Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

142. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 19, 1966, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Current Political Crisis in Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

• Bui Diem, GVN Deputy Foreign Minister
• Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador
• William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
• Robert H. Miller, Director, FE/VN

Bui Diem opened the conversation with a long apologia for the recent GVN action against Da Nang and with an assessment of future prospects which overplayed the positive and underplayed the negative. Bui Diem minimized the threat of civil war between I Corps and the GVN, but recognized that finding a political solution would take some time. He said the GVN had shown its good will in respecting the date set by the National Political Congress for elections and by cooperating in the preparations for those elections. He said that the election law drafting committee had worked reasonably well for two weeks and in fact better than the GVN had expected. The GVN felt that the committeeʼs conclusions so far were reasonable and that if it continued in this fashion the GVN could accept the committeeʼs conclusions without change. Diem emphasized that the GVN was not trying to delay elections and that Thieu and Ky recognized that elections must be carried out as promised.

However, Bui Diem stated the GVN was faced with the problem of how to carry out the elections when its authority was not respected in I Corps. Diem pointed out that the GVN had to take into account not only the militant Buddhistsʼ views but also the views of Catholic elements and of young military officers who are getting impatient with the militant Buddhists. Diem noted that many elements were displeased that the GVN had agreed to proceed with the elections and that these elements were very concerned at developments in Central Viet-Nam. In view of this situation, General Dinh had been taking too long to restore the GVNʼs authority in I Corps; the 11th Ranger battalion had asked for GVN assistance in restoring the Central governmentʼs authority in Da Nang; and the GVN had no choice but to back the 11th Rangers even though it was well aware of the risks involved. At the same time, Bui Diem said, Ky had asked the election law drafting committee to finish its work by the end of the month, while the militant Buddhist representatives were trying to influence the committee to stop its work.

Bui Diem emphasized repeatedly that the GVN intended to keep its promise to hold elections and its intention to deal with the I Corps problem as a local military problem. He emphasized also that a lack of confidence had unfortunately been created between the government and the militant Buddhists. He cited Kyʼs remarks to the press in Cantho, and observed that one issue undermining confidence between the government and the struggle forces was the question of whether or not the constituent assembly would be transformed into a legislative assembly. The GVN says that it is too soon to decide this issue, and the Buddhists use this position to charge the GVN with being insincere.

Diem said that the GVN still felt that it had handled the situation correctly, that the Directorate and military establishment generally were still basically unified and that the problem in I Corps was created by a small group of 20 to 25 officers close to General Thi who had gone too far and could not pull back from an extreme position.

Mr. Bundy expressed the belief that the situation was more serious than as described by Bui Diem. He cited several explosive elements in the situation, in particular the GVN siege of the main pagoda in Da Nang. Mr. Bundy noted that we had already expressed to the GVN our concern that we had not been consulted or informed in advance of the GVNʼs plan to move against Da Nang. He stressed that we understood the GVNʼs dilemma in agreeing to elections and working for their realization without being able to guarantee its authority of I Corps, but said that we could not understand why the GVN chose to move against Da Nang when the election law drafting committee was working well in Saigon and might have resolved these problems itself.

Bui Diem explained that, from a military point of view, the GVN was dragged into the affair in Da Nang by the actions of some younger officers. According to Diem, the GVN had planned to replace the marine battalion in Quang Ngai with one from Saigon but that the latter was diverted to Da Nang when the GVN learned that the 11th Rangers, probably at Col. Loanʼs instigation, was plotting to move to re-establish GVN authority in Da Nang. Bui Diem said that the GVN had no choice but to back the Rangers at the last minute and that this was why Ambassador Porter was informed of the operation so late on Sunday morning.

In response to Mr. Bundyʼs query, Bui Diem pointed out that Col. Loan had been furious when he was not allowed to crush the struggle movement with the three marine battalions in the earlier crisis. Diem also claimed that the battalion commanders themselves reacted very emotionally when they were held back from occupying Da Nang. He claimed that in a ceremony the commanders mingled their blood, drank it, and swore that they would return to Da Nang. Bui Diem noted that Ky had to take this kind of thinking and acting into account.

Mr. Bundy asked what ideas Ky and Diem had to resolve the present situation and to make progress toward elections. He pointed out that, although the elections drafting committee was still carrying on its deliberations, it would be immensely difficult to arrive at conclusions on some of the difficult election issues unless arrangements were made in some fashion for Tri Quangʼs representatives to participate.

Diem said that Ky did not plan to reoccupy Hue and that he was only trying to establish a position in Da Nang which would permit him to bargain with Hue. In response to Mr. Bundyʼs question, Bui Diem said that in resolving the political problem Ky would have to deal solely with Tri Quang in Hue and Thien Minh in Saigon. (Diem did not mention General Thi at all.) Diem said that contacts with these leaders had not been completely broken. For example, he said, the day before he had left Saigon Thien Minh had asked Tam Giac to see Ky. Ky, who had for some time refused to see Minh, said that he would be willing to see Minh at this time. Diem dined with Tam Giac and told him that it was up to him to get Thien Minh to talk to Ky. Tam Giac promised to do so. (Bui Diem left Saigon before any such meeting materialized.) In this connection, Bui Diem noted that U.S. influence could act as a catalyst to get the different sides together since the U.S. presence had to be taken into account by all sides, both by elements which accepted U.S. influence and by those which did not like to accept it.

At the end of the conversation Mr. Unger noted that U.S. officials would like to discuss the serious economic situation with Bui Diem and that it would be discussed with him later that evening.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. Diem agreed that, in response to press queries, it would be noted that Diemʼs trip had been long planned and that it was both for the purpose of visiting Vietnamese Embassies abroad and for discussing Vietnamese problems with foreign governments such as the U.S., and that the current situation in Viet-Nam made it even more important that the trip be carried out.

1. Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 70 D 102, POL 7, Bui Diem Visit. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Miller and cleared by Unger. A memorandum of Bui Diemʼs conversation with Rostow on May 20 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII.