203. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0
SUBJECT
- West New Guinea
As I have indicated to you, the Secretary of State has decided to float our draft resolution on West New Guinea despite Indonesian opposition.1 The draft, as it now stands, is attached. The Secretary presumably was unaware of any possible Presidential interest.
We have informed the Dutch and the Australians of our plans. We have indicated that we will actively support our draft resolution though we have not decided whether we will be one of the sponsors.
From an objective point of view it can be argued, as we have argued, that this resolution would offer real possibilities to the Indonesians if they attempt to make use of it to accomplish their purposes. One of the key questions will be the membership of the proposed UN Commission. If the Indos attempted to get friendly nations represented on it, they might be able to obtain recommendations favorable to themselves.
However, from the Indonesian point of view we have now entered the lists against them. They do not favor this resolution and will probably strongly oppose it. There is a fair chance that they may have a blocking third against the resolution just as they apparently have against the Dutch resolution. (They claim to have forty votes lined up against the latter and the Dutch seem to have grown quite pessimistic about its prospects.)
Thus, the end result of all of the months of work has been to put us in a worse position vis-á-vis the Indonesians on this issue than we have ever been in the past. In the past we have at least not actively opposed them in the UN.
We are almost certain to be in for rough days ahead with the Indonesians. At a minimum, our bilateral relations will suffer severely. I would consider it very doubtful, for example, that we will now get a favorable decision on the Pope case; the most we can probably expect will be further delay. In combination with what will be to the Indonesians a very [Page 459] disappointing economic aid program, our decision on West New Guinea will quite probably increase Indonesian reliance on the Bloc for aid. We will also have to be very careful to keep our heads and avoid reacting to what may be some unpleasant Indonesian statements and actions in a way that will simply accentuate the process of deterioration.
I also believe that, unless the Indonesians radically alter their attitudes toward the possibilities that a UN commission may offer to them, the pressures in Indonesia for a military attack will mount. Surely our action will hurt the efforts by moderates like Nasution to restrain the extremists. The Indonesians might also decide that, if our resolution passes, they must speed up the military timetable in order to insure that they have control before a UN commission has time to report, or even to begin its work. In the event of such an attack, our sponsorship of the UN resolution will accentuate our problem. It would be very difficult indeed for us to do anything but support a Dutch effort to secure UN action against the Indonesians. As I indicated recently, the Indonesian financial position seems very serious. An attack on West New Guinea could create a disastrous situation within Indonesia.
Perhaps all of this is too pessimistic. Admittedly, it will be some time before we can be really certain how it will all come out. The two best possible outcomes would be defeat of our resolution or a change in the Indonesian attitude toward it. No one can be certain what the prospects may be for the first of these possibilities. A defeat would not leave our relationship unaffected and would not eliminate the possibility that the Indonesians would decide that a military solution is now the best out, but it would leave us in a position where, over a period of some considerable time, we might be able to do a reasonably satisfactory repair job. An Indonesian change in attitude seems highly unlikely; rationality has never characterized attitudes on either side of this question.
As soon as we have an idea as to how this is going to come out, we will need to decide what we should do to attempt to make the best of a bad situation. For example, we will need to take a very hard look at what we should do to help the Indonesians deal with their impending financial crisis and whether we plan to get more serious about economic development than AID proposes. Work on these problems can begin now. If we could move quickly on the economic front, we could develop an Indonesian interest in avoiding a bad upset in our relations. On the other hand, they may reject U.S. offers if they see it as an attempt to buy them off on WNG. If we are going to be increasingly sensitive to continuing or expanding aid to countries that do not pursue a correct policy line, it is not going to be easy for us to opt for increased aid.
In conclusion, I believe that it was very unfortunate that the Secretary did not talk to the President about the policy issues involved. State’s [Page 460] lack of a clear view of how it wanted this one to come out has caused us to change from honest broker to advocate on the wrong side.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 11/16/61–11/20/61. Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Schlesinger, and Komer.↩
- Secretary Rusk approved the recommendation in Document 201.↩