63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
7706. Following message has been delivered to Prime Minister Home through White House channels:
Begin Text
Dear Prime Minister:
The situation in Laos has reached a critical point. Pathet Lao attacks against forces loyal to the Royal Government continue. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Souvanna, in a statement today, announced publicly he has called for consultations in Vientiane under Article Four of the Geneva Declaration, and I am glad to hear that you are having your Charge take the lead in organizing these promptly.
Souvanna also makes it clear that the Royal Government of Laos is prepared to attend a conference on Laos, which some signatories of the Geneva Agreements prefer, on condition that a cease-fire be established immediately throughout the country, that the Pathet Lao forces withdraw to the positions they held before the May 17 attacks, that his own powers be fortified and that the ICC operate effectively.
I believe we must give our unreserved support to Souvanna’s position and seek through the Article Four consultations to develop as much further support as possible. Souvanna’s conditions are truly minimal unless we are prepared to hold a conference to ratify another Communist grab. From Mr. Butler’s message to Dean Rusk,2 I gather that your instructions to Denson call for achieving the objective of (1) an effective cease-fire supervised by the ICC, and (2) some real unity in the Government of Laos, but they apparently do not mention the important matter of Pathet Lao withdrawals.
If in fact there is this omission, then I do not believe these instructions go far enough. As Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma himself has put it, we cannot go to a conference faced with a fait accompli to the advantage of the aggressors, and where the latter could use their new territorial gains to argue that they control the whole country. Moreover, seizure of the entire Plain of Jars area by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese has been aimed at demoralizing and indeed eliminating the Neutralist forces in Laos. Unless a Neutralist position can be restored, [Page 115] Souvanna’s right to speak for his country internationally will be put in question and the whole political basis for the Geneva Agreements undermined. In this connection, we are somewhat puzzled by Mr. Butler’s allusion to a Zurich-type meeting. We do not, of course, wish to weaken in any way Souvanna’s position as Prime Minister, any more than we can accept the takeover of the Plain of Jars. Souvanna must sit at the conference table as the representative of Laos just as he did at the concluding session of the 1962 conference. He could bring with him representatives of various factions if he wished.
To sum up, and to put the matter in more precise terms, I wish to say to you in all frankness that I do not see how the Government of the United States can consider attending a conference on Laos unless (a) there is an effective cease-fire supervised by the ICC; (b) there is a withdrawal of the Pathet Lao from the positions held by the Neutralists on the Plain of Jars before the recent Pathet Lao attacks; and (c) it is clearly understood that Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister would represent the Government of Laos at the conference. As Dean Rusk has put it in his letter of Friday to Mr. Butler,3 any other position would simply not be understood in this country and, “might very well be disastrous for our whole position in Southeast Asia, by finally convincing our friends that we really do not have the will and determination to resist a Communist take-over of the peninsula”.
I fully realize that firm adherence to this position may result in sharp disagreement on the Communist side, at least initially. We would then have to consider various additional moves of a military nature. We would expect to consult closely with you on these.
I greatly value the close consultation our two governments have had and the parallel actions we have been taking. I hope that we can continue to see these matters eye-to-eye in approaching the Article Four consultations in Vientiane. Lyndon B. Johnson. End Text.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Vientiane.↩
- Dated May 23. (Ibid., S/S Presidential/Secretary’s Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials-Sec. Rusk, 1962–1964)↩
- Text in telegram 7679 to London, May 22. (Ibid.)↩