403. Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 21, 19601

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and discussion of subjects unrelated to Laos. The discussion on Laos was part of the item “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in Laos was still confusing and that little progress had been made toward the settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threatening situation in Sam Neua Province, however, had been quieted as a result of the dispatch of Laotian parachute troops to that area. The situation remains troublesome because Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem of the conflicting governments in Laos is no nearer a settlement. The King has requested that General Ouane and General Phoumi call upon him. A skirmish between Phoumi’s forces and Vientiane forces has been reported at Pak Sane,2 but little bloodshed resulted. Apparently, Phoumi has adopted tactics of carrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has been firing across the Mekong River into the city and Phoumi apparently intends to starve out the government. Meanwhile, Sarit is bringing strong pressure against the U.S. to support Phoumi, who is of course strongly anti-Communist but is unlikely to become reconciled with Souvanna Phouma. The King hesitates to take strong action in this situation for fear of losing his crown.

Secretary Dillon said the situation was so confused that we could not continue to let it drift. He believed we must take strong action in the direction of securing a unified government in Laos which would include Phoumi and eliminate Kong Le. Action toward such a government could only be taken by the King. Yesterday our Ambassador in Laos told Souvanna Phouma that we believed his government was inadequate, that the time had come for a national union government which would get rid of Kong Le, and that we wished to consult the King.3 Souvanna Phouma took this démarche reasonably well and [Page 860] arranged for Ambassador Brown to see the King today.4 At the same time we have advised Phoumi that an attack on Vientiane would not be productive and should not be undertaken. We have also authorized a reinforcement of Sam Neua by giving Phoumi equipment and supplies. Mr. Dulles said the problem was to find a single leader who could work out the situation with Phoumi and establish a unified government. Secretary Dillon agreed but added he did not know whether Prince Boun Oum was such a man.

[Here follows discussion of South Vietnam (see volume i, pages 585586) and topics unrelated to Laos.]

Marion W. Boggs
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on September 21.
  2. During the night of September 21–22, Phoumi’s and Kong Le’s troops fought a major engagement 90 miles east of Vientiane. Phoumi’s forces had captured Paksane just a month earlier, but despite their superior numbers, the Phoumists scattered and withdrew after putting up little resistance against Kong Le’s troops, ([document number not declassified], September 22; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, International Series, Laos Situation Reports)
  3. Reported in telegram 579 from Vientiane, September 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2160; included in the microfiche supplement)
  4. See telegram 593, infra.