Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, April 25, 1964, 5:51 p.m.

904. Embtel 1198.² Our objective remains to restore Geneva Agreements and full authority Government of National Union.³ We continue to hope these results can be achieved without threat of sanctions. At same time, we cannot allow Revolutionary Group to insist on conditions or changes which would give Pathet Lao legitimate basis for claiming Geneva settlement undermined, and you are authorized to state that our support (military and economic) will not be forthcoming if Group does so insist, and if it does not restore Government of National Union to full authority. This should be made clear to all concerned.

You may make clear this does not mean composition of government need be exactly same as prior to coup, or that Pathet Lao protests must necessarily be heeded or improper demands met, but it does mean that any new composition must adhere to principles of June 1962 PDJ agreement. (See Deptel 898 notal, reporting Secretary’s talk with Alphand yesterday.)⁴

To achieve your objective you are authorized at your discretion to proceed with implementation measures recommended in Embtels 1163 and 1169 per Deptel 889.⁵ With respect cut-off military supplies leave to your discretion whether it would be effective to make distinction between extreme hotheads and forces under control other members of Revolutionary Group whose position less clear. Request you give us your judgment as to when cut-off of military supplies including consumables, likely affect military capability of forces involved.

Re evacuation you have authority to proceed when and as you deem necessary. Payment for transportation and per diem is based on authority to evacuate for safety reasons. We feel present circumstances in Laos provide ample justification for invoking this authority although you may do this partly for tactical reasons.

We are arranging for Washington statement per your recommendation and will inform you by septel.⁶

Instructions re approach to Thai will be sent by septel.⁷

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, McNaughton, and in substance by Rusk; and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
2. In telegram 1198 from Vientiane, April 25, Unger reported that, encouraged by an April 23 public statement by Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman that his government would not act jointly with other powers in imposing sanctions against the Revolutionary Committee, the Committee was demanding concessions from Souvanna for cooperation with a restoration of legal government. If Souvanna made these concessions, Unger suggested that the Pathet Lao would withdraw from the government and could justifiably claim that the Geneva Accords of 1962 had been breached. (Ibid.) The text of Thanat’s April 23 press conference in Bangkok is in telegram 1804 from Bangkok, April 23. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)
3. In telegram 892 to Vientiane, April 23, the Department of State reported that President Johnson stated during a press conference that morning that he had received encouraging reports from Unger that the Government of National Union under Souvanna “was continuing and has the support of all, including the Revolutionary Committee.” The President concluded that the important thing was to concentrate on peace and unity in Laos under the principles established by the Geneva Agreements. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS) Johnson’s statement is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, p. 520.
4. During this discussion, as reported in telegram 5424 to Paris, repeated to Vientiane as 898, April 24, Alphand stated that France could only support a Lao Government that represented all three factions, but he agreed that the composition need not be exactly the same as the old Souvanna government. The crucial point, Alphand continued, was that the Pathet Lao agree to the formula for the new government. (Ibid.)
5. See Document 36 and footnote 2 thereto.
6. Not further identified.
7. In telegram 1910 to Bangkok (repeated to Vientiane as 905), April 25, the Department instructed Ambassador Martin to stress to Thanat and Prime Minister Thanom that whatever its weaknesses, the Geneva framework was still the best means of preventing a Communist takeover of Laos. Although desirable in theory, a strong conservative government in Laos was a chimera. It would lead to an attack by the Pathet Lao, conservative defeat, and Thailand and the United States having to decide to accept a Communist Laos or to assume the fighting in Laos. Once Souvanna’s government was reestablished, the United States would continue strongly to support anti-Communist elements in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)