanna from altering RLG’s foreign policy, he might also be warned of dangers of trying to resolve his foreign affairs problems at time when he is engaged in trying reestablish internal unity. Risk he runs is that PL will seek exact larger concessions in foreign field as part price of internal peace. Souvanna should remember that there were no active bloc pressures upon RLG in this field until Kong Le coup and RLG’s own announcements indicated bloc might gain access to Laos while also limiting existing free world ties. We feel Souvanna would be well advised to stall for time and evade bloc proposals which he must now be receiving with significantly increased frequency.

5. Cutting off aid is such blunt instrument that we prefer wait to assess total situation as it develops before making use of this threat.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–660. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Chapman and Parsons and cleared with SEA and John Holdridge of CA. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, Moscow, Taipei, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. See footnote 4, Document 395.
3. Dated September 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–660; included in the microfiche supplement)