Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

395. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 20, 1966, 0905Z.

2388. I have just returned from one hour of extremely cordial but very vigorous conversation with President Nasser. Before I could begin, he expressed extreme pleasure with Sadat visit saying Mr. Sadat had been well received and greatly impressed by everything and everybody he saw in the US. Meetings with Pres, Secretary and Congress as well as State govt officials had impressed him, had been productive and were encouraging.

I said that we too were pleased with the visit and presented him with the letter from the Pres² which he read carefully two or three times and obviously appreciated. I then stated that quiet discussions of problems represented best approach to dealing with difficulties between our two countries. I said that we had gone a long way toward solving some of our problems and that I hoped that through quiet conversation through usual diplomatic channels augmented by other visits we could keep issues on responsible level and make further progress without putting our differences in headlines. He assented.

I stated one of my roles as American rep was to foresee problems and hopefully to find a way of dealing with them before they became a threat to our bilateral relations, the success of which were most important to both countries. I said I wanted to lead off our discussion with two difficulties that might, given past experience and the magnitude of the problems, be issues in the future if we were not careful—Yemen and Aden. I stated that we were not a party to the Yemen dispute, but were good friends of both SA and Egypt and that while we could not mediate the complex issues between them we wanted to do what we could to preserve an atmosphere between the two that would be productive and helpful. I had been greatly encouraged by the obviously statesmanlike response to King Feisal concerning which al Khouly had informed me. The responsive tone represented an obvious effort, as had the Jidda agreement, to reach a solution to a difficult problem. The US has encouraged SA to be equally responsive and I hoped that talks were continuing. Honest difficulties in interpreting the Jidda agreement could occur but this did not necessarily mean bad faith on either side. I said we were convinced that both sides wanted a settlement, at which point he interrupted vigorously and said, “do you really believe the Saudis want a solution?” I said we believed they did and that the interested parties must find a way to continue discussion and to rebuild confidence that had existed in the past.

The President then reviewed the Yemen problem over the past several years, adding little that was new. He then paused as though he was not sure where to go next and I mentioned, making it very clear that it was a personal suggestion, the thought that perhaps a transitional govt in the Yemen could be based on no formula of distribution between republicans and royalists but on the selection of individuals who might play a role but who were not identified completely with either side. He said it was hard to tell a republican from a royalist in terms of what they stood for. That, I indicated, should make my suggestion more attractive. He said that it was impossible to look toward such a solution since all responsible people carried one or the other designation even though it really did not make much difference as far as their abilities or philosophies were concerned. We played around with the idea for a bit but it got nowhere.

The Pres then remarked that I had said we were not interested in the Yemen. I corrected him by saying we were not a direct party at interest and that one of my particular interests was the relationship of Yemen to US-UAR relations and beyond that to stability in the area. He said, “If shooting resumes, you will be a party at interest immediately.” I nodded. “You must therefore follow this issue closely.” I nodded again. “I have instructed my people to keep you completely informed on all aspects of the Yemen problem.”

I expressed my gratitude and returned to my basic thesis, which was the need for continued talks. I asked whether the Haradh conf would resume. The reply was in the affirmative, but the Pres did not believe anything would come of it. I stated that as I understood the situation at present there was a possibility of talks at higher levels between the UAR and SA. The Pres stated that the UAR had suggested this some time ago and that King Feisal after first designating Prince Sultan to represent him had withdrawn from the idea. I stated that I had understood there was still a possibility of talks, not necessarily between King Feisal and Pres Nasser but at a senior level. He said no such suggestion was before him. I asked him 3 times whether I had understood him and said that I had hoped that the latest response from Saudi Arabia had included the suggestion for high level talks. Each time he denied this.

He then launched into a long discourse on his own situation. He said that King Feisal thought the economic drain was too great for the UAR to bear and that the UAR would eventually have to leave the Yemen. The UAR could stay for years as he had pointed out. I asked whether he meant at the present level of troop strength and he said, “No,” that all military requirements could be met by reduction to about 50,000 or even fewer men. The current regrouping of troops is toward this eventuality if it becomes necessary.

To my surprise, the President stated that one of his main problems was the morale of the Egyptian army which would have great difficulty in accepting a defeat in the Yemen. “As you can realize, this would present real problems for me.” He then said very emotionally, “I fear that a clash between the UAR and Saudi Arabia is inevitable.” I said, “I do not accept that and I hope you will not. The stakes are too great to permit us to believe that there is no solution and I hope that the Middle East and the world can count upon your patience and your wisdom to solve this difficult problem. We must not accept the inevitability of what will always be a defeat for mankind and I hope that you will continue your efforts as you have in the past to solve this problem.” He replied that I could count upon him to continue to try but implied that he was discouraged.

He then said, “I understand the relationship of this problem to my relations with you and your country and I assure you we consider it carefully in that light.”

After a pause we turned to Aden. I stated that we believed the British decision to grant independence to South Arabia and to close out its military installations there by 1968 provided an opportunity for constructive Arab action and was in fact exactly the development that he had sought. 1968 is close at hand and there are many problems that must be resolved in a short space of time. Political, social, and economic difficulties are many and it will take the constructive help of all concerned with peace and stability in the area to create a situation which will be helpful on the long term and offer a chance of stability. He had great influence in the area and a key factor is whether he wishes to play a constructive role which we very much hope that he will do.

I emphasized that there was great flexibility on the part of the British and on the part of all concerned with the future of Aden and South Arabia and that we must attempt to be constructive in working out solutions. The President mentioned immediately the UN resolutions but admitted very quickly that the difference between what the British had offered and the UN resolution was negligible. I said that we must try to look to realities and not form and that the opportunity that had been sought for the aspirations of the people of South Arabia could be found in the present framework.

Again I pointed to the flexibility on the part of the British in dealing with various groups in Aden and to the hope we all had for help from the UAR toward a constructive resolution of a difficult problem.

I was sure the Pres would realize that the alternative to the constructive approach I had outlined was that of a Yemen-like situation. At this point he reacted strongly, saying, “You cannot believe we would ever put troops in Aden!” I said I was not suggesting that he would but I would appreciate an interpretation of his recent speech in which he had appeared to tie his withdrawal from Yemen to the British position in Aden. There followed what he described as an explanation and which contained some elements of apology but which was in fact neither. He appeared to regret the speech as I suspect he does many of his speeches. He indicated he was talking to the British primarily and to a lesser extent to the Saudi Arabians that he had had inadequate time to prepare his notes for the speech. He assured me, however, that he did not connect the Aden situation with his own settlement of the Yemen problem. I asked whether I could assure my govt that he had not changed his position on Yemen to relate to the situation created by the planned British withdrawal. He most emphatically affirmed that I might do so.

I returned to the basic issue of Aden and to the situation created by the British decision and again asked for his constructive assistance. He stated that he did not know many of the issues in this problem in detail but that he would study them carefully in the light of what I had said and assured me he would attempt to be helpful and within the time framework that I had outlined to him. He said he would like me to have more conversations with FonMin Riad on Aden, going into more detail.

Comment: Several points struck me rather emphatically.

1. Pres Nasser still wishes a settlement of the Yemen problem but does not quite know where to go. If there is a “new element” in Saudi position (para 5 Jidda Embtel 814 to Dept)³ he is unaware of it.

2. I believe there is still flexibility in Nasser’s position provided Feisal forthcoming, but distrust is obviously great.

3. Nasser will make every effort keep us informed in hope we can be helpful.

4. This conversation was first in which he has admitted depth his concern about domestic problem military morale if defeat in Yemen obvious.

I dealt with both Yemen and Aden throughout conversation in terms their importance to US-UAR relations and at one stage referred to them in connection my continuing talks Kaissouni regarding aid which I hoped could be continued provided no new difficulties arose. I have no doubt he understood. I have been sending him messages to this effect via Eugene Black, John Badeau and others for some time, believing private expressions dangers to US-UAR relations by resumed Yemen hostilities were sometimes more effective than official expressions. In addition I have had own private talks with Kaissouni, Riad, Mustafa Abdul Aziz and Hassan Sabri al-Khouly.

It is interesting the President did not raise arms to Israel or the nuclear potential of Israel, particularly in view concern reportedly expressed in Arab PriMins meeting on these subjects.

Battle

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda, Taiz, Aden, and London.
2. Telegram 5017 to Cairo, March 7, transmitted the text of a letter from President Johnson to President Nasser replying to the message from the latter delivered by President of the UAR National Assembly Anwar al-Sadat on February 23. The President’s letter expressed the hope that continued UAR-Saudi talks would make it possible to reach a solution to the Yemen problem. (Ibid., POL 7 UAR) Johnson’s February 23 conversation with Sadat is printed as Document 274 in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII.
3. See footnote 4, Document 394.