106. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
325. From Acheson for Ball. We must begin prepare for last act of Geneva. Mediator plans to leave August 7 for Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, Athens, returning Geneva August 20, a veritable phantom Finn. Believes [Page 224] he should then urge on SYG that he (Tuomioja) make his final report if I am still stuck in mud. He will tell Greeks during visit to Athens his report will stress no change in present status Cyprus toward full independence and beyond is possible under UN Charter except by unanimous agreement signatories present treaties. Hence, if they want enosis now offered on silver platter they must pay comparatively small price to get Turkish agreement.
Believe we too should begin to make terminal noises, stating that if next round of talks produces no progress I shall go home to report and have no personal intention of returning. USG’s future course not up to me.
Should like to give to Nikolareisis as personal opinion that under existing pressures and Makarios’ present policies Turkish physical reaction inevitable, that I have urged restraint and will continue to do so, though knowing that advice is useless; furthermore, Turkish attitude quite understandable. Finally, that if USG asks, as it has done in past, my opinion on what our action should be in event Turkish move, I should give Lincoln’s advice to Stanton (in view of Far East situation) “one war at a time.” We are deeply involved on many fronts and Greeks and Turks are not only people with domestic political problems. Whether through UN or otherwise I would be against US military involvement in Cyprus.
Would also say to Greeks that if, as Nikolareisis suggested, move directly to enosis after understanding reached with Turks is contemplated, danger of popular upheaval Turkey could be overcome by announcement that Turkish forces would shortly arrive not as enemies but by prior agreement and to aid in orderly transition of Turkish Cypriots to enosis. They would thus transform greatest hazard in path of enosis to important asset. It also might even work, and help Inonu as suggested mytel 315.2
To Turks I would say that they know our advice that Cyprus not worth a war; we still believe that. But we would neither attempt to stop any military action by them, nor rescue them from the consequences of their action if any occurred. They would be entirely on their own.
To both I would say that, in UN, US would reenforce the Mediator’s view that changes in status can only be recognized if accomplished by legal means.
So much for terminal noises.
Problem in reaching agreement lies primarily in Athens and primarily there with Papandreou. He has not made one attempt toward the agreement he could have and which would give him nine-tenths of all he hoped for. I cannot reach him because Nikolareisis is not wired for [Page 225] sound. Harry has got to get into the act with a baseball bat and make him see that he is risking everything by taking 100 percent negative attitude and not making one constructive suggestion. Specifically we want to get here some one with power at home authorized to work out a long-term lease of the peninsula—or any other place—without any more nagging restrictions than the British have and under some sort of organization like Canada-US Joint Defense Board. If no Greek can come here perhaps Harry ought to fly up secretly in military aircraft for talk with me and return to be a relaying station in Athens. God only knows what N says I say.
Impossible for Ray to do anything unless a Greek first comes here bearing a small gift or rather small downpayment on a rare bargain.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Nodis-TAG. Received at 2:14 p.m. and repeated to Ankara and Athens.↩
- Document 103.↩