Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

314. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, October 15, 1962, noon.

916. Department also pass information White House. For Secretary and Under Secretary from McGhee. For Ambassador from McGhee. For Stevenson from McGhee. I have been increasingly concerned with possibility Adoula would appear to be falling behind Tshombe in carrying out of plan. If Tshombe actually agrees to standstill, oath taking, token payment, opening of Lubilash Bridge and telecommunications, some response from Adoula would appear necessary to create atmosphere which would facilitate agreement on remainder of plan, most of which still lies ahead. Forward movement Adoula’s part also necessary create favorable world opinion, particularly in US, Belgium and in UN, which will make it possible obtain necessary support for Adoula if plan fails and stronger measures must be considered.

Following up meeting with President Kasavubu reported Embtel 893² and in anticipation agreement on cease-fire between GOC and GOK representatives in Elisabethville as advised Elisabethville’s 619 to Department,³ paper prepared to give to Adoula as suggested statement he might make if and when standstill and oathtaking agreed. This document sent separately (Embtel 915).⁴

Adoula opened conversation by expressing skepticism UN’s intentions. UN appears want to withdraw from responsibility for carrying out plan and leave it to him to negotiate with Tshombe which he has said he would never do again. Apparently not well informed about events in Elisabethville, Adoula expressed strong reservation proposed standstill agreement, if location applicable only to north Katanga he would not sign agreement which would give Tshombe freedom of movement while pinning him down. He also insisted it be made clear that UN had freedom of movement to carry out mandate in area. He indicated that proposal had been drafted by Consuls which was improper. It should be UN document.

Adoula summarized for us what his instructions had been to his delegation with respect to cease-fire: 1. Cease-fire (arret du mouvement) should apply to whole of Katanga, north and south. 2. There should be stipulated freedom of movement for UN whole of Katanga. UN had no problem in north Katanga controlled by ANC; it was not free to move in south Katanga. 3. UN resolutions are to be strictly applied. He singled out half of purchases of arms and munitions abroad as well as recruitment mercenaries. At present, he claimed, GOC practically prevented from buying arms. He was prepared see UN resolutions applied to all of Congo. 4. Both sides would agree to give every facility to UN in its movements and in applying resolutions.

I attempted persuade Adoula that carrying out plan through voluntary action by both sides necessarily involved some negotiations between GOC and GOK on details implementation. UN could not do it all for him. I attempted minimize importance standstill agreement pointing out that military commission would in theory be coming up within short time with plan for total integration of forces, importance of which was so great it would overrun provisions of standstill agreement. Perhaps we had all allowed ourselves be so diverted by negotiations for standstill that we had allowed it impede progress toward integration in military commission which was much more important. Consuls had not attempted interpose their judgment into standstill negotiations but had only, on request, assisted in formulation views expressed by GOC and GOK. Adoula expressed skepticism about Tshombe’s agreeing to any integration of forces and said he did not in meantime intend to be trapped.

We raised with Adoula question of amnesty pointing out that, on face of it, this was one of the things which central government had in plan promised do and there appeared to be no particular reason why it should not have been done. GOC delay played into hands of Tshombe who had already made his suggestions re amnesty. If GOC delayed or appeared to link issuance of amnesty with other aspects of plan this would justify similar tactics on Tshombe’s part.

Adoula responded that Cabinet was meeting tomorrow with President in connection his name day celebration and hoped President would be able issue amnesty at end of meeting. It was simple matter. Draft had already been formulated. However, it would not, as Tshombe had suggested, apply to common crimes and would be applicable only to Katanga. They had arrested no one for political crimes in Léopoldville, for example. I urged him consult with Gardiner before final formulation amnesty so Tshombe’s views could be taken into account to maximum extent possible. Tshombe had demanded it be agreed with him.

In discussing preparations to be made in connection opening Lubilash Bridge, Adoula said this was matter for central government and not Tshombe; however he wished cooperate and Minister of Transport and Communications would be present at ceremony. He indicated preparations would be made for receiving copper shipment and for return shipments. I asked Adoula if he would personally invite Tshombe be present at meeting of provincial presidents to consider Constitution scheduled October 16. He said he planned telephone him tomorrow (now that telecommunications are open) and, at our suggestion, agreed to make fact public.

I raised with Adoula point made by Department in Deptel 582⁵ as to position his government would take with respect to substance of Constitution, point out desirability attributing it to UN experts. Dissociation his government would permit Constitution be freely considered and changed by normal means in Parliament. He said this was precisely what government proposed to do. Constitution had been drafted by UN experts and everyone should be free criticize it including government.

When we gave Adoula proposed declaration he appeared distressed at idea saying not enough progress had been made to justify such a statement, that he had been induced to do so in the past only to his embarrassment when nothing materialized, that he did not at this stage want get into business of exchanging written broadsides with Tshombe which could only result in transferring discussion to these texts and starting new series of false hares.

He reacted to reference to north Katanga, rather than to all of Katanga. He did not like reference to fact that commissions were going to decide Tshombe’s ability to pay, although I indicated this had already been discussed in commission and provision in plan with regard foreign exchange payments referred only to minimum of 50 percent which could be raised. He strongly rejected inference (not intended by us) that until new constitution adopted Loi Fondamentale did not apply. He did, in the end, indicate he would consider idea of such a communique if and when matters it referred to had been agreed.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–1562. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Brussels and USUN.
2. Telegram 893 from Léopoldville, October 12, reported that, in his meeting that day with Kasavubu, McGhee had emphasized the need to meet Tshombe half way whenever he gave concrete evidence of willingness to cooperate. He urged the Congolese Government to promulgate an amnesty law, reopen air communications and telecommunications with Elisabethville, see that the Congolese negotiators on the commissions at Elisabethville expedite the commissions’ work in every way possible, give serious consideration to Tshombe’s proposal to make deposits in London and Léopoldville against foreign exchange earnings and tax receipts, and consider the draft constitution as subject to change in Parliament. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1262)
3. Dated October 14. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1462)
4. Dated October 15. (Ibid., 770G.5/10–1562)
5. Telegram 582 to Léopoldville, October 11, expressed concern about the draft constitution, which the Department thought was too complex and inflexible to meet the conflicting needs of the Katanga situation, where some autonomy was essential, and Adoula’s political needs and the needs of the other provinces. It recommended persuading Adoula not to identify himself with the current draft but to present it to provincial presidents strictly as a draft prepared by U.N. expert. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1162)