6. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk1

SUBJECT

  • Southeast Asia: Your Meeting at 4:00 p.m., February 26

On February 15 you authorized me to undertake inter-agency discussion of the desirability of strengthening the US posture in Southeast Asia, particularly in connection with recent developments in Laos.2 Attached is a draft Memorandum For The President entitled “Stabilizing the Situation in Southeast Asia” for discussion at your meeting at 4:00 p.m., February 26 with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy.3 The draft has the informal approval of the agencies concerned; the purpose of your discussion is to obtain final inter-agency approval of the version to be forwarded, at your discretion, to the President.

The situation within Laos itself is now somewhat less threatening than it was a week ago, although the Communists continue to occupy the area in central Laos into which they had been moving. Our discussions of the problems confronting us in Southeast Asia have, however, only re-enforced our judgment that we should move promptly to counteract the widespread speculation on neutralist solutions for the area and to reassert US determination to exert its power effectively to frustrate Communist advances there. The continued flagrant Communist violation of the Geneva Accords4 in Laos provides us with the clearest and most understandable immediate issue on which to base actions to these ends.

The draft Memorandum sets forth a broad program of political, military and covert actions designed to have an immediate impact upon the situation in Laos as well as to convey a mounting sense of US determination to do whatever is necessary in Southeast Asia generally to defend Free World interests. This program is not specifically aimed at preparing us for any particular military courses of action with respect to Laos, South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam which may commend themselves to [Page 14] us at some point in the future. Nor is it designed to pre-judge decisions on such military courses of action. If the program is successfully carried out, we would expect the Communist side to be substantially more cautious in taking actions which could force us to make these difficult decisions and we would expect our friends in the area to take new heart. In any case, we will be in no worse a position to face the possible difficult decisions on military courses of action if events eventually require them.

We do not feel that it is possible at this point to be too precise on the details of the various actions included in the program. Close and continuing consultations between the agencies concerned will be required as the various steps are taken. At all times we must keep in mind the sensitivities and interests of our friends who are most directly concerned, particularly the Thai and the Lao. Undoubtedly, we shall have to tailor some of our actions to fit their desires. What is important, however, is the general concept of coordinated political, military and covert actions—within the limits set forth in the Memorandum—as a means of achieving a limited and essentially political end.

I also attach a paper setting forth—in broad outline—our view of how we might expect the proposed program to be implemented.

Attachment 15

Draft Memorandum for the President

SUBJECT

  • Stabilizing the Situation in Southeast Asia

The Communists may well see an opportunity for broad forward movement in the recent course of events in Southeast Asia. The political climate is dominated by widespread speculation on neutralist solutions for the area sparked by France’s recognition of Communist China and DeGaulle’s statements as well as Prince Sihanouk’s efforts to obtain international guarantees of Cambodian neutrality by threatening to turn to Hanoi and Peiping. The Communists may well believe that the United States is unwilling to exert its power effectively to defend its positions in [Page 15] Southeast Asia. They, as well as DeGaulle and Sihanouk, must be disabused to any such ideas; and our friends, especially the Thais and Vietnamese, must be reassured as to our determination and intentions.

In our view the recent Communist advances in central Laos highlight the continuing erosion of the situation in Laos. We have a clear and understandable immediate issue—the continued flagrant Communist violation of the Geneva Accords.

Objectives

With respect to Laos, we must undertake a series of coordinated political and military actions designed (1) to discourage the Communist side from continued advances against the neutralist/conservative forces, (2) to give us additional time to augment the efforts we have been making to strengthen and consolidate areas under the control of neutralist/conservative forces, and (3) to preserve our freedom of action in responding to any further actions undertaken by the Communists. The actions we propose do not involve committing U.S. forces to Laos.

In the broader context of Southeast Asia, our actions must be designed to give the Communist side reason to believe that we are prepared to escalate the conflict in the area in order to defend our positions there. Our actions should in no way foreclose options we may later wish to pursue with respect to South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam as well as Laos. Communist concern should be reinforced by gradually accumulating evidence of our willingness to support actions against North Viet-Nam itself under the presently approved plan (OPLAN 34–A–64)6 or on a more extensive scale. We should make it clear that our actions stem from our concern over the situation in Southeast Asia as a whole, and that our actions with respect to Thailand and Laos are indeed coordinated with our assistance to South Viet-Nam.

While none of the actions we propose is decisive in itself, a number of them taken together should represent some actual increase in United States military capability within Southeast Asia and demonstrate our concern over the course of recent events together with our determination to reverse that course.

Reconvening of Geneva Conference?

We do not propose to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Laos at this time. Nevertheless, the Communist side could do so, and Prince Souvanna might if he became extremely discouraged over the situation in Laos. Moreover, at some future time, it might actually be in our interest that a conference be held. In any event, the measures which we are proposing [Page 16] would tend to put us in a stronger position to participate effectively in such a Conference should one occur.

Regional Cooperation

In view of Souvanna’s key importance in the Geneva settlement, it is essential to coordinate closely with him, obtaining his support or tacit acquiescence.

Because Thailand is an avenue for introducing U.S. power, we must obtain full Thai cooperation and support, consulting in advance and treating the Thai as partners.

This coordination is particularly important because both Souvanna and the Thai may have reservations on varying specific actions to be taken. Their reaction will be conditioned by the intensity of Communist pressures and our willingness to meet them squarely.

The actions we propose will not in themselves cause Prince Sihanouk to accelerate his timetable to threats unless they are executed in such a manner as to cause suspicion that they are directed against Cambodia.

Recommendations:

1.
That we resume the US program of graduated actions which were contained in the memorandum for the President attached to NSAM 256 of July 31, 1963.7 Specifically, it is recommended that the following actions be taken promptly (exact timing to be determined by the Department of State with the concurrence of the Department of Defense):
a.
With regard to Laos:
(1)
Encourage selective use of 6 Lao T–28s.8
(2)
Expand use of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] other specialist covert teams.
(3)
Resume use of South Vietnamese border patrols to conduct guerrilla operations in south Laos against the Viet Minh.
(4)
Further enlarge guerrilla units in Laos and expand operations in enemy held territory.
(5)
Expand sabotage operations against the North Vietnamese within Laos and in areas of North Viet-Nam adjacent to Laos by guerrillas launched from Laos.
(6)
Conduct high level aerial photo reconnaissance of Laos9 (timing as mutually agreed by Department of State and Department of Defense).
b.
With regard to the deployment of U.S. forces, deploy promptly to Thailand the remainder of the F–100 squadron, approximately 12, which currently has a detachment of 6 there. A decision as to the deployment of additional forces, with composition to be recommended by DOD, [Page 17] will be deferred until after the forthcoming conference in Viet-Nam.
c.
It is recommended that the current Joint US/Thai Special Warfare Exercise in Thailand be expanded or extended as feasible.
2.
That, together with the foregoing measures, we move in the diplomatic arena (a) to reassure our allies as to our intentions to stand by US commitments in Southeast Asia, (b) to indicate that the US is considering further measures for coping with Communist aggression in the area, (c) to produce evidence of North Vietnamese intervention in Laos and South Viet-Nam. Among the diplomatic measures to be taken, we will:
(a)
Publicize fully Communist actions in Laos in violation of the Geneva Accords.
(b)
Consult with Souvanna Phouma in order (1) to convince him of our intention to prevent the Communists from destroying the Geneva settlement and to uphold the position of his government and (2) to obtain his support or tacit acquiescence in our course of action.
(c)
Consult fully with Thailand keeping in mind Thai sensitivities regarding decisions affecting their interests taken unilaterally by the US. Continue to encourage the Thai to strengthen their military forces in Northeast Thailand.
(d)
Coordinate with Thailand the extent and character of SEATO approval and involvement.
(e)
Obtain maximum support and contributions from the UK, Australia and New Zealand.
(f)
Urge the British to go to the Soviets again urgently and demand Co-Chairmen action in support of Souvanna. If the Soviets continue to stall, the British should issue a unilateral statement in reply to Souvanna’s appeal.
(g)
Follow up the British approach with a direct approach of our own to the Soviet Co-Chairman. We should also speak to the Poles.
(h)
Inform the Indian and Canadian governments and their ICC Commissioners of our projected actions, and continue to press them for more forceful action in the ICC.
3.
Since the solution to the Laotian problem is intimately linked with the solution to South Viet-Nam and its relationship to North Viet-Nam, it is recommended that the Laotian and South Vietnamese problems be discussed further in conjunction following the return of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor from Saigon.

[Page 18]

Attachment 210

Paper Prepared by the Department of State

IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM FOR STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

If the program is approved, we envisage implementing it along the following lines:

1.
Begin immediately to publish in increasing detail information about the Communist actions in Laos during the past two years in violation of the Geneva Accords.
2.

Initiate prompt discussions with the Thais in order to gain their full understanding of our broad purposes and our intent to use the situation in Laos as the immediate cause for action. Our discussions with the Thais will cover the question of how to manage the extent and character of SEATO acquiescence, approval, or involvement in the actions we will jointly be taking with Thailand. We should be prepared to modify our proposed program in order to obtain maximum Thai collaboration and understanding. Although Ambassador Martin believes that Thai cooperation will depend upon our assurances that we are prepared to enter Laos if necessary, it should be possible to obtain their full cooperation on the general concept we pursue without explicit statement as to what we might do in response to hypothetical Communist advances in Laos. We should, of course, be prepared to indicate that the option of using US forces in Laos remains open.

It will be absolutely essential that no leak regarding our proposed program occur before discussions with the Thais have begun.

3.
After consulting with the Thais, we should tell Souvanna Phouma of the general nature of our proposed actions with emphasis upon our determination to be ready, under whatever circumstances, to defend the position of his government under the Geneva Accords. Since he will not believe that the situation in Laos itself really demands this kind of action on our part, we should be prepared to philosophize with him about the threat which Communist activities centered in North Viet-Nam offer to Free World positions in Southeast Asia generally.
4.
Having talked to the Thais and while we are discussing matters with Souvanna Phouma, we should seek maximum political and military support for our actions from the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. The manner of approaching these governments will depend upon the agreements we have reached with the Thais regarding SEATO involvement.
5.
Carefully structuring our actions to the degree of understanding we obtain from Souvanna Phouma, we will begin promptly to implement the Phase II actions with respect to Laos. Those actions which are entirely covert will be pushed vigorously as soon as authorized. Others, such as offensive use of T–28s, will demand careful tailoring to Souvanna’s sensibilities as the situation develops. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
6.
Movement of F–100s into Thailand will take place following full consultations with the Thais. Movement of any other US forces into Thailand will follow decisions reached after the visit of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to the area.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. Secret. Drafted by Neubert on February 25 and cleared by Sullivan. A copy was sent to Harriman.
  2. See Document 3.
  3. See Document 8.
  4. For texts of the Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos (the Geneva Accords), July 23, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075–1083.
  5. No drafter indicated. On February 26 the draft memorandum was sent to Vientiane as telegram 664, to Bangkok as telegram 1438, and Saigon as telegram 1319 for comment by those embassies. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
  6. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 45.
  7. See footnote 2, Document 5.
  8. Actions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of Group A of Phase II. [Footnote in the source text. The footnote in the source text appears on paragraphs (1)-(5) below.]
  9. Action No. 1 of Group C of Phase II. [Footnote in the source text.]
  10. No drafter indicated.