Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, August 20, 1965.

524. Ref: Embtel 2920, Apr 5, 1965.² Vietnam and Soviet American Relations II.

1. In reftel’s analysis we stated Soviet Govt had clearly decided apply “freeze” to Sov-American relations as result Vietnam, specifically:

A) To take no new initiatives themselves and to accept none from American side;

B) To allow presently arranged exchanges to continue but accept no extensions or additions; and

C) To avoid or at least play down, both direct negotiations with United States and negotiations in which two countries are main protagonists.

2. This Soviet decision has given us a rugged six months, during which Embassy’s activities could best be described as “holding action” designed to keep as much as possible going, to minimize long term damage, but at same time not to compromise US policies. Following are typical features this period:

A) Continued anti-American campaigns in press and other media, including mass meetings.

B) Attacks on Vietnam policy by Soviet leadership even at official invitational receptions has obliged me depart one such and avoid others.

C) Refusal to invite or permit me to speak on Soviet TV on July 4 as I did last year.

D) Foot-dragging across the board on implementation of ex-change programs, which despite endless prodding on our part have fallen seriously behind schedule. Architectural exhibits in Leningrad and Minsk got off to successful start only because we forced Soviet hand all the way, by such methods as sending word in advance to local authorities I would open personally and sending them copy speeches I proposed to make. In both cases hesitations were obvious but they finally came through correctly, albeit reluctantly, after much checking with Moscow. In case of track meet in Kiev, in which such advance effort not made, I got cold-shoulder from local authorities.

3. I believe we are now seeing first steps in the implementation by the Soviet Govt of a harder policy toward the US. This tougher line undoubtedly represents Soviet Govt’s considered reaction to worsening of the war in Vietnam and more specifically to President Johnson’s July 28 decision to raise the ante there.³ It also marks an abrupt shift away from posture which Soviets were taking as late as seven weeks ago when Gromyko, for example, was encouraging us to believe that Soviet Govt wished to pursue closer bilateral relations and that it was only US which was stopping progress.

This new line is beginning to be evident in number of ways:⁴

A) One of the most striking is Soviet decision to violate our exchange agreement by canceling space and hand tool reciprocal exhibits originally agreed for later this year. This and other evidence of new and sharply negative attitude on exchange is reported in Embtel 503.⁵ These developments on exchanges are, in fact, bunched together in such a way as to suggest that they result from single decision probably taken at end of last week to call off exchanges already contracted. These developments also may mean that Soviets will not be willing to enter into negotiations at this time about new exchange agreement on expiration of present agreement December 31, 1965.

B) New line is also reflected—although less strikingly so—in some of statements now appearing in Soviet press. Given importance of President’s July 28 decision, initial Soviet reaction to it was notably restrained but a more strident note is now being heard in Soviet commentaries and Shelepin’s speech in North Korea was very tough indeed. It will also be recalled that Pravda, in its authoritative foreign policy review on Aug 8, again implied inevitability of deterioration US–USSR relations in its reiteration of past warnings that “USSR cannot agree with approach some circles in West who hope coexist with Soviet Union and simultaneously pursue aggressive course toward Socialist countries. …” This was clear echo in public of what Kosygin had told Gov. Harriman and me in private on July 21 when he said: “… Vietnam issue cannot help but have its reflection on all these (bilateral) matters. This is inevitable as the situation hamstrings us, and you as well, all along the line.”⁶

C) There have been other recent straws in the wind such as Foreign Ministry’s refusal to permit Pillsbury visit to Sevastopol or Yalta in reciprocity for Soviet ship visit already made to Honolulu, slightly tougher travel control policy, increasing difficulties with Soviet customs, and apparently freer hand being given KGB operations against Embassy (Embtels 158 and 339).⁷ I should emphasize that some of these events by themselves are not particularly significant (life being what it always is in Moscow) and some or all may be unrelated to any top-level policy decision.

4. I still believe that Soviet Govt will find it in its own best interest to keep deterioration of its relations with US within carefully defined limits. All evidence available to me continues to suggest that Soviet Govt is proceeding with great caution to avoid direct confrontation with US in Vietnam. Indeed, it may be precisely the unwillingness of Soviet Govt to react in kind to our military moves in Vietnam that forces it, in sense of frustration, to turn to exchanges and bilateral relations as only form of retaliation which still provides it with “self respect” of punishing us for our actions. This posture is all the more important to them as long as they continue to vie, as they are doing now, with Peking for dominance among the militant Communist groups of Asia.

Nevertheless, trend which I believe we are now seeing will make it progressively more unlikely that Soviets will allow themselves to be seen holding hands with US in public. This will probably mean, for example, the Supreme Soviet will not now ratify consular convention even if US Senate ratifies,⁸ that exchanges will be whittled down to bare bones program, and that we can generally expect refusal of any proposal which would link US and USSR in cooperative action before public eye. It will also necessarily have further negative implications for such multilateral issues as disarmament.

5. At same time I do not believe that we should allow sharpening of Soviet attitude to move us from our present policy of seeking improvement in Soviet-US relations wherever this may be possible, and to make it clear for all that any deterioration in our relations proceeds from their actions and not ours. This is certainly policy but designed to keep our relations below boiling point in uneasy days ahead, and will make it easier for both sides eventually to resume more favorable course in our relations.

Dept please pouch to interested posts.

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. The telegram bears no time of transmission, but it was received in the Department of State at 8:01 a.m. on August 20. A notation on another copy of this telegram indicates that President Johnson saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. X) The cable was also summarized for the President in the items for his evening reading on August 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164)
2. Document 105.
3. For text of the President’s press conference on July 28 at which he announced that he was raising to 125,000 the number of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 794–803.
4. See Document 115.
5. Dated August 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, EDX US–USSR)
6. See Document 119.
7. Telegram 158, July 17, reported that the KGB had detained and attempted to recruit a member of the Embassy staff on July 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 9 US) Telegram 339, August 2, summarized a series of harassments of the Embassy. (Ibid., POL 17–6 US–USSR)
8. Responding to this statement by Kohler, the President called Ball on August 23 and told him to tell Fulbright “that the cable shows it was unlikely that they would act, and in light of things we should let sleeping dogs lie.” Half an hour later Ball told Fulbright about the cable and said that he “felt for the moment we ought to let it alone; let it go until January and then get another reaction from Moscow.” Fulbright “agreed this was the best judgment.” Memoranda of the two telephone conversations, dated August 23, are in the Johnson Library, Ball Papers, USSR II.