Office of the Historian

133. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, May 10, 1966, 3:45 p.m.

THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF BOMBING POL

The Situation

Secretary Rusk believes that our launching of POL attacks in the North will greatly heighten international tensions. Although this is debatable (Gen. Taylor, for example, disagrees), the Secretary is probably correct if for no other reason than the Communists will, at the minimum, pull out their propaganda stops on a worldwide basis.

Some of us believe systematic oil attacks could have a major effect on the military and economic position of North Vietnam. Although this is also debatable, it is a contingency worth taking into account.

Taken together we may, therefore, be in a position where we:

a)
need a softening political-diplomatic track to reduce the noise level;
b)
have a better chance than ever before of inducing a serious negotiation with Hanoi.

There is a third element: U.S. domestic politics.

The polls show that something more than 30% of our people want a tougher policy: about the same percentage want a harder try for peace.

Bombing POL will look like an Administration move to the hard side—giving in to the JCS, etc.

We need something new on the dove side to balance our account.

[Page 379]

Recommendations

Taking all these elements into account, here are the elements we need for a political-diplomatic scenario.

1.
A first-class television briefing by Secretary McNamara on:
a)
the Laos logistical build-up;
b)
the location of targets and low expected civilian casualties.
2.
Secretary McNamara and I believe you should override the inhibitions of the intelligence people and permit publication of the communications net controlling operations in the South from Hanoi. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
3.
A lucid statement of what the Geneva Accords of 1962 said about transitting Laos by Secretary Rusk.
4.
Prior notification of the U.K., Australia, Korea, and New Zealand of our intentions and the reasons for them.
5.
A Pen-Pal note to Kosygin of the kind I drafted.2
6.
Possibly a similar communication to the Chinese Communists indicating our intentions remain limited.
7.
Possibly an open offer along the lines which Myrdal evolved from my prodding:3 to stop bombing the North if infiltration stops and stoppage is effectively monitored—perhaps by the Swedes; plus a parley of the four fighting elements to bring this about as a preliminary to more general peace talks. Any formula for talking with the VC—even on a limited military basis—would be complex to arrange in Saigon; but it would also have a political wallop at home and abroad. I like the commitment to enter into talks because some infiltration is not via Laos but through Cambodia and even (a little) over the 17th Parallel. It only really makes sense to stop the bombing in the North if the war is going to stop. We need to hinge our commitment on a general intent of the four fighting parties to stop the killing.
8.
Although we shall have to return to the key oil targets after repair and mop-up smaller ones—including some underground storage—we would do better, I think, to hit the major ones hard in a short space of time—for political as well as military reasons—rather than space them out.

P.S. I have started some more detailed work on a political scenario in my shop; but you may wish to ask Secretary Rusk for his suggestions.

Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.↩
  2. Not further identified.↩
  3. On May 8 Rostow forwarded to the President a memorandum of his conversation with Gunnar Myrdal on May 6, during which the two men discussed Myrdalʼs ideas about how to end the war in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII)↩