Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

72. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, September 19, 1964, 7 p.m.

2. I had fifty minute meeting with Pres Ayub morning Sept 18 Rawalpindi. FonOff note taker only other person present. Personal atmosphere cordial and results substantially satisfactory within limitations to be expected.

1. SEATO

I obtained the assurances we required on continuation Pak membership in SEATO. In effect we have highest level corroboration of what Bhutto told me Sept 9. After my exposition of intensified need for united front of SEATO allies in view acute confrontation taking place in Southeast Asia, Pres indicated his govts distaste for staying in the organization where it was unable to carry out the commitments and obligations normally associated with membership. He said that Pakistan unable carry out those commitments because of increased military capability which has been given Pakistan’s neighbor, said this increased capability had “created great difficulties for Pakistan” and had “put Pakistan under severe pressure.” He asked me if US nevertheless preferred that Pakistan retain her SEATO membership. I replied that we could not concede the validity of the premises he had spelled out, but in any event we consider it of high importance that a solid alliance front be maintained with Pakistan remaining in SEATO and identifying herself with objectives and spirit of the organization.

Pres said in that case Pakistan would retain her membership. He added that this was being done solely out of regard for the US and in consideration the recognized need to avoid any action which in the US view would interfere with the implementation of broad US policy.

2. ChiRep issues in UN

After I had set forth in pessimistic terms the unpredictable but certainly adverse effect which could be expected to flow from any favorable vote on the admission of Communist China to the General Assembly this autumn, Ayub assured me that Pakistan had no reason to get out in front on the Communist China issue in the UN and said he saw no reason why Pakistan needed to do anything other than cast affirmative ballot if issue came to vote. He agreed that Chinese Communists are carrying out disruptive operations in various places, although he did not know much about Chinese Communist subversive activities in Africa and wanted to know more about that, especially about the interplay of Chinese Communist and Soviet subversive efforts in the Congo.

I told him in a general way of assurances I had from Bhutto on ChiRep issue. The Pres did not indicate any disagreement with Bhutto’s position and said the GOP had no occasion to actually push for admission of Communist China this year. He seemed to assume that the vote could not be so close that Pakistan can some day be an honest broker in bringing about some sort of détente between US and Communist China and that it might be better to postpone any showdown on Chinese Communist membership in the UN. He said he believed that some US-Chinese Communist relations would have to be established. When I said there would have to be some changes made in Peiping first, he heartily concurred but noted there would need to be some adjustments of view in Washington also.

3. Exchanges of good-will gesture with Communist China

I made the President aware of the difficulties that are caused by unnecessary and unfortunate gestures of friendship and goodwill between Pakistan and Communist China, especially during this trying period. I said the gestures were particularly regrettable when there was an appearance of some possible negotiations of a secret nature. I cited the recent extended and rather private Pak hospitality accorded ChiCom Vice Minister of Defense Air Marshal Liu, in Peshawar and Karachi as an example.

President defended good-will gesture as necessary part of new Pak policy of good neighborliness. He assured me that absolutely no substantive talks of sensitive nature were held with Liu, and he chided us for hyper-sensitiveness and over-suspiciousness. He said Marshal Liu was received only as routine good-will gesture. Pak Air Marshal Asghar Khan had just that morning reported on the visit to him; and had reconfirmed that nothing of any significance took place during visit. He said visit lasted as long as it did only because of infrequency of flights from Pakistan to China. Liu had to wait for next scheduled PIA weekly flight. He urged that we trust GOP good intentions as a friend of the US and that we have confidence in Pak ability to deal with Chinese Communist without falling into any traps or giving anything away. He thought that some useful information and some Pak leverage on Chinese Communists might be developed out of Pak associations with Chinese Communists. I told Pres that appearances had to be considered and general impression gained by Americans was bound to be adverse. Chinese Communists were able to exploit their apparent gains in Pakistan. It was natural for Americans reading the headlines to take a dim view of what seemed to be going on. I said inexplicable Pak actions made it difficult for American friends of Pakistan in a better position to explain in comprehensive terms Pak courses of action. I told him high-level visits between Pakistan and Chinese Communist leaders, exchanges of good-will missions composed prominent people, and Pak senior level participation in Chinese Communist national occasions were all unfortunate and harmful to our relations in present circumstance.

Pres said he wanted me to believe that his government did not intend to do anything inconsistent with her friendship with the United States or contrary to basic American interests. “We do not want to do anything that would hurt you.” He said he was in favor of drawing closer to Communist China.

4. Indo-Pak relations and Narayan² visit

I probed for further information on results recent visit of Narayan.

Ayub said Narayan was “the best Hindu I have ever dealt with.” He felt talks had been worthwhile, although only exploratory. He attributed influence and stature to Narayan in India even absence government position or mandate from Shastri government. He said he had given Narayan full Pak position that fundamental issue in Indo-Pak relations (Kashmir) would not be postponed or subordinated, and that any meeting of the two heads of government which did not produce tangible results would be a mistake. He said Narayan had spoken well of Shastri’s intentions. In regard to a Pakistan settlement, Narayan was not certain Shastri considered himself in a sufficiently strong domestic position to take the unpopular steps that would be necessary to produce tangible progress with Narayan from summit meeting. Ayub said that the main result of his sessions with Narayan was apparently clear and sympathetic comprehension by Narayan of the Pak position and an undertaking by Narayan to find out from Shastri whether latter felt that he could open the way for a really substantive development at a summit conference this year.

Ayub said Narayan is to give an assessment as soon as Narayan obtains Shastri’s reaction. Ayub indicated that his decision is whether to go to Delhi would be influenced by Narayan’s report.

I told Ayub that I believed it was the estimate of Amb Bowles and his staff in Delhi that Shastri was genuinely disposed to press for constructive steps and that perhaps Shastri would be inclined to reciprocate affirmative moves by Pres Ayub, possibly including the return of a summit level visit. Ayub took note of this and perhaps took some encouragement from it. He seemed appreciative of our desire to facilitate a settlement, but again expressed dignified regret that we had not found a way of working our assistance to India into a framework of conciliation on the part of India. He accepted my statement that we could not force the GOI, but added that he believed our resources should be sufficient to find a way of inducing India without force.

5. GOP suspicions of US activities in Pakistan

I told Pres that in view of systematic efforts of elements unfriendly to us to propagate fabricated stories of US official sympathy with opposition parties in Pakistan, I was going to give him an assurance which ought to be, and probably was, unnecessary. This assurance was that US reps would be fully circumspect in all their contacts to insure that none of their actions or relationships could be plausibly misconstrued as giving aid and comfort to anti-govt elements, or as constituting intervention in the forthcoming election campaign or in any aspect of the domestic affairs of Pakistan. I said that our people had not been guilty of any such impropriety but I knew that allegations to this effect had been manufactured out of the whole cloth and that unfortunately they seemed to have been given some degree of credence.

Pres said he welcomed and appreciated this statement. He confirmed that reports along lines indicated had come to his ears, especially in reference to East Pakistan. He said the reports charged US reps with maintaining prejudicial contacts with such opposition leaders as Mujibur Rahman, disaffected student groups and other dissident elements. He said the reports included assertions that money had changed hands. I told him that it was incredible that such preposterous insinuations could be seriously entertained by anyone who knew anything about American policy. I said that as he knew Americans were mostly gregarious people who liked to get acquainted with all manner of people among whom they lived. Some of personnel might not inquire too closely about all the connections of people with whom they struck up a casual acquaintance. Americans could not be expected to hole up and isolate themselves and see no one except govt officials and those in East Pakistan could not be expected to confine their casual day to day contacts exclusively to other foreigners and govt officials. Pres had earlier said that GOP rep could not be expected to “go into purdah” so far as contacts with Chinese Communists were concerned. At this point I tossed the phrase back at him, saying that Americans could not be expected to “go into purdah” as far as casual social contacts with non-official Bengalese in East Pakistan were concerned. But I assured him that I had issued new instructions to all our people to use the greatest circumspection so as to avoid any even half-way reasonable inference that they were consorting improperly with anti-govt elements.

Pres said he was very pleased to hear this and he accepted my assurances. However he picked up book on his desk which he said he had been reading with surprise and shock at its title “The Invisible Government.”³ He hoped nothing like the operations described in the book were going on.

I told him I assumed no one would take as gospel truth everything appearing in that mischievous and irresponsible book. (N.B. I understand on good authority the Pak Foreign Office has systematically distributed copies of this book among most of the officials in Pakistan.)

I told the President that, of course, we were not assisting and would not assist in any opposition element in Pakistan. By the same token, although we recognized the key importance of Pres Ayub to the stability and welfare of Pakistan, we were, of course, not in any way intervening in his behalf either in the election campaign. Our posture was completely “hands off.” Pres immediately expressed his approval, saying “I want to be judged by my own people.”

6. Rail spur to Afghanistan

I mentioned apparent Pak delay in signing agreement covering engineering survey for the rail extension from Chaman to Spin Baldak. I told him that we had a direct interest since AID was providing the financing through a development loan. We understood Afghans had already done their part and we were ready to make the loan. The absence of Pak signature to the agreement was holding up the survey. I knew he was interested in the early completion of the rail extension as an important element improvement of Pak-Afghan ties and a means of strengthening the Yusuf government. Pres responded that he did not want any delay and promised he would investigate immediately reasons for inaction on the Pak side. He made handwritten notation of this matter on his own pad.

7. Soviet role on sub-continent

We discussed Chavan trip to Soviet Union and resultant announcement of substantial new Soviet military assistance to India.⁴ I noted that publicity on this development had been received quite mildly by Pak Government, press and people, in sharp contrast to strong outburst which greeted every modest installment of Western arms assistance to India. Pres said reason for this was that US was a friend of Pakistan. Pakistan expected nothing from her enemies, but expected much of her friends.

Pres expressed some puzzlement at double standard apparently applied by US to Soviet Union and Communist China. I explained why short-run threat from Communist China seemed greater, and therefore called for stricter immediate measures of deterrence, including tighter trade controls.

Pres referred to overall ceiling on Indian arms procurement from all sources which he understood had been agreed to by Chavan in Washington last summer, and inquired if Soviet arms included in recent Indo-Soviet announcement would in US view come within this ceiling.

I said I would want consult Washington before replying definitely, but it was my offhand impression that Soviet offer was a credit arrangement which would be includable.

Pres said this was an important question to him, and asked [me to?] ascertain Washington interpretation urgently.⁵

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to New Delhi, London, Bangkok, Hong Kong, USUN, Kabul, Moscow, and Karachi and passed to the White House.
2. Jayaprakash Narayan.
3. Apparent reference to David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government (London: Jonathan Cape, 1964).
4. Defense Minister Chavan reported to the Lok Sabha on September 21 on the military assistance for India which had resulted from his trips to the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union. The text of Chavan’s statement was transmitted to Washington in airgram A–332, September 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 US–INDIA. Komer summed up the agreement reached in Moscow in a September 21 memorandum to President Johnson. Beyond military credits, Komer felt that the most significant new element in the agreement was India’s purchase of 90 Soviet amphibious tanks, which, he noted, “gives the Soviets their first foothold in the Indian army.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. II, 6/64–11/64) Talbot assessed the agreement in a September 11 memorandum to Secretary Rusk and concluded that the understanding reached with Chavan in June, which called for a ceiling on Indian military procurement abroad, should hold down Indian purchases from the Soviet Union. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/INC Files: Lot 68 D 207, DEF 19–6, Communist Bloc Assistance)
5. In telegram 13 to Rawalpindi, September 22, the Department confirmed McConaughy’s impression that the agreed ceiling on Indian foreign procurement applied to Soviet purchases. (Ibid., Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 INDIA)