Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, April 22, 1964, 7:43 p.m.

889. Embtels 1163, 1165, 1168, and 1169.² We conclude from your 1168 that King may now endorse continuation government of national union, subject possible modifications, and that this may be accepted by Phoumi but subject to grave danger counter action by Revolutionary Committee.

Seems preferable obtain restoration status quo without additional measures or sanctions. However, in event Revolutionary Committee continues to put pressure on King and perhaps Phoumi, whether or not King has announced formal action, we authorize you to carry out limited sanctions and measures enumerated your 1163 and 1169 except for public announcement of suspension of military supplies.³

Instead of public announcement we believe military supply suspension should be handled by your informing key individuals to this effect in your discretion. You might wish to start with Phoumi, making clear that shipments would continue, not through Vientiane, to FAR units remaining loyal to government recognized by King. (This need not mean formal pledge to this effect, but could be left to your judgment of where loyalties lie.) We leave it to you how to play Kouprasith and whether it would be useful to say this to Siho or might drive him to violent reaction. You could also inform UK, French, and Australian reps urging no publicity.

We prefer this discriminate approach rather than press announcement although we recognize word may get out. If so, believe you should avoid comment at your end but report to us, and we could arrange low-key confirmation here covering all aspects.

In suspending shipments of military supplies to Revolutionary Committee forces, we assume that it is unlikely that the Pathet Lao will take advantage of present confusion to initiate any military action since reconstruction Geneva framework and government of national union presumably in their interest also. If PL do attack, we would, of course, have to reconsider our position. In any event immediate impact of suspension will be primarily psychological and will be slight in terms of military capability of units affected.

In order to ensure that PL/NVN will not interpret suspension as invitation to move against non-Communists, suggest Denson, Millet, or one of your other colleagues make it clear to ChiComs and DRV Ambassadors Vientiane that we would not condone any military action by PL/NVN forces in Laos.

In connection with third sanction, restricting contacts with Revolutionary Committee, we fully concur in your actions reported 1165.⁴

Re withdrawal of Ambassadors, we share your view that it would be unwise to withdraw Ambassadors as Millet has suggested and that best step would be for you to move to Luang Prabang if you feel situation warrants it and Souvanna remains there.

As to evacuation, we regard this more as a matter of your discretion for safety US community than a sanction that would have weight with Revolutionary Committee, and you are authorized to do this at any time and in any degree you see fit. Septel gives funding authorizations.⁵ You can judge best balance of safety factors as against any possible implications we expecting the worst.

We assume of course that you will first discuss these sanctions and other measures with Souvanna and, if possible the King, so that they will understand what we are doing and our rationale for it. It is essential that we first have Souvanna’s full understanding and support.

In addition to your proposed measures, we would like your views on continuing suspension of FEOF sales. Appears to us that resumption of sales during crisis period not in our political or economic interest.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Trueheart, cleared in draft by McNaughton and Forrestal, cleared in substance by Poats, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok for DEPCHJUSMAG and to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In these telegrams, April 21 and 22, the Embassy reported on efforts to restore legal government in Vientiane and raised the possibility of gradual sanctions against the coup leaders if they refused to agree to a restoration. (All ibid., POL 15–1 LAOS)
3. Those sanctions were: a gradual but visible withdrawal of dependents of Western diplomats from Vientiane; a public announcement of suspension of U.S. military shipments to forces under control of the Revolutionary Committee; elimination of U.S. Mission contact with the Committee except for delivery of messages from the Ambassador; withdrawal of Western Ambassadors from Laos, or at least from Vientiane to Luang Prabang; and withdrawal of American aircraft based in Vientiane.
4. In telegram 1165, April 21, Unger reported that he had declined a request for a member of his requirements staff to meet with the Revolutionary Committee, and he had refused to provide aircraft for members of the Committee to fly from Savannakhet and Pakse to Vientiane for a meeting of the Committee.
5. Not found.