Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

61. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 24, 1964.

SUBJECT

• White House Meeting On Southeast Asia—24 May 1964

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Mr. Sullivan
• Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster
• Mr. Bell, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Smith, Mr. Cater
• Mr. McCone, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Colby

1. Mr. McNamara opened the meeting by securing general approval of photo flights over the Plaine des Jarres on 25 May. He commented that he had been disappointed with the product from the low-level reconnaissance of the Tchepone area to date.

2. Secretary Rusk then opened the discussion of Vietnam. He stated, viewing Southeast Asia as a whole that it is clear that South Vietnam is the lynch-pin, although Laos and Cambodia also bear upon the matter. He emphasized that we have a good political position with respect to Laos in our demand for return to the 1962 Accords and that it is important to exploit this. [Here follows discussion on Vietnam.]

3. The problem of what to do about Laos was discussed in considerable depth, at the end of which Mr. William Bundy was requested to draft a detailed scenario of escalation of military action related to Laos. Mr. Rusk indicated concern that we may have an immediate problem on Laos and suggested that it might offer an alternate route to action against North Vietnam, on which our political base would be better founded. While the U.S. public is not much interested in Laos, Mr. Rusk thought that the Ho Chi Minh trail and the Viet Minh presence in Laos as related to South Vietnam could associate the problems of Laos with the U.S. public’s more positive attitude toward Vietnam. Mr. Rusk thought that it important to maintain pressure on the pre-conditions for a Laos conference, such as restoring Kong Le’s positions on the Plaine des Jarres by a Pathet Lao withdrawal, a cease fire throughout Laos, strengthening of the ICC and reaffirming Souvanna Phouma’s full authority. At the conference itself there would be emphasis upon the Ho Chi Minh trail and the Viet Minh presence, but an effort would be made to restrict the conference to Laos rather than allowing it to spread into Vietnam. Mr. Rusk thought that the way to achieve the pre-conditions is to bring pressure on the Pathet Lao through other governments. Mr. McNamara felt that it would be necessary to use military action to bring about these pre-conditions, e.g. dispatching U.S. Forces to Thailand, bombing the Pathet Lao and possibly going ahead to bombing North Vietnamese routes of access into Laos. Once the failure to obtain the pre-conditions for a Lao conference is evident, particularly if this involved extension of military action into North Vietnam, it would be necessary to approach the Communists on the basis of Vietnam as well as Laos. Mr. McNamara felt that this would depend on the degree to which we force the pace. Mr. Rusk thought that the operation could be divided into two phases, a diplomatic effort to clarify our pre-conditions to a conference followed by the steps we might take if these were not achieved; Mr. McNamara felt that U.S. military action at least to some degree would be necessary in both phases. The DCI urged that we not divert our attention from the main Vietnamese problem just to obtain small diplomatic advantages based on Laos. Mr. Bundy felt that the U.S. position vis-à-vis Laos would have an effect on Vietnamese morale.

4. With respect to Vietnam Secretary Rusk reiterated his concern at adopting a course of action which might collapse because of poor performance or a collapse in South Vietnam. He insisted therefore that firm commitments be obtained from Khanh at an early rather than late stage on these matters. As an aside he said that he was investigating the potential for a UN Security Council sponsorship of a UN Commission to cover the Lao/Cambodia border.

[Here follows discussion related exclusively to Vietnam.]

11. [Here follows discussion on Vietnam.] Mr. McNamara reverted to Secretary Rusk’s interest in Laos, commenting that we might be able to move into a North Vietnam program via the Laotian problem or we might even be forced into considering it by the situation in Laos. Mr. Sullivan brought out the point that Souvanna Phouma might cave in under too large a U.S. support of Laos.

12. The following actions were assigned:

a. JCS: Scenario of a stepped up covert program against NVN.

b. State: Proposals for the use of the United Nations.

c. Mr. W. Bundy: Scenario on Laos.

d. Mr. McNaughton: Revise the scenario on NVN.

e. Mr. Cooper: Review of number of additional personnel who would have to be brought into a formal USIB condition of the draft SNIE.

f. All Agencies: List of all personnel who are aware we are considering North Vietnam operations to be provided to Mr. Bromley Smith.

13. Mr. Bundy reiterated the necessity of secrecy in this whole operation.

William E. Colby ²

Chief, Far East Division

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, April 64. Secret. Drafted by Colby on May 24. Bromley Smith prepared an account of this meeting, which he noted began at 11 a.m; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 369–374.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.