Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

399. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 12, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Yemen

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• H.E. Mohsin A. Al-Aini—Ambassador of the Yemen Arab Republic
• NEA—Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary
• NE—Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

The Secretary opened the conversation by enquiring when the Harad Conference would resume. Ambassador Al-Aini said no date had yet been set but in any case no results were possible until Cairo and Riyadh had reached agreement on a Yemen settlement. At the Secretary’s request, Ambassador Al-Aini then reviewed the origins and principal issues of the Yemen conflict. Emphasizing that he was giving his own assessment and not reflecting the views of his government, the Ambassador made the following points:

(1) The 1962 revolution in Yemen had been unrelated to the Arab “cold war,” but Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. had made Yemen a cold war battlefield.

(2) Attempts by the Yemenis to solve their own problems had been frustrated by Saudi support for the royal Hamid al-Din family and by the U.A.R.’s refusal to withdraw its troops.

(3) Any attempt to return the Hamid al-Din family to power would prolong the Yemen conflict indefinitely, since it would not only be opposed by the Yemenis themselves but would threaten complete defeat for the U.A.R. and thus be totally unacceptable to Nasser.

(4) The Jidda Agreement had been unworkable from the beginning. A plebiscite in Yemen was difficult to envisage under the best of circumstances. If held one year after formation of a provisional government, as agreed at Jidda, a plebiscite would subject the country to a year of outside political pressures and maneuverings. An immediate plebiscite (which the Ambassador later defined as a plebiscite immediately after departure of the last U.A.R. troops) would be preferable, though still of doubtful feasibility. A solution better suited to Yemeni conditions would be an elected council of tribal representatives from which should be excluded members of the Hamid al-Din family on the royalist side (the Ambassador subsequently said this meant eight to ten individuals at most) and members of the Sallal group on the republican side.

(5) There were some on both sides who benefited from the present situation, but the Yemeni people were the losers. While a solution now would be difficult to achieve, it would be much more difficult later—say five years from now.

(6) The Ambassador had discussed Yemen with Anwar Sadat during the latter’s visit to the United States and had concluded that Cairo’s new Yemen strategy was extremely dangerous. That strategy, as the Ambassador saw it, was to prepare for a long stay, while minimizing the cost to the U.A.R. by consolidating the Egyptian position in south Yemen where the U.A.R. had concentrated its efforts from the beginning. This would relieve the U.A.R. of responsibility for holding the difficult mountain areas but leave it in a position to launch air strikes against those areas whenever it felt this necessary. To relate his new strategy to future developments in Aden, as Nasser had done, was purely a pretext. It would not bring stability to Yemen or South Arabia; only the evacuation of U.A.R. troops and formation of a unified Yemeni government would do that.

(7) The “main and only solution” was to convince Saudi Arabia that it must guarantee the removal of the Hamid al-Din family from Yemeni political life. This would not be a defeat for Saudi Arabia, but a success for all concerned. Nasser and the Yemeni Republicans would then accept the “State (as opposed to the Republic) of Yemen” formulation, would agree to the exclusion of President Sallal and his followers, and U.A.R. troops would be withdrawn.

(8) If the U.A.R. were to withdraw before the threat of a return of the royal family had been eliminated, a number of Republicans would turn for support to the Russians and the Chinese, who now had a significant presence in Yemen.

(9) In summary, the essential elements of a Yemen settlement were: (a) elimination from Yemeni affairs of the Hamid al-Din family and of Sallal and his followers; (b) withdrawal of U.A.R. troops; (c) an end to Egyptian and Saudi interference in Yemen; (d) Yemeni neutrality with respect to inter-Arab differences. If these conditions were agreed upon, the United Nations could play a helpful role in guaranteeing that they were carried out. It was essential, however, that they constitute a single package. A piecemeal approach would not work.

The Secretary asked a number of specific questions about the Harad Conference of November-December, 1965, to which Ambassador Al-Aini replied along the following lines:

(1) Harad failed primarily because the Saudis refused to permit the Conference to deal with the future of the Hamid al-Din family. Having been assured by Nasser that exclusion of the royal family from a future Yemeni government had already been agreed upon, the Yemeni delegates discovered at Harad that this was not so and that the subject was not one they could settle at the Conference. The impression was conveyed to the Conference that King Faisal supported the Hamid al-Dins. This had the effect of strengthening Nasser’s hand and dividing the conferees along pro-Hamid al-Din and pro-Sallal lines. In fact, however, there were no royalists outside the royal family itself. It was opposition to the U.A.R. presence in Yemen, not support for the Hamid al-Din, which united the “royalists.”

(2) If it had not been for Saudi and U.A.R. pressures at Harad, and if there had been a firm guarantee that the royal family would have no future political role in Yemen, the delegates at Harad could have reached agreement on a “State of Yemen” solution. The Khamr Conference of May, 1965, had demonstrated that, if left to themselves, Yemenis could achieve an all-Yemen solution. The Government which emerged from that conference (with Ahmad Numan as Prime Minister and Ambassador Al-Aini as Foreign Minister) had represented all elements of Yemeni opinion. It had not won Saudi support, however, and efforts to elicit the support of other Arab governments had failed. Finally, the Numan government had been actively opposed by Nasser, and this had led to its ultimate collapse. The Khamr Conference had nevertheless revealed the basic weakness of Nasser’s position in Yemen at that time. It was thus the Yemenis themselves, not Faisal, who had obliged Nasser to conclude the Jidda Agreement. (The Secretary requested Ambassador Al-Aini to send him copies of the Khamr Conference resolutions.)

The Secretary said it appeared from what Ambassador Al-Aini had said that two basic questions were involved. The first was what would happen within Yemen. This was for the Yemenis themselves to decide, hopefully with a maximum degree of solidarity. The second related to the tensions between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. The latter problem, however, had become interwoven with the first. He wondered if the Yemenis could not find some way—perhaps through the United Nations—to show the world that they were prepared to agree among themselves. Perhaps this would have a good effect on Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. He had a feeling that the problem was less one of Saudi emphasis on the Yemeni royal family than it was of simply making the voice of the Yemeni people heard in the world. Though he might be quite wrong, a Yemen settlement seemed just out of reach and might be achieved if the Yemenis could get together and make their voice heard. What role could the United Nations play?

Ambassador Al-Aini replied that the U.N. could supervise the implementation of any agreement that might be reached. The previous U.N. effort in connection with the Bunker Mission had not been fruitful because, largely due to Nasser’s opposition, there had been no true agreement for the U.N. to supervise. If an agreement were now reached, there would be a role for the U.N. to play. The difficulty was that responsible Yemenis were too disillusioned and exhausted, too disappointed by the failure of the revolution, to seek a solution now on their own. They had come to feel that the matter was no longer in their hands. There were many like himself who were neither pro-U.A.R. nor pro-Saudi and who had nowhere to turn. In the Ambassador’s opinion the United States, as a friend of all concerned, was in the best position to help.

The Secretary said that our influence was more limited than the Ambassador seemed to imply but we would give thoughtful consideration to this problem. He continued to believe, however, that the important thing was to make the voice of Yemeni solidarity heard in the world—perhaps through a new Harad Conference, which was after all a device that both Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. had accepted. Wouldn’t it be difficult for Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. to reject a Government on which the Yemenis themselves had agreed?

Ambassador Al-Aini thought it might be useful to seek support in other Arab capitals but outside of the Arab League framework. Earlier in the conversation he had noted that the Ruler of Kuwait was now in Cairo, reportedly to discuss Yemen, and that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister had recently visited Saudi Arabia and had expressed hope that Kuwait might be able to play a useful role.

Turning to U.S.-Y.A.R.G. relations, Ambassador Al-Aini praised the Taiz Municipal Water System, an A.I.D. project, and suggested similar projects in such places as Sanaa and Hodeida. Such projects were a demonstration of American support for the Yemeni people and unrelated to the republican-royalist conflict. The Ambassador also urged that the United States provide more scholarships for Yemeni students. Only about twelve Yemenis had been sent to the United States to study since the revolution, whereas hundreds had gone to the Eastern Bloc. The Secretary replied that we would look into both of these matters. Finally, Ambassador Al-Aini urged that U.S. PL-480 wheat deliveries to Yemen continue.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton and approved in S on May 23.