133. Editorial Note

In a memorandum to Secretary McNamara dated July 15, 1963, President Kennedy wrote that he was “tremendously impressed with the Special Forces Unit in West Germany. However, I am wondering if we are making the best use of this unit?” Kennedy believed that it was a “wasted effort” to keep this unit “where prospects of guerilla action are very slight.” Instead “they could be demonstrating and training all over the underdeveloped world where the guerilla actions are rising in intensity.” A July 24 memorandum from Taylor to Kennedy noted that some of the six existing Special Forces Units were already operating along the lines suggested by Kennedy. One in Panama had “dispatched Spanish speaking mobile training teams” to nine Central and South American countries, and detachments from the one in Okinawa had conducted demonstrations or counterinsurgency training in six Asian countries. Taylor concluded that “it would appear that the worldwide program for the employment of Army Special Forces is generally consistent with the desires which you have expressed in your memorandum of July 15,” but that it was “probable more can be done and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will keep under review the adequacy and employment of the Army Special Forces as well as Air Force Commando and Navy Units.”

On July 26, Kennedy sent a memorandum to Rusk stating that he had “been very much impressed by the appearance and demeanor of the special forces I have seen and believe that their presence in other countries can project a U.S. image which will be a very useful political influence. To do so it is important that the size of the cadres be sufficiently large to have an impact. Since the judgment of our Ambassadors in the countries concerned will be dominant in both the decision to introduce the forces and the decision as to their size, I believe that you should send a letter to those Ambassadors in countries where the forces are likely to be employed, calling attention to the importance of these points.”

(On March 8, 1962, [Page 485] circular airgram CA-2108, sent to all diplomatic posts, had described U.S. Special Warfare capabilities, and invited addressees to comment “on desirability and political feasibility utilizing these US capabilities to supplement functions of present MAAG/Missions or (where no MAAG/Mission exists) Embassy.”)

Circular airgram CA-1507, August 5, drafted jointly in G/PM and OSD and approved by U. Alexis Johnson, was sent to a large number of Latin American, Near Eastern, African, and Asian posts. It stated that the President had “directed that appropriate Country Teams examine the possibility of increased use of U.S. Military Mobile Training Teams (MMTs) which have proved so successful in many areas of the world in preventing and combating subversive insurgency.” Additional suggestions by Ambassadors for such training were “invited where applicable and practicable” and where requested by the host government.

In a memorandum for the record dated September 3, Clifton noted that the President had said that CA-1507 “would not get anyone steamed up. It is not a sales job, and he feels it is really a very routine response to what he really wants to do.” He “wants a real sales job on why it is going to be so helpful to them, what a good face forces can put on our nation, and how inspiring they are.” Clifton suggested that a White House staffer “draft the kind of message that should be sent to the Ambassador and then sell it to State and Defense to send, or else the President might send it.” (All these memoranda and cables are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Special Warfare Volume II 1962-1963)

Circular airgram CA-5661, dated December 2 and addressed to the same posts as CA-1507, was drafted jointly in S/S and the JCS and cleared throughout the government, including Michael Forrestal at the NSC. It opened by quoting much of Kennedy’s July 26 memorandum to Rusk, continued with a detailed description of special warfare units of all the services, and directed all action addressees to comment by January 15, 1964, on the potential appropriateness, with host government approval, of these units for demonstrations, training, or civic action in their countries. (Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 458, SG(CI) General 1963)