132. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
SOUTH VIETNAM: AN APPRAISAL OF CURRENT POLITICAL DYNAMICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS
Summary
Under goading political pressures by the Buddhist leadership, dominated by Tri Quang, the military government in South Vietnam has been forced unwillingly into commitments and actions which, at this reading, seem destined to produce a new constitution and civilian government, certainly within a yearʼs time. These political pressures, spawned in an environment of heightened armed conflict and effective Viet Cong political agitation, have created new tensions and fragilities in the Vietnamese military establishment. The clear Communist content of the propaganda lines used by the Struggle Groups in the I Corps area symptomize the continuing gravity of the turmoil there, in spite of a seeming easing of tensions there in recent weeks. General Dinhʼs command and leadership have brought about this superficial easing, but have not yet dominated the more fundamentally divisive forces at work in the area. His own objectives and motivations remain unclear as well.
Odds would seem to favor the military establishmentʼs observing their present political commitments and going along with the constituent assembly and the subsequent formation of a civil government. Real risk remains, however, that military elements, not yet coalesced, may unite in action against suspect Buddhist motives. This risk is increased if a civil government begins to move toward a neutralist position of disengagement.
The other religious sects and groupings appear at this time to have no decisive political impact. The contest is essentially one between the military establishment and the Tri Quang hierarchy. It appears that the U.S. does not have any significant leverage at its disposal in this contest. The imperative factors now at work in the social structure of Vietnam are deeply indigenous in their character and roots. If a Buddhist-dominated civil government emerges, and does not provoke military reaction by moving to the left we may indeed witness the forging of a new and intrinsically [Page 378] more natural Vietnamese national character, a development which could strengthen the national fabric in our joint endeavor. If a new government does move to the left, additional and greater political convulsions can be expected.
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- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive/Registry, Job 80–B01676R, V–1, Vietnam 1966 (May-Dec.). Secret. Forwarded to Rostow by Helms on May 10 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Here is the study you requested.” Copies were sent to Taylor, Rusk, McNamara, and Komer under covering memoranda indicating that Rostow had asked that the copies be provided in preparation for the NSC meeting on May 10. (Ibid.)↩