390. Editorial Note

On September 9, representatives of the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met to exchange views on Laos. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Merchant briefed the group on the most recent developments in Laos. Assistant Secretary of State Parsons expresed his concern over the effect that the crisis was having in Thailand and South Vietnam. Deputy Director for Central Intelligence General Charles P. Cabell then summarized a message informing Phoumi that it was safe for him to return to Vientiane and that Souvanna Phouma would allow him to bring a battalion of his choosing [Page 836] and place his men in responsible positions in the new government. Cabell stated that this message should come from the Ambassador in Vientiane [less than 1 line of text not declassified]. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Irwin asked if this was not the first official U.S. Government contact with Phoumi. Irwin complained that the United States never supported Phoumi’s requests nor gave him evidence of its sympathies for his cause. Merchant and Parsons contested this statement, citing the transfer of 8 million kip to Phoumi to pay his forces and rice shipments for his troops.

The discussion then turned to how safe it would be for Phoumi to go to Vientiane. Cabell stated that it was the consensus of the U.S. official community in Vientiane that there was a “reasonable expectation of safety.” General Lemnitzer countered that Phoumi was the best judge of his own safety. Asked for his personal assessment of Phoumi, Parsons said that he “had grave doubts that in spite of all his good attributes Phoumi was the man to run Laos.” Merchant concluded the discussion with a summation: only the Pathet Lao would benefit from civil war in Laos. Although Phoumi was the best judge of “whether or not he was walking into a trap,” all believed it was essential that he return to Vientiane. Merchant admitted that should the Pathet Lao join Kong Le, the United States had to back Phoumi “100 per cent.” But for the present, he continued, “a united non-communist front is still our best bet.” (Memorandum of discussion, September 9; Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328; included in the microfiche supplement)