Office of the Historian

392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sudan1

Washington, March 8, 1966, 6:59 p.m.

305. Cairo tel 2267 to Dept (being rptd Khartoum).2 Yemen.

1.
Khouli’s report (reftel) of Nasser response to Faisal message on Yemen gives hope real progress. Important we urge Faisal not lose opportunity presented or allow slackening in momentum.
2.
For Khartoum:3 Please deliver urgently following oral message from Secretary to Faisal:
a.
Hassan Sabri al-Khouli has informed us of Nasser’s March 5 response to King’s recent message on Yemen. (Summarize gist of message as in reftel.)
b.
As emphasized both to Prince Sultan and Anwar Sadat in recent visits Washington, we believe Jidda Agreement still affords best approach for peaceful solution Yemen conflict and hope way can be found move forward toward peace on that basis. We understand from UAR that present Nasser response supplied in spirit of advice given here to Sadat to keep dialogue going.
c.
Nasser’s present message appears open way by which King, through prompt statesmanlike act, can achieve immediate goal of bringing start to UAR troop evacuation Yemen which, once begun, could be carried through by end September. King’s longer range goal of limiting Communist influence Yemen will be enhanced by bringing closer time when Yemen can be reunified and governed by all-Yemeni government giving Yemenis opportunity for realization legitimate desires develop in peace, dignity and freedom. Only under latter conditions can real halt to Communist penetration be expected.
d.
Realize that questions ratio republican and royalist participation in transitional government and future of Hamid al-Din family not completely resolved but should be negotiable.
e.
Present proposal contains possibility of solution with honor for both King and President Nasser. Doubt strongly that any settlement feasible in which honor and dignity do not accrue both sides.
f.
Renewed expression my personal respects and deep friendship accompanies this urgent plea to Your Majesty that you give careful consideration to this further opportunity achieve peace in Yemen.4
3.

For Jidda:

Request you pass foregoing to Saqqaf for his possible parallel transmission to King.

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Symmes, Davies, Officer in Charge of Sudanese Affairs Robert W. Stookey, and Hare; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Jidda and repeated to Taiz and Cairo.↩
  2. In telegram 2267 from Cairo, March 7, Battle reported that Al-Khouli had informed him that Nasser met with Saudi Ambassador Ali Reza on March 5 to receive Faisal’s long-delayed reply to his proposals for a new agreement on Yemen. The King asked for withdrawal by September 25 and an interim government with a 50/50 ratio of republicans and royalists, and said that he would consider banishing the Hamid al-Dins once withdrawal was complete. Nasser responded that the United Arab Republic was not prepared to withdraw its proposal for an all-Yemeni interim government with a 2-to-1 ratio of republicans to royalists. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Faisal was in Khartoum preceding the Arab Prime Ministers’ Conference, March 14-17.↩
  4. In telegram 636 from Khartoum, March 13, Ambassador William H. Weathersby reported that Faisal had expressed appreciation for the Secretary’s message and his interest in a peaceful settlement in Yemen. Faisal told him that he had instructed Ali Reza to reply to Nasser that a 2-to-1 ratio of republicans to royalists was impossible; Nasser would have to live up to the Jidda Agreement for 50-50. Weathersby said he had emphasized the urgency of an immediate start in troop evacuation and repeated the Secretary’s suggestion that the ratio of participation in the transitional government should be negotiable. The King replied that even if Nasser kept his troops in Yemen for 10 years, he could never accept a 2-to-1 ratio. Upon being urged again to keep the dialogue going, Faisal said that he had instructed Ali Reza to keep the door open and to respond to any initiative from Nasser. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN)↩