Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

391. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 25, 1966, 5:05-6:39 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Yemen

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Anwar al-Sadat, President of the U.A.R. National Assembly
• His Excellency Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the U.A.R.
• His Excellency Ahmad Hassan al-Feqi, Under Secretary of the U.A.R. Foreign Ministry
• The Secretary
• NEA—Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary
• NE—Michael Sterner, Escort Officer

The Secretary said that since seeing Sadat last, he had had a chance to talk to the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, and get his views on the Yemen situation. After hearing both the U.A.R. and Saudi views, the Secretary felt there were no major obstacles to settlement. He would like to encourage the thought that with a little more work on the part of both of these great countries the gap between them could be narrowed.

Mr. Sadat hoped the Secretary’s optimism would prove to be well founded. Since the Jidda agreement, the U.A.R.’s objective in Yemen was to evacuate its troops from the country completely. Now, in view of King Faisal’s ambiguous attitude, the U.A.R. might be forced to change this objective. Faisal kept saying he wanted a settlement in Yemen, but his acts were beginning to point to another conclusion, and it was the acts that counted, not the words.

The Secretary hoped the Saudi reply, which should have been received in Cairo by then, would be constructive. Mr. Sadat said this raised another question. Suppose the latest Saudi response turned out to be more of the same—sugared words but no constructive action underneath—what should the U.A.R. do?

The Secretary said he had the impression from his recent conversations with both sides that the gap was not so great as might seem. It did not appear to be one which further discussion had no hope of bridging. The Secretary said he would like to make two comments, both against the background of our relations with the U.S.S.R. The fewer things that were said about the other side publicly with sharp edges on them the better. Secondly, he strongly urged that a decision not be made too quickly that further discussion was pointless. For one thing, the alternatives to discussion were not too pleasant. The Secretary felt diplomacy had a duty to be persistent.

Mr. Sadat agreed with the last statement. Before coming on this trip he had met with President Nasser on Yemen and they had agreed the U.A.R. would give Saudi Arabia another two months, from the date that they informed the U.S.G., before deciding on a “change of strategy” in Yemen.²

The Secretary said the U.S. would continue its friendly interest in a settlement but we didn’t feel we could play a role that could substitute for direct contact between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Sadat said he knew this was U.S. policy, but he wished the U.S.G. would give further consideration to playing a helpful role. The U.A.R. saw the need to compromise but it could not abandon the field empty handed. The Saudis seemed now to want the complete extinction of the Yemeni Republic and the total discrediting of the U.A.R. for having supported it. This the U.A.R. would never accept. Aside from the blood and treasure the U.A.R. had expended in Yemen, there was the consideration that the Yemeni Republic had been recognized by the U.N. and most of the nations in the world.

The Secretary emphasized that internationally the U.S. had a great interest in seeing peace maintained between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. We also wanted to see a government in Yemen that was acceptable to the Yemenis themselves. The Secretary promised the U.S. would continue to follow the situation and if there were things the U.S. might do to help matters along, we would give them consideration.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Sterner on February 28 and approved in S on March 28. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
2. Ambassador Kamel later told Ambassador Hare that this statement was not intended to be an ultimatum. He said the intention of the Speaker was to say that the U.A.R.G. had decided to wait at least another two months before reviewing the situation to see whether a change of strategy was required. [Footnote in the source text.]