Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

64. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council¹

Washington, May 26, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Additional Measures to Stabilize the Situation in Laos

Vientiane’s 1419 and 1430² contain Unger’s judgment that we could only get the Communist side to withdraw from the Plaine des Jarres by the application of very considerable military force in Laos, and the further fear that, if we and Souvanna should stand firm on the withdrawal conditions, the Communist side may also respond by maintaining attacks and gradually enlarging its area of control.

We have all felt that it was unwise or premature, or both, to get into substantial military actions in Laos at this point. Hence, the UN proposal³ to build up additional diplomatic pressure before we go further, with the “go further” contemplated to include measures against North Vietnam.

However, this may leave us a serious problem of deterring the kind of additional Communist attacks Unger fears. I believe that the only measure that would do so would be a prompt deployment of moderate-sized US and other SEATO ground and air forces to Thailand. We would not use these forces in Laos unless the Communists did actually continue to move on a significant scale, but their very presence would indicate that we were considering further measures and could well serve as a warning to the Communists that would hold the situation somewhat in place while we urge Souvanna to take the deadlock on withdrawal to the UN.

I therefore recommend that we consult immediately with the Thai in this sense,⁴ and concurrently with the British, Australians, New Zealanders, and Filipinos. This would involve our making clear that we were contemplating the UN request in order to build up international support and as a prelude to possible additional actions. I do not think, however, that we would need at this point to go through the whole range of possible actions in order to get the key nations to accept this course of action. It must be recognized that the Thai might so insist, but I think in the existing situation we would probably not have to spell it out.

The only other way I see to deter continued Communist action in Laos would be to bring the Lao complaint to the UN at once. However, this would somewhat rush our timing both in the sense of getting our materials together to handle that case effectively, and in the sense that the Lao action is itself part of the broader timetable on which we probably do not wish to act quite as rapidly as this. Therefore, the movement of forces to Thailand becomes a stopping action to enable us to take perhaps ten days or so before we move to the Lao complaint.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. V, Memos, 5/21/64–5/31/64. Secret. Drafted by Bundy on May 26.
2. Dated May 24 and 25. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
3. This UN “Scenario” was prepared by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, and sent to Stevenson on May 26 under cover of a letter from Cleveland. (Ibid., POL 27 ASIA SE) A copy can also be found in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Special Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I.
4. In telegram 2152 to Bangkok, May 27, the Department asked if the Embassy thought Thai attitudes against introduction of U.S. troops had changed and, if not, what could be done to change them. In telegram 2032 from Bangkok, May 28, the Embassy responded that to obtain Thailand’s concurrence, Thai leaders had “to be cut pretty fully on scenario” and convinced that contemplated U.S. actions represented effective countermeasures. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)