143. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)1
CJCS 2837–66. 1. I believe that both of you should have my reading of the effect here in the United States of the continuing political turmoil and backing and filling of the several contending parties in RVN. We have had adverse reactions here in the past arising from the numerous political imbroglios in that country; however, in my judgment, the effect of the present situation on the public and in the press and in the Congress (both of the latter in this instance reflecting early and muted public opinion) is far more adverse than heretofore. There are a number of reasons for this but the principal reasons, I think, are the facts that we have committed a quarter of a million men to combat in South Vietnam; the prestige of the United States is at stake; and U.S. casualties are mounting. I note that, for the third successive week, our casualties have exceeded those of Vietnamese forces. Rightly or wrongly, this latter fact is taken by the American people as proof positive of assertions continuously made by those in opposition to our Vietnamese policy that United States forces [Page 395] are fighting the war against VC/NVA forces while the South Vietnamese, whose freedom and country are at stake, squabble pettily among themselves to achieve political advantage.
2. To illustrate my point, I made an Armed Forces Day address yesterday in Houston, Texas, to an overflow luncheon audience of the Houston Rotary Club and the Military Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of Houston. As you would expect, the audience and the local press rather unanimously support an American policy of strength and opposition to Communist initiatives. Nevertheless, I was impressed during my conversations with civic leaders and during the following press conference by the dissatisfaction and uneasiness of all as to our future in Vietnam. For example, I was questioned sharply as to whether, in view of the Vietnam situation, we were reducing or would cease our deployments to RVN. To widen the field a bit, Senator Javits yesterday expressed the view that we should stand down our military efforts in both North and South Vietnam. In brief, he advocated that we should stop our air campaign against North Vietnam and should, in agreement with the GVN, instruct our ground combat forces to desist offensive operations and fight only to defend themselves against attack. The demerits of Senator Javitsʼ proposal from the military point of view are so obvious that I will not discuss it further. You should be aware, however, that, as farfetched as this proposal to abandon the initiative to the enemy may seem to us in the military, it will have a distinct appeal to all flocks of doves and, even more importantly, to the relatives of our men in South Vietnam whose lives are at risk. The rationale of this latter group (for whom I have much sympathy) will be why should my son or brother or husband be killed fighting against the VC/NVA while the South Vietnamese whose country and freedom are at stake engage themselves in political bickering to the detriment of the effort against the enemy.
3. As I read the cables from Embassy Saigon and from Headquarters MACV reporting upon the actions, the statements and the proposals of the two sides, I get two distinct impressions: (a) all parties to the controversy appear to be convinced that the United States is so firmly hooked in Vietnam that nothing they do, or any circumstance arising therefrom, will cause us to disengage from our commitments; and (b) both parties to the confrontation are acting in bad faith, are cemented in fixed positions which they will not undertake to modify by compromise and that the GVN, at least, is proceeding without having a clear-cut objective in mind.
4. A further item in this devilʼs stew is Colonel Loan who, if the cables are reasonably correct, is a continuing troublemaker. I note that at last he has departed the Da Nang area for Saigon; based on the past, I wonder how long he will remain absent from the scene. Moreover, I recall that in response to an earlier query from me, you stated that the Directorate continued to be a cohesive body. Do you judge that cohesiveness [Page 396] continues? I note that General Thi at first agreed to, and has now backed out of, a meeting with General Ky at Chu Lai for reasons which at best seem specious. I note also the public statements of General Dinh calling for the ouster of Thieu and Ky. Does this reflect personal outrage or political conviction?
5. I really do not expect that either of you have answers to the questions I have posed or any reassurance of the early resolution of this mess. My purpose in addressing you is to convey my own deep distress and concern that the lives, the resources, and the political capital we have expended in our effort to preserve South Vietnam as a part of the free world approach the point of having been in vain. Very frankly, I am greatly worried, the more so because in all logic one cannot expect the American people to suffer indefinitely the continuation of this truly sickening situation.
6. As you know, I am usually pretty much of an optimist; but always, I hope, on the realistic side. This time, however, I think I can feel the first gusts of the whirlwind generated by the wind sown by the Vietnamese. Westy, I know that you will exert to the full your influence to set things once more on a proper course. If any of the above views will be of use to you, you have my full permission to use them as and how you think best. Even so, even if we get some semblance of solidarity and common purpose among the contending factions, we must all recognize that we have lost irretrievably and for all time some of the support which until now we have received from the American people. In other words, regardless of what happens of a favorable nature, many people will never again believe that the effort and the sacrifices are worthwhile. Warm regards.2
- Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp.↩
- In telegram MAC 4070, May 22, Westmoreland responded that he believed the situation in Vietnam had been “blown out of perspective” by the press. While it was “serious,” it was “not desperate,” and the GVN seemed “to be making positive headway in restoring government authority in the I Corps area.” In a telegram transmitted to Wheeler at 0929Z on May 23, Sharp concurred with Westmorelandʼs assessment. (Ibid.)↩