Office of the Historian

402. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, September 19, 1960—5 p.m.

562. For Secretary Parsons. For SteevesFE. From Ambassador. Reference: Deptel 320.2 Greatly appreciate your 320 and personal message of Sept 18 through other channels.3

My 5494 should be read with 5485 and 554.6 I was trying get needed supplies Sam Neua, if possible, without getting into political problems. For moment have succeeded, but will act through Phoumi channel for future needs in regions he controls. To clear record, have secured Souvanna’s approval such action (Embtel 556).7 This particularly to protect our position with UN, British, French and Indians, whose criticism, unless forestalled, could harm US interests. Have advised Addis and telling Falaize today.

Leaflets dropped by plane were not signed by Vongvichit. I don’t know where that report came from. They were leaflets prepared by Souvanna to explain his govt not Communist (Embtel 531)8 and were dropped with consent Phoumi regional commander after he had read them. Vongvichit is reported to have sent own message ordering PL cease fighting (Embtel 548, para 8). This part of Souvanna’s general plan appeal PL stop fighting. Vongvichit is Souphanouvong’s liaison with Vientiane.

I fully agree your views necessity Phoumi role in govt machinery (para 4 your 320) and have been pressing effort get him back in govt in every way possible as you know.

I do not question Phoumi’s anti-Communism, his ability, nor his known friendship for the US. I do have doubts about his judgment and to some extent his sincerity, hence his ultimate effectiveness. On the latter point, for example, he refuses help for his troops fighting against PL because it comes from Vientiane. He has not hesitated to take action resulting in division of FAL. Is this putting anti-Communism or personal interest first? On the former, his tactics have consistently [Page 858] served to build up rather than reduce the power and influence of Kong Le and consequently of those more hostile to US who are seeking to use him for their own purposes.

I think Souvanna too is anti-Communist and not anti-US. I think he has learned since 1957. I agree that with Souvanna in the saddle we will have lots of problems but I think we would with Phoumi also. I do not think we can say authoritatively now that Souvanna’s policies will inevitably lose Laos to Communism, nor that Phoumi’s will save Laos from Communism. I think, as you said in your 171,9 that US will still have enormous influence and it is up to us to use it wisely.

As bearing on my less skeptical attitude towards Souvanna, I think one cause possible misunderstanding is different reading extent significance factors of opinion culminating in Kong Le revolt. I am inclined give this more weight than Washington appears consider justified. I don’t like it any more than you do. But I must give you my judgment, for what it is worth, as to what the facts are.

Since events since receipt your 31610 have not given any further evidence effective Souvanna control, perhaps contrary, and we unwilling, for reasons I respect, to take steps which might enable him obtain it, I am of course prepared carry out wholeheartedly plan proposed 316. This involves perhaps more risks than would immediately appear. Hence my 555,11 since I want to be sure Washington has all facts as I see them before making major decision.

Machinery is all laid on, however, carry out 316 within deadline set if you so decide.

Thanks again for your messages and exposition your thinking. You may be sure that doubts expressed or arguments advanced before decisions are taken will in no way affect vigor with which instructions will be carried out.

Brown
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1960. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.↩
  2. Document 400.↩
  3. Not found.↩
  4. See footnote 2, Document 400.↩
  5. Telegram 548, September 17, requested a 48-hour postponement before providing direct U.S. support to the FAL through Phoumi. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1760; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  6. See footnote 5, Document 399.↩
  7. See footnote 4, supra.↩
  8. Telegram 531, September 14, summarized these leaflets which were apparently based on a commentary in the Lao Presse entitled, “Souvanna Government is not and will never be Communist.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1460)↩
  9. Printed as telegram 172 to Bangkok, Document 364.↩
  10. Document 398.↩
  11. Document 399.↩