Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

7. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

I–21710/64

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Memorandum for the President Concerning Actions which Can Be Taken with Respect to Laos Toward Stabilization of the Situation in Southeast Asia

Subsequent to your discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject, the Department of State revised the Draft Memorandum for the President² in preparation for your meeting with the Secretary of State at 1600 hours today.

The revised Memorandum (Tab A) forwarded to us by State calls for early implementation of the measures listed in the previous memorandum except that U.S. force deployment at this time is limited to the remainder (12 aircraft) of the F–100 squadron which currently has a 6-aircraft detachment in Thailand. A decision on additional U.S. deployments is to be deferred until your return from Saigon.

The new draft is in accord with views of ISA and, with one exception, those of the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs recommend the resumption of low level aerial reconnaissance over Laos.³ This action, however, would be an overt violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements,⁴ and its implementation would require a policy determination to the effect that the U.S. is no longer willing to permit unilateral violation by the Communist side.

Arguments for the deployment of the F–100’s at this time are:

a. It might have some impact as an indication of our willingness to take action in the area.

b. It is keyed specifically to Laos.

c. It would probably be more acceptable to the Thais than would U.S. ground force deployments.

d. It represents a threat against both PL/VM troop movements and Laotian supply routes from North Vietnam.

Arguments against are that by itself the action does not mean very much, it may have lost some credibility because we have done it before without taking further steps, and it is a card we might want to play later.

On balance, the argument which seems most persuasive is that deployment of U.S. aircraft would be a positive action which we could take immediately and which might have some deterrent impact on the PL/VM.

Peter Solbert

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, Asia 092, Jan-May 1964. Secret. There was no date on this memorandum but there was an indication that it was received in McNamara’s office at 12:30 p.m., February 26. A note on the source text indicates McNamara saw it on February 26.
2. See attachment 1 to Document 6.
3. In JCSM–159–64, JCS to McNamara, February 26. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, Asia 092, Jan-May 1964)
4. See footnote 4, Document 6.