Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

55. Memorandum by the Chief, Far Eastern Division, Directorate for Plans (Colby) and the Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support, Directorate for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cooper)¹

Washington, May 21, 1964.

SUBJECT

• A Program for Laos and South Vietnam

1. To meet the current Communist threat in Laos and Vietnam essentially two extreme courses of action are now being discussed: a) salvaging what we can by negotiations at Geneva; or b) carrying the war directly to Hanoi. Whatever the advantages of either course (we think they are limited) the risks (political in the case of Geneva and political as well as military in the case of Hanoi) are so high as to warrant a searching examination of yet another alternative. We call this, for want of a better name, “massive counterinsurgency.” We recognize that this may be regarded as “more of the same” rather than as a genuine alternative to either of the two extreme courses. We believe, however, that what follows represents a difference in kind from the present US/GVN effort in implementation as well as conception.

2. The Program

In brief, what is proposed is that the defense and stabilization of the situation in South Vietnam (and Laos) be accomplished by a substantial change in the nature of the counterinsurgency program and certain substantial increases in its scale. This to be supplemented by intense psychological warfare pressures and selected military action (including, but not necessarily limited to bombing) against the Communists in South Vietnam and Laos as well as in North Vietnam. Such a program would necessarily require further inputs of personnel by CIA, a reorientation of US military and AID programs, some changes in the US organizational and command structure, and putting the GVN on a “war footing.” These actions would probably involve additional requirements for US personnel directly involved in the counterinsurgency effort of as much as 5,000 men. Perhaps a corresponding economy could be achieved among US military and civilian personnel presently in South Vietnam.

3. The “oil spot” concept is the key to victory in South Vietnam, and its objective is the population, who must be given something to fight for and something to fight with. They must also be supported by the regular forces against the larger VC units now prevalent, and these regular forces must give this supporting, reinforcing, and protective mission priority over attempts to find and kill the VC.

4. In order to insure maximum attention to the development of this counterinsurgency approach CIA should develop such local political and paramilitary forces as feasible, among the Montagnards, the Cao Dai, the Hwa [Hoa] Hao, etc.). These would be supplementary to the CIDG, SDC, etc. In order to carry this out, CIA would establish officers in the local areas with direct lines of command to Saigon and direct logistical and financial support. This is not a reversal of Switchback; it is an extension of the CIA capability to conduct political and paramilitary actions in a flexible manner into new fields, leaving to the regular military and aid programs the development of the more organized and orthodox national forces.

5. Essential to the oil spot approach is a program of local self defense, which is where we believe the CIA can make an important contribution and we suggest that the Agency re-enter this field on a large scale. Thus, we propose:

a. There should be established in each province of South Vietnam an officer not necessarily CIA, in charge of counterinsurgency. He would have on his staff a USOM man and an officer of the US Special Forces or Marines. The latter, in turn, would have under his command up to 100 specially trained and indoctrinated US troops.

b. The Province counterinsurgency group would report, over its own communications, to a counter-insurgency command center in Saigon, [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This command center would be directly under the Ambassador and would have the same status in Saigon as MACV, USOM, etc.

c. Consideration should be given to establishing regional counterinsurgency commands (the Delta, the Montagnard area, etc.).

d. US Special Forces Officers would function on a “counterpart” basis at the hamlet level and would be the action element in carrying out the elementary economic and social measures that are needed to provide the positive element to defend as well as to instruct the locals in their own self defense. The CIA, AID, and Special Forces officers would travel constantly through the Provinces to see that the programs are being implemented.

6. These proposals are designed to supplement rather than replace the regular AID and military programs in Vietnam. In essence, the regular, more orthodox programs should be designed to support the local counterinsurgency effort at least until the situation is stabilized.

7. We recognize that the proposals involving increased counterinsurgency activity with CIA participation, entail a number of adjustments in the chain of command structure: the relationship of the military and AID personnel on the counterinsurgency group to MACV and USOM, the relationship of the counterinsurgency command to the Commanding General, Vietnam. We believe, however, that if the concept of massive counterinsurgency is adopted, these command relationships could be easily worked out.

8. To supplement a vastly increased counterinsurgency effort within South Vietnam, the US/GVN should undertake a stepped-up program of psychological warfare against North Vietnam. This would include diplomatic, military, propaganda and economic pressures. This would also involve a program of bombing Communist targets, especially in Laos, but leading close to the North Vietnam frontier and into North Vietnam if necessary. This is relatively low-risk in Laos, and would encourage our friends and perhaps give pause to one enemy. (The pilots should be in the first instance Lao [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], phasing into the use of US pilots.) The initial military target inside Laos would be in the Plaine des Jarres area, along Routes 12A and 12B, Route 9, leading then along Route 7 towards the North Vietnamese frontier. These attacks would be more in the nature of a psychological pressure program than an all out military attack. They would have some slight military value in interfering with Communist supply routes, but their main objective would be to demonstrate an increasing determination on the US side to press the bombing into North Vietnam.

9. In Laos, it is recommended that all of the villages on our side be approached with the same philosophy as in South Vietnam, adapted as necessary to local conditions. Enterprising Lao have demonstrated in several instances that it can be done. In this way the areas on our side of the ill-defined informal partition could be secured by the villagers themselves. The FAR’s mission would become a defensive one in support of calls for help from any village complex that comes under attack. Since the attack on a village if properly defended has to be fairly large scale, the political noise level to the Communists would rise and they would also be vulnerable to aerial attacks. This tactic should remove the scattered Pathet Lao bands on our side of the informal partition and provide the basis for long-term political development in Laos. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Southeast Asia Counterinsurgency Command

10. We suggest that the idea of a civilian counterinsurgency command for Southeast Asia be explored. Such a command would have general authority over counterinsurgency programs with, of course, major emphasis on South Vietnam and Laos. This command would be directly responsible to Washington and have authority to guide, expedite, and inspect the counterinsurgency programs in various countries under its aegis. Its primary responsibility would be to augment and coordinate current counterinsurgency programs. The command will also have authority to recommend appropriate military and psychological measures against the enemy to affect his will to press the current insurgency effort.

11. The functions of the command would be:

a. To guide, expedite, and inspect the work of all agencies and their concentration on the implementation of the approved strategy, i.e., the oil spot. The emphasis should be on the rapid exploitation of any opportunity, however valid, not overall or detailed planning or comprehensive reporting.

b. To organize a counterinsurgency center to train and indoctrinate Americans, Lao, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on an accelerated basis. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] subcenters for extension of the effort might be established in the countries involved.

WE Colby

Chief, FE/DDP

Chester L. Cooper

A/DDI/PS

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, May, 1964. Secret.