Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

71. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

New Delhi, September 16, 1964.

Dear Mac:

I believe we are faced with an important question of tactics in regard to the handling of questions involving nuclear power here in India.²

It has been our view that while the development of Chinese nuclear weapons is an ominous development it can with skilled handling be made to serve our political purposes here in India.

With this in mind I have discussed with Shastri, TTK, Chavan and Desai in the last several months, the possibility that the Chinese may be able to develop not only a crude nuclear bomb but also intermediate range missiles with nuclear war-heads. In developing this possibility I referred vaguely to information about a testing installation in West China which has come to us from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and other sources.

I have pointed out that when and if these weapons are fully developed, India will find herself faced with the choice of three courses of action.

(1) India could take a position similar to that which we took regarding Cuba, i.e. an ultimatum to the Chinese to remove such installations from Tibet or to see them blown up by the Indian Airforce. This involves obvious risks in brinkmanship.

(2) India could proceed to develop her own nuclear deterrent capacity. This, I suggested, would not only run contrary to India’s clear commitment in the United Nations and elsewhere, but it would also be a losing game both technologically and financially. While the Chinese could reach the major northern Indian cities with relatively few shortrange missiles, the Indians would require many more weapons of greater range and precision to reach comparable targets in China. Clearly it would make no sense for a country facing India’s vast economic problems and financial difficulties to embark on a program of this nature.

(3) India could reach a quiet understanding with the United States under which we would undertake to provide India with the same type of nuclear umbrella that has enabled Japan, the Scandinavian countries and other nations to maintain an effective defense at a reasonable cost.

I believe that these three or four discussions have done much to make some Indian leaders think in broader terms about questions of nuclear defense. If carried somewhat further I believe they might also provide an arresting influence on India’s plans to build up a major supersonic airforce which clearly has no relevance to India’s air defense vis-à-vis the potential threat from China.

Against this background I recently sent a message to John McCone³ suggesting that his briefing team which met here last weekend with the GOI be authorized to discuss Chinese nuclear installations and potentialities and the ultimate need for further information on their development. John took a rather dim view of this on the ground that if India becomes too aware of this possibility she may move into the development of nuclear weapons herself.

This impresses me as miscalculation. The more opportunity we have to talk to the Indians about this situation the more likely we are to persuade them that the nuclear deterrent that could provide a real threat to Chinese cities was beyond their capacity and that the ultimate solution may be some kind of understanding with us.

The question I may add goes beyond this particular point. [2 lines of source text not declassified] If we fail to come clean the Indians will eventually discover through their own sources (and very possibly from the Russians) precisely what the Chinese have been doing. At that point we will appear in their eyes to either have been inept in our own intelligence work or to have withheld vital information from them.

I will be grateful if you will think about this complex problem, discuss it with John and also whoever you may feel should be involved and then give me your considered views.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles ⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64–6/65. Top Secret.
2. In late August the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, chaired by Llewellyn Thompson, was formed to consider the question of the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities, particularly with respect to India. Documentation on the activities of the Thompson Committee is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XI.
3. Not found. McCone discussed the proposal to brief Shastri about the progress of the Chinese nuclear weapons program with Richard Helms on September 8. His concern about such a briefing was that it might stimulate a similar weapons program in India. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, September 8; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Memos for the Record, 9 Jul-10 Sept 1964)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.