91. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Laos and Southeast Asia
I think there has developed over the last few days some clearer thinking on what might be done during the next few months to stiffen our friends in Southeast Asia and give appropriate signals to Hanoi and Peking, without getting stuck on an escalator.
As a result of Monday’s action,2 we have come upon a device which may be just what we need during the negotiations developing over Laos to show our determination. We have almost established our intention to continue reconnaissance flights over Laos on an as-needed basis with Souvanna’s approval; and we have a good public rationale for these flights, i.e. support of the ICC and the Geneva Accords. This public rationale would permit us to conduct reconnaissance not only over the Plain of Jars, but also over the panhandle where evidence is accumulating of significant Viet Cong buildups directed at Vietnam.
We should now develop in advance a number of specific targets both in the panhandle and in the area east of the Plain of Jars, Ban Ban, and Nong Het. We should pre-plan with the military as carefully as possible the most precise kind of strike directed only at clearly military targets.
We should put these plans on the shelf while we continue limited reconnaissance (high-level in the dangerous areas) in order to maintain the presence of aerial inspection. Then at appropriate times during the course of the negotiations over the next few months, we should be ready to pick one of our strike plans quickly off the shelf and put it into rapid and effective execution in support of a diplomatic objective. I believe and hope that the aftermath of Monday’s action would show that the Communists will have great difficulty mounting a public reaction to a specific strike, if the target is entirely military and preferably Viet Cong, since they cannot allow an international inspection without admitting the presence of North Vietnamese military installations in Laos.
[Page 181]The essence of this scheme is that we can control the timing and the place of strike. This will require the greatest self-discipline and coolness on the part of all agencies of the Government; but I think it would permit us to maintain some pressure during the period of the next several months.