Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

56. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, May 22, 1964, 6 p.m.

1395. We may at this point in Laos be on watershed between (a) continued Communist military attacks driving at or very near to Vientiane and Paksane or (b) at the end of this dry season’s pressure except for few consolidating and mopping-up operations. We are not disposed here to think that Communists this time do intend move to Mekong although their calculations in this regard may have been changed by some new elements in picture. These are (a) Souvanna’s much more outspoken and consistent anti-Communist position which has finished any lingering Communist hope that he can be used to gain their ends and (b) our reconnaissance flights over Ho Chi Minh Trail which Communists may regard as prelude to serious assault on that corridor. Since corridor certainly represents major North Vietnamese interest in Laos, they might be driven to more extreme action if they become persuaded their continued use of it is threatened.

More likely hypothesis is that recent rash of fighting just about over, having resulted in body blow to neutralist forces, from which they may or may not recover, and having acquired for PL/VM prize geographical base for future harassment and advances in all directions northern Laos. If this is case, however much right wing and even Souvanna will protest about being devoured by Communists bite by bite, we (i.e. Western Powers) might accept new situation and try live with new state of affairs as we have lived with other unsatisfactory situations in Laos before. It would of course be a good deal harder to get acceptance of this course of action in Vientiane even than in past and would be much harder to live with our friends here in future, unless we considerably increased military help and showed ourselves much less restrained by Geneva Accords.

A fuller discussion of implications this course of action contained septel.² Under this we would seek to avoid involving ourselves in another conference and another set of accords, which could only be worse than last and where we might put ourselves in position of being obliged to beat an even more recalcitrant right wing (and perhaps Souvanna too) into negotiations and concessions to Pathet Lao which we full well know could only benefit latter. In other words should we not seriously consider drawing the line at this point and living with an even uneasier peace than before and something shakier than our accustomed instability rather than pretending that there is a possibility of peaceful co-existence with Communists in Laos? Of course, if an international conference could buy some worthwhile concessions it might have some value but otherwise I can’t see why we should go into it and I would hope we could persuade enough of our friends of the rightness of this position that we could avoid finding ourselves so uncomfortably isolated as to feel obliged to give in.

With the French proposal and their current pressures on Souvanna, coupled with Communist line that is becoming daily clearer, we obviously will very soon have to adopt clear course or find ourselves swept along by force of events. It seems increasingly clear that it is Communist strategy to present Souvanna as prisoner or puppet of right wing and to present government in Vientiane as fictitious. In short order I expect them to say they cannot accept Souvanna Phouma as in position speak for Laos. They may go to point of even withdrawing diplomatic representation and, if there were a call for article 4 consultations from Souvanna, they would most probably not attend or, if they did, would not accept that he represents the Royal Laotian Government. At a Geneva type conference I would expect them to accord Souvanna role merely of representative of one of three tendencies and in no sense able to speak for Laos as a whole.

I believe this is line we must do our utmost to combat and frustrate and in conversation with U.K., France and Australian colleagues this morning I emphasized this point. Particularly for benefit of Millet whose government’s officials (Paris to Dept 5565³) talk of Souvanna as “prisoner of right.” Souvanna as we all well know has many times threatened to resign and once carried this threat out some years ago. He is certainly under no physical compulsion today and if he wished would not have slightest difficulty in leaving country. He apparently has been so thoroughly disillusioned and discouraged by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese behaviour that he no longer feels able work on his earlier cherished hopes of bringing about reconciliation. As for Souvanna not being free here, there of course comes immediately to mind contrast with Pathet Lao zone where he may not even enter without express permission. Colleagues here make much of Polish two-day incarceration, current plight of North Vietnamese Embassy, continued though moderated censorship, etc. all of which thoroughly stupid and highly counterproductive actions of extreme right wing; I urged them do as I have done, i.e. try bring about correction of these errors but don’t dwell on them so as to play into Communist hands when grounds for condemnation of Pathet Lao and DRV are so much graver.

French are obviously obsessed with idea that tripartite balance must be restored and I am persuaded Millet using all effort with Souvanna to this end. If he manages play role in bringing about cease-fire (Deptel 1043)⁴ it will certainly be with intention break up present neutralist right wing cooperation. This would of course also be French objective in any conference. Continuation of uneasy status quo as discussed para 2 above would be entirely unacceptable to French in present frame of mind.

In light all this we come to immediate question of international conversations, in whatever form. As for Geneva type conference (either as Communists would have it or in slightly modified form proposed by French) if I understand correctly we have not burned our bridges entirely (for example Secretary’s statement Depcir 2133⁵ which appeared leave door slightly open). Nevertheless I gather from Deptel 1039⁶ and various public expressions that we are definitely not prepared accept a conference now. It seems to me this is correct position since we know nothing can come out of conference that would in any way improve situation in Laos from our point of view. I believe our answer to pressure for conference should be two-fold:

(A) Article 4 consultations requested by PriMin should proceed in first instance to solidify PriMin’s position and define issues and strategy of friends if there is to be a conference and

(B) Conference would be accepted only if it brought in advance clear gain, such as cease-fire coupled with withdrawal throughout Laos of PL forces to April or May 1963 positions (i.e. following Neut-PL break). (If, of course, current Pathet Lao/Viet Minh military attacks continue and cannot be contained and we are not willing intervene militarily to block them, we might have to buy cease-fire with conference.)

If Pathet Lao-Viet Minh pressure continues strong and we give consideration to military intervention, or if we come to conclusion that even with let up by Pathet Lao today we cannot expect to have viable free Laos with Plaine des Jarres severed from it, then another possible course of action outlined septel may have to be considered. This would entail a sharp and limited employment of U.S. forces to retake Plaine des Jarres.

Depcirtel 2169⁷ arrived following drafting foregoing. I see no conflict between that message and present tel and will await comments on cirtel, with which I am generally in accord.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC for POLAD, London, Paris, New Delhi, Canberra, Moscow, and Phnom Penh and pouched to Ottawa.
2. Telegram 1398 from Vientiane, May 22. (Ibid.)
3. Dated May 21. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 1043 to Vientiane was a repeat of telegram 6078 to Paris, May 20, in which the Department reported that Rusk discussed Laos with French Ambassador Alphand who answered Rusk’s question about the French proposal for an international conference on Laos to reestablish tripartite government and implement the 1962 agreements. (Ibid., POL 15–1 LAOS)
5. Dated May 17. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)
6. In telegram 1039 to Vientiane, May 20, the Department asked the Embassy to inform Souvanna of U.S. opposition to proposals for reconvening the Geneva Conference. (Ibid.)
7. Circular telegram 2169, May 21, contained the Department of State’s views on Souvanna Phouma’s request for consultations along the lines of Article 4 of the Geneva Declaration and the French call for a Geneva Conference on Laos. The United States wanted to proceed with Article 4 consultations as it doubted that a new Geneva conference on Laos could resolve the problems. The Geneva Agreements of 1962 provided a suitable framework for a settlement provided the Pathet Lao cooperated. (Ibid.)