60. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council1
SUBJECT
- Laos and the Timing of Possible Actions Against North Viet-Nam2
Present Situation
Souvanna Phouma has stated that he would accept a “Geneva” conference on Laos subject to several preconditions, of which the most notable are withdrawal of Communist forces from areas previously occupied by the neutralists (principally the western part of the Plaine des Jarres) and reaffirmation of his own status and full power as head of the government. We are strongly supporting these preconditions, and are pressing the British and friendly signatories of the 1962 Accords to do likewise.
In addition, we propose, if a conference should ever meet, to press for full compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1962 as our objective. This would include total withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and an end to the corridor through Laos from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. Both of these Communist actions have persisted since 1962; we have protested against them frequently, but in practice have taken no stronger action.
Probable Communist Reaction to this Position (We assume that the Communists do not enlarge their present military actions to a further offensive. If they did so, we would have immediately to consider drastic action both within Laos and against North Viet-Nam.)
Unless further pressure is applied, the Communists are virtually certain not to withdraw their forces from the neutralist areas of the Plaine des Jarres. Moreover, they will undoubtedly fight any clear affirmation of Souvanna’s power and legitimacy, and at least seek to argue at length that they were justified in boycotting the government, that Souvanna is a prisoner of the right-wing generals, etc. Thus, if we, and Souvanna, and the British, adhere to these preconditions—as we must seek to do—we shall be at an impasse with the Communist side. They may well cease any further military action, so that we would have virtually a de facto ceasefire. But they are unlikely to go further.
[Page 107]US Options
The US could take further military actions within Laos at any time. We have already introduced jet reconnaissance flights and have now authorized US civilians to fly T–28 prop fighter bombers against Communist positions. Our next actions in Laos could include the use of US aircraft in Thailand, South Viet-Nam or from carriers to bomb Communist positions in Laos.
This should be done only on the request of Souvanna and a major problem might be that, although he might well request some quantity of such action, he is basically concerned about destructions in Laos and might not wish us to push it far without himself pressing us to go at once against North Viet-Nam.
Our action could further include deployment of ground and especially air units to Thailand both to step up such air actions and to convey at least a threat of ground action by US forces within Laos. If we do deploy forces to Thailand, we could probably get the British, Australians, New Zealanders, and possibly the Philippines, to join with us, but it is less clear that any of these nations would join in actual attacks into Laos.
Once we started overt US military attacks into Laos, we would be forcing even more of a showdown and making it even more imperative that we not withdraw from our insistence on Communist withdrawal. By such attacks, we could inflict substantial damage on the Pathet Lao and could perhaps try to single out North Vietnamese troops for such attention. However, even in the face of such damage, the chances cannot be considered great that the Communists would withdraw, since to do so would represent the loss of the major morale and material gains they have made by their recent actions.
Thus, we could arrive at the point where we would virtually have to consider attacking North Viet-Nam in order to prevail in the contest of wills. Thus, in effect, the “Laos route” could lead us to the point of attacking North Viet-Nam, and could compress any timetable we might have for taking such action based on our wider view that it had become essential to hold South Viet-Nam and the whole area.
On the other hand, the timing of such a showdown is to some extent within our control. The various preconditions laid down by Souvanna, particularly in the political sphere, could be negotiated for a significant period of time before the withdrawal issue became the last remaining one. We must not seem to be dodging that issue, but we need not force it at once. For example, we could let the Article 4 consultations in Vientiane spin out a little on the issues of the ICC and Souvanna’s own position, employing direct US military action only if the Communists did continue to move to any degree. We might during this period still move forces to Thailand to steady the situation and put ourselves in a position [Page 108] to move fast and hard once we did decide to act either within Laos or against North Viet-Nam.
In sum, the course of events in Laos could burn out the fuse on a decision to hit North Viet-Nam in a matter of 3 to 4 weeks, or it could conceivably be strung out longer. But, now that we are launched on insisting on the preconditions—which we could hardly have avoided—what we must recognize above all is that there is almost bound to be a showdown over these preconditions at some time in the next 1–3 months. If we back down from such a showdown—by abandoning the precondition of withdrawal—we will suffer a serious further loss of confidence among the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia.
Laos in Relation to South Viet-Nam as a Peg for Action Against the North
Up to a point, the Laos issue can be useful to us in preparing the way for whatever action we want to take against North Viet-Nam. Our legal case in Laos is strong, with widespread recognition that the Communist attacks have been major violations and cannot be justified by the antics of the right wing or by past occasional right-wing violations. This helps us to bring the British and others along and gives a good legal basis for opening moves we might want to make in any case.
However, as we approach the point of actually hitting North Viet-Nam, justifying this on the basis of Laos would have little appeal to the American public and probably would not seem appealing even to the British and others. Thus, before we hit North Viet-Nam, we would wish to justify such action not merely on account of Laos but, perhaps far more, on the basis of the continued North Vietnamese aggression against South Viet-Nam. The “Laos route” must merge with the “Souvanna Phouma route” at this point and in fact become the smaller of the two.
Course of Events if Communists Do Accept Withdrawal
On the lesser chance, that the Communists would accept withdrawal from neutralist positions in the Plaine des Jarres, we would then be virtually compelled to go on to a conference on Laos in Geneva or preferably somewhere else. Such a conference would probably be a prolonged “who struck John” exercise with endless argument about the political problem and with we and perhaps others pressing for total force withdrawal and the end of the corridor.
Such a conference, however, need not significantly affect either the timing or the carrying out of actions against North Viet-Nam. The issues are old ones and do not involve the loss of confidence that would be entailed by our backing down on the immediate withdrawal issue. Indeed, since we would have achieved our immediate objective of withdrawal, our psychological position at such a conference would be fairly good.
[Page 109]In sum, if this should happen, the Laos problem as such could be put to one side as a factor in our thinking whether to hit North Viet-Nam.
- Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Special Papers, Apr/June 1964. Top Secret.↩
- For the record of meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC, see Document 61.↩