398. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
2571. My April 7 conversation with President Nasser lasting just under one hour began with a discussion of my recent fishing trip to Red Sea. The President said he did not like fishing because he had to [Page 750] be patient all day every day and he found fishing an unnecessary drain on his patience. I said that regretfully I was there to ask for more patience with regard to a favorite topic of ours, Yemen.
I said that during recent months I had been convinced of President Nasser’s basic desire for peace in the Yemen. I had repeatedly in reports to my government and in appearances before the Congress regarding the recent aid agreement drawn heavily on his efforts to reach a Yemen solution and praised his statesmanlike conduct, particularly in reaching the Jidda agreement. I was aware of the frustrations that the Yemen problem had caused him and of the continued requirement on him for wisdom and patience. I was now perplexed. The Department of State had asked me to reconcile my convictions of his basic purpose with his recent public statements, particularly the March 22 speech which had had unfortunate repercussions. For example, King Feisal had considered the speech an attack upon himself (Nasser nodded). On our side, we considered that the changes for a high level meeting between the UAR and Saudi Arabia were lessened by the speech. In effect what I hoped he would do was to write my report for me. How could I respond to my Dept’s request for clarification of my own sympathetic view of his basic aim toward peace with what he had said publicly.
“The answer,” he said, “is that we have given up. King Feisal believed when I entered into the Jidda agreement that it was a move from weakness but it was not. It was a move to avoid a clash between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. That clash now is before us.” The avoidance of this clash was the basis for Nasser’s efforts to reach the Jidda agreement which he now considered no longer existed. “The Jidda agreement is finished. There is no agreement. As I told you last time, we are consolidating our troops and will withdraw in large numbers, perhaps even up to half of them, but we can stay in Yemen for ten years. We are not weak. This does not cost us as much as Feisal thinks it does. It does not cost foreign currency. The present cost is 35 to 40 million pounds a year and with the steps I propose we can reduce that cost to something like 20 to 25 million.” He stressed that this does not mean a resumption of hostilities by the UAR but that what happens depends on the Saudis.
I said that if he intended to withdraw, why could he not withdraw as part of his efforts to implement the Jidda agreement. Perhaps a concession toward implementing that agreement by him would bring concessions from the other side and this new situation might engender new possibilities of a solution. “This is impossible as the Jidda agreement is one piece,” he said. “If I claim to implement that agreement by a withdrawal of troops, I am prevented from reentering Yemen if at a later date hostilities have been resumed and they need my assistance.”
[Page 751]But if the other side resumes hostilities, this will be a new situation, I pointed out, and we must look upon the Yemen problem step by step. He repeated that the Jidda agreement is one piece and cannot be partially fulfilled unless the total understanding can be implemented.
I reaffirmed the need for patience and quiet diplomacy. He responded by stating that he could not do what the Saudis do—to talk one way and act another. Either there was a basic understanding and friendship between two countries or there was not. He could not pretend publicly what did not exist in fact and therefore must state what he felt to be the realities of the situation with respect to dealing with the problem. The Egyptian people have a deep interest in the Yemen and a right to know the situation.
I repeated that this problem could not be dealt with publicly. There must be a restrained quiet effort toward solution if there is a chance of improvement in the present outlook. He replied, “I have been restrained—there is much more I could say about the Saudis than I have said. They are spending money in Kuwait, Beirut, and other places against us. I know that but I have refrained from talking about it.”
I pointed out that my country still hoped that a dialogue between the UAR and the Saudis could be resumed and in the light of the present situation the Saudis considered the next move up to Nasser. They believed that they had not had an answer to the Feisal communication from Khartoum. (The President shrugged indignantly.) I had reason to believe that an initiative by the UAR to send a high level rep to Jidda to pay respects to the King and to resume discussions at the level of the rep would be well received. The President replied most emphatically, “This is impossible.” Later I brought up the matter again and the President said, “We will receive a rep from the Saudi Arabians but I will not initiate it and I cannot send anyone there at present.” I then pointed out that my country wished to be helpful in this problem within the limits of its judgement that it could not mediate this complex intra-Arab problem but could only contribute to keeping a climate between the two countries which left hope for continued discussions. My own concern stemmed from my knowledge that the Yemen and its closely related problem of the Aden loomed large on the horizon as a problem between our two countries and this I sought to avoid as I had sought to avoid or remove any problems that might create difficulties between our two countries. I asked whether the President had any suggestions for me in this context and he said that he did not. He wishes us to be informed completely and thoroughly on his actions on the Yemen and will be happy to talk with me at any time since he knew of our interest in the Yemen.
During the conversation the President again mentioned the problem with the army. “If we bring it back, I can control it,” he said, “but [Page 752] it will not be easy. I can make speeches and explain the situation and they will respond.” (He seemed less than convinced on this point.)
I asked whether the President had had any further thoughts with respect to Aden since we last talked, indicating that this problem was closely related to the Yemen. He said that he had no suggestions. I repeated that we must look for constructive answers to the problem raised by the projected British withdrawal and wished to assure him again of the high degree of flexibility the British appeared to have on this matter. I urged that he look toward constructive action which would bring about stability and a government in Aden that reflected the will of the people—a goal he had long had.
As I rose to go he said there was one problem he wished to discuss with me. He had been informed this morning of my talk with Dr. Kaissouni on rice (see Embtel 2554),2 and he considered our decision to exercise the option as a “threat.” I said this was not the case and the exercise of the option stemmed, I was sure, from the general problem of food with which the US was faced around the world. He then said, “We have no rice. We cannot give you fifty thousand tons.” He mentioned my discussion with Dr. Kaissouni about the Indian food problem and the copy of the President’s message re India which I had given Kaissouni. He then stated, “India has its problems and we have ours.”
The President referred to the US decision to exercise the option in a manner suggesting that he believed it stemmed from his recent public remarks on the subject of rice. I said I had accepted his assurances on many matters, and hoped he would accept mine on this one. The decision to exercise the option on rice had already been made before his speech and was not an outgrowth of those remarks. He indicated he would accept my assurances, but I do not believe he is convinced of the truth of my statement. I indicated that I was going into the facts of the rice situation in Egypt with Kaissouni and said that the understanding permitted the option to be met from rice from next season’s crop.
With respect to American aid he said he did not even like to discuss this subject. He wished that relations between us did not involve aid but he had the problem of his people and the development of the country and while his job would be easier as President if he could ignore aid, he could not do so. You are giving us now only wheat and the economic assistance which we had hoped for and had been promised in the early days of President Johnson’s administration has not been forthcoming. I referred to the importance of the wheat and [Page 753] other various private credits which had been extended to the UAR and said that I hoped that the climate of our relations would continue to improve and that eventually other forms of aid might be introduced into the UAR. I only hoped that problems such as Aden and the Yemen would not cloud our relations in which there had been such marked improvement in recent months.
In the last moments of my conversation I urged the President to adhere to his basic goal which, as I understood it, was still peace and a UAR withdrawal from the Yemen and to find a way to bring this about. I asked whether the Harad conference would be resumed and whether we could look for progress in this context. He said that it would be resumed but would amount to nothing.
“I have a speech coming on May first,” he said, “and I must continue to talk about the Yemen and I must discuss the Islamic pact.” “But you must remember,” I said, “that there is a great need to maintain flexibility in your position in order to respond to new situations that we hope will emerge and which will make resumption of talks between you and Saudi Arabia possible.”
Comment: The conversation was at all times cordial, at times light and amusing, but in other moments very ominous. The President came very near to an explosion on the matter of rice and seemed very badly informed on the matter, referring to the fact that we were only going to pay 25 percent in dollars. I corrected this impression by saying this was entirely a pound transaction and diverted the conversation by saying I would talk further with Kaissouni about the matter.
I am very depressed about the chances of a Yemen settlement at this time and regretfully conclude that Nasser has decided at least for the present to remain there. This does not mean that he is not capable of changing his position quickly and completely for no apparent reason but such a shift seems a remote hope at present. Therefore we must decide the limits of our tolerance in the Yemen and must formulate a contingent policy based on the several possibilities that exist, ranging from stalemate to resumption of major hostilities. A separate telegram is being submitted regarding this matter.3