Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, March 19, 1966, 3:11 p.m.

540. Yemen Settlement.

1. Question arises whether Faisal, confident in own strength, and perhaps misled by reports UARG internal difficulties, unduly rigid in pressing advantage in hope ultimately unseating Nasser or, at minimum, dealing lasting blow to Nasser’s position outside Egypt. If so, appears great miscalculation strength UAR regime which could lead to prolonged instability Yemen and whole Peninsula, with ultimate serious effects for Saudi Government. Leave to your discretion how best convey this thought to King, but consider it essential he realize that durable Yemen settlement depends on freely consented compromise by both UAR and SAG.

2. Agree with your tel 794² that vague wording Jidda Agreement leaves room for honest difference interpretation Article 6 re timing UAR troop withdrawal. Doubt, however, that any party justified in citing individual article out of context. From practical point of view, UAR cannot accept public embarrassment of withdrawal without agreement on successor regime. Also, it questionable if leaving republican areas Yemen in vacuum would serve Western or Saudi interests.

3. Re points at issue, tentatively agreed list 100 acceptable Yemenis offers hopeful base for discussion transitional government, either by UAR-SAG reps or, as possible first step, by individual royalist and republican reps (e.g., Shami and Iryani). Concerning Hamid al-Din, it doubtful that Faisal could prevent them from future activity in Yemen in any event. (Spirit Jidda Agreement implies eventual halt Saudi financial aid, which has been prime tool for Saudi control royalists.)

4. In your next meeting with Faisal, suggest you reiterate our position along lines Secretary’s message (Deptel 508),³ urging focus on spirit Jidda Agreement as enunciated in preamble. Also might note Article 9 provides for direct Faisal-Nasser contact to avoid difficulties re implementation; we pleased learn SAG prepared send “high personality” to Cairo for this purpose (Embtel 814).⁴ We recognize Saudis have been solely tried by Nasser but wonder if some further compromise would not pay dividends in getting UAR forces out of Yemen. In any event UAR failure honor any new Faisal-Nasser agreement would considerably strengthen Saudi position in eyes rest of world.

5. You should use this, or other early occasion and context which you deem appropriate, again to make clear to Faisal that our commitment to support Saudi integrity does not extend to providing military cover for SAG operations in support hostilities in Yemen or to any Saudi actions of provocative nature.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore and Korn on March 18; cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer (paragraph 2), Symmes, and Davies; and approved by Hare. Repeated to Cairo, London, Taiz, Aden, and Dhahran.
2. Dated March 13. (Ibid.)
3. Repeated as telegram 305 to Khartoum, Document 392.
4. Dated March 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN)
5. In telegram 844 from Jidda, March 22, Eilts reported that he shared the Department’s view that at least some of Faisal’s present rigidity was probably prompted by his belief that Nasser’s regime was tottering. He said he would continue to impress on the King that the U.S. estimate of Nasser’s internal position was different, and the dangers of basing Saudi policy on any such mistaken estimate. He would also stress that a durable settlement in Yemen depended on a compromise freely consented to by the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. The Ambassador noted, however, that this was only one element in Faisal’s hardened position. First, the King was deeply distrustful of Nasser. Second, he believed Nasser was seeking a pretext to avoid beginning any withdrawal from Yemen. Third, he believed that Nasser was willingly acting as a “commie agent” in the Middle East. And finally, he believed the Yemenis should have self-determination, rather than a Saudi-UAR imposed government. (Ibid.)