Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

438. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, April 27, 1967, 1420Z.

6805. Ref: State 182453.²

1. Foreign Minister Riad received me this morning and as instructed I confronted him with Department’s comments on current status our mediation effort as set forth paragraphs A through G State 181932.³

2. After introductory remarks to effect Washington found it difficult to understand long delay in receiving UARG reaction to our proposed terms of reference [garble] points verbatim adding to point F that we would back out of the exercise now if this is in fact the wish of the GUAR.

3. Foreign Minister Riad pondered my presentation for several minutes and then said that his government had appreciated very much our readiness to be helpful and to mediate their differences with Saudi Arabia.

4. It was fully realized that all sides must cooperate fully and frankly in such an endeavor and that the atmosphere must be propitious and optimistic.

5. Our proposed terms of reference had embraced obligations on all three parties which might require further clarification. His own personal feeling was that our draft was too short and too vague. In any event it required study and while no changes might be called for, some clarification might be sought. This study was now in process and must of necessity involve the top command of the UAR.

6. Riad said he would contact me immediately when views of Supreme Executive Committee were known. In this connection he mentioned in passing that President Nasser intended to take ten days rest from his official duties and this might involve further delay.

7. Referring to my reference to ex-King Saud under point E he smilingly said that at time when King Feisal was treating and referring to Badr as “King of Yemen” he could hardly complain about UAR references to Saud as King of Saudi Arabia. There did not seem to be much purpose in pursuing this subject.

8. Comment: It is quite evident that Foreign Minister Riad supports idea of our mediating Yemen embroglio and probably sees in it means of improving US-UAR relations in general. I find it difficult to predict exactly what decision of committee will be or when we will receive it but I strongly recommend we play this out to end as to withdraw our offer now would only magnify our problems which seem to be sufficiently difficult as they are.

Nes

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Jidda.
2. See footnote 5, Document 436.
3. Document 436.