Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

132. Memorandum From the JCS Chairman’s Special Assistant (Goodpaster) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)⁰

Washington, April 20, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Major Military Issues in Basic National Security Policy

1. Attached is the document that I believe should be distributed for the discussions between the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on basic national security policy. The document consists of three parts:

a. A brief covering memorandum explaining the procedures used in developing the material.

b. A summary of the six major issues.

c. A three-column (State, JCS, OSD/ISA) tabulation of the issues as extracted from the appropriate draft BNSP documents.¹

2. With your concurrence I will have the document circulated to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A. J. Goodpaster

²
Major General, USA

Attachment³

Washington, April 20, 1963.

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE⁴

SUBJECT

• Major Military Issues in Basic National Security Policy

1. Attached are six major issues with military implications extracted from various draft BNSP documents. In three columns are shown the view of:

a. The State Department (from their 2 August 1962 draft of BNSP);⁵

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (from the 7 December 1962 JCS comments on the State Department draft BNSP);⁶ and

c. OSD/ISA (from the 25 March 1963 ISA revision of the State Department draft, taking into consideration the JCS comments of December 1962).⁷

Covering the detailed views is a brief summation of the State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and OSD/ISA positions on these issues. The Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared the materials in coordination with OSD/ISA.

2. The issues in the attachments cover selected major divergencies in the present draft versions of the BNSP. Other points of issue would undoubtedly arise in the consideration of any complete document.

3. This memorandum and its attachments will be used as the basis for discussion of basic policy issues at the forthcoming meeting of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be scheduled when the Chairman returns.⁸

Attachment⁹

DRAFT

SELECTED ISSUES IN BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Summary

Attachment 1: Strategic Retaliatory Forces

Neither the State Department nor OSD/ISA believe a first strike against substantially all Soviet nuclear delivery systems appears practical; hence, they do not think it desirable as a policy directive, and would not increase strategic forces for attainment of this goal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, believe a first strike capability is both feasible and desirable, both for deterrence and to lessen the probability of defeat should general war occur. They recognize that the degree of success will depend upon US force levels and on US reaction to changing Soviet capabilities.

Attachment 2: General Purpose Forces

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would give essential non-nuclear and nuclear requirements equal priority, emphasize the dual capability of these forces, and thus would not attempt to have general purpose forces large enough to defeat a major Soviet conventional assault with conventional forces only. Rather, they would have Allied forces equipped with tactical nuclear weapons for deterrence and for use if necessary. The State Department would give priority to conventional forces build-up, and would defer on a doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons pending completion of studies on the subject. The State Department would not now plan to defeat a major Soviet assault with conventional weapons but would set this as a desirable goal in the future.OSD/ISA agrees with State on giving priority to conventional forces and the limited value of tactical nuclear weapons. ISA would establish interim conventional force goals at the MC 26/4 level.

Attachment 3: NATO Policy

The divergent views on the role and size of conventional and tactical nuclear forces outlined in the issue above on General Purpose forces are highlighted again in the NATO section. The State Department and OSD/ISA believe the Soviet conventional threat in Europe is somewhat less than do the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the State Department and OSD/ISA would have the US adopt as basic policy endorsement of a sea based, multilateral mix-manned MRBM for NATO. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while recognizing the national decision on this point, would not write the decision in the basic policy document because of the evolving nature of this problem.

Attachment 4: Arms Control and Disarmament

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that arms control agreements should include all major powers. OSD/ISA and the State Department believe in partial agreements. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would link arms control and disarmament agreements, and their implementation, more explicitly to military security implications, the possible consequences of Soviet sudden abrogation, and our treaty commitments than would either OSD/ISA or the State Department. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would thus move more cautiously in this field.

Attachment 5: Communist China

The State Department and OSD/ISA would adopt a “two China” policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose adoption of such a policy without a thorough analysis of its implications.

Attachment 6: Research and Development

The State Department and OSD/ISA advocate that the US seek a selective superiority in military technology, with especial emphasis on conventional weapons. Neither would stress military space research. OSD/ISA would recognize the need to increase the means to reduce damage to the US in general war but emphasizes the difficulties attendant to, and the questionable value of, current AICBM programs and other advanced research programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would have the US seek across-the-board military technological superiority.

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, BNSP. Top Secret. Attached to a covering note from Major Smith to Nitze.
1. Not found attached.
2. Printed from a copy that indicates Goodpaster signed the original.
3. Top Secret.
4. In his memoirs, Nitze wrote that he sent a “memorandum” summarizing six issues to McNamara “in the spring of 1963 and asked him to resolve them. He refused and sent it back with the comment that he didn’t believe there was anything to be gained by the formulation of such a document. He suggested that a reading of the President’s and his (McNamara’s) public statements was sufficient to delineate our national security policy.” (Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 252)
5. See the source note, Document 93.
6. Document 119.
7. Not printed. Copies are in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Drafts, and ibid., S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Basic National Security Policy.
8. Concerning a meeting between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs on this issue, see Document 136.
9. Top Secret.