Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 12, 1962, 4:39 p.m.

Re: USUN’s 1208 Oct. 11.² For Stevenson from Secretary.

1. As of today Tshombe has taken certain initial steps before even being consulted about Constitution or seeing a copy of draft Constitution. Case can plausibly be made that Tshombe’s performance on Reconciliation Plan now slightly ahead of Adoula’s, since Adoula has not surfaced a constitution.

2. There is therefore no basis for invoking the tougher measures in “Course of Action” paper. Situation might change again rapidly, and we await McGhee’s evaluation latest Gardiner talks with Tshombe. But CAC meets in New York today, and we must operate on how it looks today.

3. Disruptive or inflammatory statements coming out of Congo Advisory Committee meeting this afternoon, just before Constitution is to be considered by Adoula and provincial Presidents in Léopoldville next week, might seriously jeopardize honest attempts pursue negotiated solution along lines U Thant Reconciliation Plan.

4. Request you strongly discourage SYG from presenting course of action paper and Reconciliation Plan to CAC, which we understand from telecon he contemplating. Leave to your discretion which arguments may be most convincing, but following points may prove useful:

(a) Publication course of action undesirable since pressures described in phase two were related to failure Tshombe reply within 10 days to UN upon presentation plan. At time presentation to Tshombe pressures were not outlined in such stark terms as phrased in paper. UN proposal also envisaged Adoula presenting draft constitution to parliament by Sept. 30. Moreover, Tshombe acceptance of plan in principle and Oct 11 promises (E’ville 587)³ have already changed frame of reference for application pressures. Positions of states supporting pressures or measures outlined by SYG August 20 in that context now not clear. This particularly true for Belgium, whose backing is crucial for success economic sanctions. Should note Spaak’s willingness invoke economic measures, or press UMHK, conditioned on satisfactory constitutional negotiations and GOC fiscal legislation, which are still far from complete.

(b) Publication course of action without consultations powers most involved in application likely freeze SYG’s position and prejudice his ability obtain support for economic measures or for other forms of economic measures such as plan divert UMHK tax payments to GOC, that not contained in course of action paper.

You might suggest that while appreciating pressures on him, we believe presentation to CAC should be oral. However, if he feels he must table any document, it should be reconciliation plan but no course action.

5. We fear that, coming on heels of SYG report re Katangan buildup,⁴ pressures for radical action in CAC will develop unless Thant damps them down. Believe you should tell Thant U.S. considers no purpose served by depreciating limited Tshombe response to date; on contrary important to exploit actions and promises by Tshombe in effort to induce more relevant steps. Tshombe’s agreement to partial implementation of UN plan prior to constitutional discussion appears sufficient permit SYG describe it as limited program in right direction. In addition, Adoula willingness to submit draft constitution to provincial presidents next week and invite their comments means progress being made on that side.

6. Thus, we strongly hope Thant, who is key to avoiding unacceptable moves by radicals in CAC or in SC, will use these developments to buy time and forestall pressures for action which could undo what has been accomplished thus far.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–1162. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Cleveland and cleared by Williams and Burdett. Pouched to USUN and repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, London, Paris, and Elisabethville. Telegram 1243 from USUN, October 12, refers to this as a “draft telegram dictated from Cleveland’s office.” (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1262)
2. Telegram 1208 reported a conversation that afternoon between Yost and Bunche. (Ibid.)
3. Reference should be to telegram 586; see footnote 3, Document 312.
4. Reference is to an October 8 report from Gardiner to Thant. (U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.12)
5. Telegram 1243 from USUN (see the source note above) reported that Stevenson had covered the points in the message with Bunche, who promised to report the U.S. comments to Thant but did not hold out hope that the latter would withhold the Plan and Course of Action. Thant did release them to the Advisory Committee on the Congo when he met with it that afternoon.