202. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0
SUBJECT
- West New Guinea
I don’t know whether, following our conversation yesterday,1 you had a chance to talk with Alexis Johnson and indicate to him our view that the President should have an opportunity to participate in any decision relating to how we finally play out the West New Guinea issue at the UN.
[Page 456]I. The Situation
I am unable to follow this issue on an hour-by-hour basis as is necessary at this stage in order to be fully informed of its status. However, it seems increasingly obvious that neither the Dutch resolution nor our counter-proposal offers the basis of agreement between the Dutch and the Indonesians at this session of the General Assembly. The Dutch seem absolutely determined to ensure that Indonesia does not get West New Guinea and the Indonesians appear unwilling to compromise because of their apparent belief that they have a blocking third against the Dutch resolution and their view that time is on their side.
USUN in a telegram of November 112 outlined four possible courses of action:(a) support the Dutch resolution; (b) abstain on the Dutch resolution; (c) float a resolution calling for simple UN inquiry along the lines of proposals we advanced last summer; or (d) float or sponsor a resolution along lines we have recently been trying out on Dutch and Indos with some changes. USUN recommended course (d). The Department instead made the changes, which were designed to satisfy some of the Indonesian objections, and tried the new draft out on the Indos. The reaction was negative. The Indonesians indicated that they hoped we would abstain in the vote on the Dutch resolution and that, unless we can accept their idea that Indonesia should be the sole administrator of the territory for the UN under our proposed draft (an idea which we have been unwilling to accept), that we drop our efforts altogether. Indonesia would rather face the Dutch alone than the Dutch with the UN behind it. The Department has not yet sent a new instruction to New York in response to its outline of the alternatives.
It is clear that the hour of decision on our position on West New Guinea is close at hand. The Dutch are pressing us hard to come out in support of their resolution or, at least, of the principles embodied in it. The Australian Ambassador is going to see the Secretary of State today, presumably with the same message; possibly also to recommend that we now surface our draft resolution.
One danger that is beginning to cause some concern is the possibility that, if the Dutch are defeated on their resolution, they may introduce the draft that we have been floating. If this should occur we would be placed in a terribly difficult position. On the one hand, it would be difficult for us to vote against a resolution that we have ourselves drafted. But to vote for the resolution would not accomplish the objective for which it was advanced and would seriously antagonize the Indonesians. It is hard to believe that the Dutch would put us in this position, but Luns feels so strongly on this issue that I would not rule out the possibility.
[Page 457]II. Recommendations
If you have informed Alexis Johnson of our view that the President ought to participate in the decision on the position we should finally take, I would like to know so that I can also pass the word to the FE Bureau.
I have stated many times why I do not think that we can afford to be in a position of opposition to the Indonesians. In the immediate situation we must, it seems to me, abstain in the vote on the Dutch resolution. We should not float our own resolution and, if it appears that the Dutch might do so, we should use all possible pressure to dissuade them. We can argue, as we have been arguing with the Dutch, that our draft was advanced only for the purpose of attempting to find a middle ground which might be the basis for agreement. Now that it is apparent that the Indonesians will not accept the resolution with the amendments which the Dutch desire, we do not believe that it should be introduced.
If we had been telling the Dutch what we consider to be wrong with their resolution rather than simply telling them that it represented “an advance”, our position would be much less subject to misunderstanding than it now is. Even now we should indicate frankly to the Dutch why we cannot support their resolution.
It would be preferable if we could be in a position of voting for the Indonesians. I can think of only one kind of resolution on which we might just possibly be able to vote with them now. That would be a resolution like those that the Indos have sponsored in the past recommending bilateral talks between themselves and the Dutch. In the past we have abstained on such votes. The Indonesians continue to be interested in bilateral talks, but I do not know whether they would now favor a UN resolution on the subject. If the net result of all of the UN activity is no resolution, I think we ought to urge the Dutch privately to undertake such bilateral talks.
I have the feeling that it may be time for another memorandum for the President which would outline the alternatives. It will be difficult to provide him one that will be up to date on the tactical situation, but perhaps that could be treated in general terms. If he is going to have any influence on the decision he will have to get into the act very soon.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 11/1/61–11/15/61. Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Schlesinger, and Komer.↩
- No other record of this conversation has been found.↩
- Telegram 1600; see footnote 1, Document 201.↩