39. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1201. Embtel 1156, 1198.2 This message addresses itself to problem of position US should adopt should revolutionary coup succeed in spite of our efforts block this and should, as a result, Communist military action be launched to take over this zone. Fundamental premises to what follows are 1) we will not permit strategic Mekong Valley to fall into Communist hands; 2) we continue to support Geneva Accords and a coalition Govt of National Union in consonance therewith. In connection with latter, believe achievement US objectives in Laos in past ten years has suffered in important degree from our sharp shifts in policy. This time we [Page 71] should not permit rash actions by irresponsible Lao to dictate a change in basic US policy.
Should the revolutionary coup, in open defiance of US opposition, press on even to point of getting King to recognize it the US should not waver from our declared policy of support for the Geneva Accords. It follows therefrom that we cannot recognize a group or even a so called govt which has taken steps which in effect tear up the Geneva Accords. Our effort, should this occur, would have to be directed at bringing the revolutionary group to its knees by massive application of various sanctions open to us. At same time, we should inform Soviets and ChiComs (and maybe even North Vietnamese), also British and/or French of our continued support of Geneva Accords and agreements underlying them, resulting in our opposition to revolutionary coup, accompanied with sober warning that this in no way means US is about to permit all of Laos to fall under Communist domination. If Communists make any moves threatening strategic Mekong Valley US will immediately take counter measures of its own choosing to guarantee security that valley.
Assuming that Communists do not make any threatening move, actions which we should take would be following:
- 1)
- We continue publicly support Geneva Accords, coalition Govt of National Union and Souvanna as Prime Minister. (It will be important to keep Souvanna from actually submitting resignation whether he actually leaves Laos or not.)
- 2)
- We would announce complete suspension of American aid to Laos (USIP,FEOF, project programs, MAP, etc.).
- 3)
- We would undertake immediate orderly evacuation all depend-ents (in hope revolutionary group would be quickly brought to its knees and AID program recommenced we would not at first evacuate employees themselves).
- 4)
- We would try to continue supply Kong Le forces and Meo and even any other dissident non-Communist military groups with necessary subsistence and military supplies by means of airlift from outside Laos (arrangements for airlift into Laos from Thailand admittedly might be difficult to negotiate with Thais if they determined to support coup group).
We believe application these measures would quickly cause economic chaos as well as serious breakdown FAR logistics thus forcing coup group to give up. At this point we would hope coup leaders would be obliged either to flee Laos or acquiesce in reconstitution of a coalition Govt of National Union under Souvanna. Political consequences hard to predict, but this might mean in effect the disappearance of extreme element of right wing and at least partial amalgamation of right wing with neutralist center under Souvanna. While economy and army might have been seriously weakened end result in terms political configuration would be more in line with our ultimate goal i.e. large grouping of all anti-Communist Lao. Since this merger of right and center would be [Page 72] under aegis of Souvanna there would be no valid reason for objection to it from such as Soviets, Poles, Indians, and French, since PL would still be represented in govt.
On assumption that Communists do not heed our warning we would have to resort various SEATO measures to introduce US and other troops to hold various key points along the Mekong. Regardless of circumstances FAR cannot be regarded as anything more than trip wire should Communists make determined move with Vietnamese or Chinese troops. Even in these circumstances we should not permit ourselves to become deflected from our stated goal of reinvesting Souvanna and reestablishing entire Geneva framework if only for our public picture.
The status of the coup group at this point has little importance. If our intervention eventually led to a military stand off and partition of Laos we would of course have to recognize govt in control this zone in due course, but since we would in effect be in military control we could probably shape things to our wish without much trouble.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and USUN. Handled as Limdis at the instruction of S/S.↩
- Document 29 and see footnote 2, Document 37.↩