235. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia0
922. Eyes only for Attorney General from Secretary. Embtel 1448.1FYI After careful discussion with the President we have concluded that line reported your 14452 is about as far as we can prudently and honorably go prior to Indonesian-Dutch talks under U Thant auspices. I do not believe we should give Indonesians assurances which, if known to Dutch, would cause latter to refuse enter negotiations or withdraw from them. Must anticipate that Indos will leak anything you say to them to their advantage. Apart question our integrity in dealing with many governments involved in similar international disputes, Indos would be in position to exploit such assurances without regard to effect on us and our reputation and in the event negotiations failed they could and probably would maintain we had betrayed them.
Moreover, believe it important that Indonesians be given no basis for attributing any statement to you which might prejudice goodwill effect of your subsequent visit to the Hague.
I am convinced Dutch are ready to enter talks with no preconditions and with readiness accept wide open agenda. I am also convinced that Dutch will make major effort to find peaceful settlement because they know that they will not sustain major or protracted military operation [Page 531] for defense West New Guinea. However, they must have opportunity to adjust their position in the course of negotiations when actually faced with choice between additional compromises or military action. Dutch will not and cannot be asked to promise in advance of negotiations that Indonesian view will prevail. Their formula self-determination is already in part a means for retreating from West New Guinea. It is our view that negotiations will either constitute or present additional face-saving formulas before this question is settled.
If we were to give the Indonesians our assurance that the outcome of negotiations with the Dutch would be the transfer of administration of West New Guinea in a manner satisfactory to the Indonesians, we would be putting ourselves in the position of assuming entire responsibility for the solution of the West New Guinea problem. Solution of problem of administration could occur in a variety of ways employing a number of different methods. It would be impractical for us to commit ourselves to Indonesia that we would support in the course of negotiations what in effect would be their concept of the best way in which a transfer might take place. For example, Indonesia would prefer a direct and unequivocal transfer. However, use of the UN as an interim administrative agency might have many advantages for both sides.
Possibilities now exist for talks to be held between Dutch and Indos without preconditions by either side, and with the assurance that no aspect of the problem, including transfer of administration to Indonesia, will be barred from discussion. Appointment van Roijen as negotiator suggests that Dutch prepared enter negotiations in spirit of flexibility, and looking for possibilities mutually acceptable solution. We believe, as van Roijen has repeatedly told us, that chances for agreement are good once talks have started, and you have conveyed our opinion to the Indos. We should not go further than this. Effect of acceding to Indo request for our assurance as to outcome of talks would be to permit them to say publicly that they are entering negotiations without preconditions, while they would, in fact, have transferred the onus to our shoulders.
Much as we wish to see issue settled peacefully and rapidly, our agreeing to Indo request would only involve us in assuming open-ended obligation in which we might well be unable deliver. At the same time, in urging that talks be begun, it is implicit that our interest also extends to seeing them concluded successfully.
This is a point you made to Sukarno (reported your 1445). In your conversation on Sunday you may therefore wish to say that if negotiations are undertaken we will use our influence with both sides in the hope that a successful resolution can be achieved—and that in making this statement we are of course aware of the views and positions of both sides.
[Page 532]Re third paragraph your 1445, in order avoid any possible misunderstanding or misquotation later, believe you should take view that while we think negotiation would improve Indos position, Sukarno must understand that our whole object is, of course, to avoid resort to force.
Sukarno has long been attempting mobilize maximum pressures on US regarding West New Guinea while making minimum investment on his part in good US-Indonesian relations. There has been lack of reciprocity in his attitude. Pope case only one instance. During most recent UNGA, on 23 votes where we and Soviets differed, Indonesia voted with Soviets 19 times and with US four times. On Monday same day you arrived Djakarta Indonesians made most disagreeable and unhelpful speech at UN on Cuba.
I congratulate you on your able appeal for Pope. If this appeal does not yield a concrete result, I suggest that you say this to Sukarno at the end of your visit: This question has now been discussed with him both by the President and the Attorney General. The President has raised the problem not as a trading matter but on a personal basis with Sukarno and you have reemphasized the President’s personal concern. You and the President still hope that this will produce a positive result, and will be deeply disappointed if it does not. But in any event you regard the matter as closed and the President does not propose to discuss it further with Sukarno.
At this particular stage of difficult relations, it is immensely useful that you are able to visit Sukarno and to make clear in so direct and personal a way that his natural desire squeeze utmost from his bargaining position is approaching diminishing returns and that our helpfulness to Indonesia’s future on broad front depends on his adopting statesmanlike moderation now.
From your 1445 it is clear that you have made real contribution to advancement of West New Guinea problem. If as a result of your efforts the Indonesians can have been brought nearer the conference table this will be a major diplomatic achievement. End FYI.
Text letter from President follows in separate message.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–1462. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rusk and Ball; cleared by Tyler, Cleveland, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Ball who initialed for Rusk. Repeated to The Hague and USUN.↩
- Document 232.↩
- Document 231.↩
- Telegram 921 to Djakarta, February 15; see footnote 2, Document 232.↩