Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

92. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, June 11, 1964, 3 p.m.

1587. When I called on PriMin Souvanna this morning he told me he would like reconnaissance flights begin again starting any time after tomorrow morning. He asked me to say nothing to press about this today. I indicated my satisfaction at his decision but noted that press were expecting something today for sure, knowing that he and I were discussing the matter; I also said I thought it would be more appropriate if word came from him.

After some discussion Souvanna agreed and he will receive press late this afternoon.

I then raised with him question of escorts and he said, while raising no objection to employment of escorts, he wished nothing to be said about this and to continue reply to question of protection by referring to use T–28s. Souvanna repeated his arguments about necessity our playing this game in same way as Communists to avoid giving them propaganda fuel, etc. I accepted his points in principle but then reviewed two compelling reasons why we had to continue to acknowledge use of escorts, namely (1) to assure Congressional and public opinion that recon planes being adequately protected and (2) by public mention of escorts to reinforce signal to Hanoi and Peking which would not be as strong if we appeared be trying to suppress this information. After much discussion in which I drew liberally on helpful information contained Deptels 1158² and 1176,³ Souvanna accepted my point.

Souvanna therefore said he will speak to press this afternoon along following lines: He will say he has received new information on Vietnamese infiltrations as result of which he has asked me to resume reconnaissance flights. If he is queried about use of armed escorts he will reply that he does not object to their use if the U.S. judges this necessary for protection of recon planes.

I used this opportunity to mention that reports frequently received about Pathet Lao/Viet Minh troop movements in South (citing what he had earlier told me about possibility impending attack on Saravane) and reports of supply convoys from North Viet-Nam. Could recon planes be used also in that region if reports required verification? Souvanna agreed.

Souvanna then volunteered that he wished make maximum use T–28s to support RLG forces, to interdict supplies arriving over routes to Xieng Khouang (No. 7) to Thakhek and Savannakhet (Nos. 8 and 12) and to destroy on the ground what supplies Pathet Lao/Viet Minh have in place. They must be so crippled that they will be able mount no further attacks on RLG forces and so that possibly in due course RLG may be able retake Plaine des Jarres. He asked that my attaches be in touch with appropriate RLG officers to work out plans for T–28 program which will really punish PL/Viet Minh. I told Souvanna of Lao-American targeting group already in operation and other forms of cooperation which I said we would be happy to augment.

Throughout our conversation Souvanna kept returning to theme “act but don’t talk about it”. He is very conscious of necessity maintain internationally his neutral position and to maintain Geneva Accords. There is no question in PriMin’s mind that violations by Pathet Lao/Viet Minh justify actions already underway and perhaps more but he insists for political reasons that we must avoid going on record acknowledging actions and thus giving Communists both propaganda fuel and pretexts. Was able put over point that we could not deny use of escort planes but he is quite opposed to our acknowledging that escorts firing or attacking on Lao territory, even though he accepts that some of this may be necessary.

Comment: I believe it was combination of having some time for reflection, influence of King in Luang Prabang and messages I was able convey to Souvanna yesterday by letter (Embtel 1582)⁴ which showed we were avoiding further revelations that avoided his going off deep end. If we continue respect his wishes, particularly with regard publicity I think we can do what is necessary and keep Souvanna with us. I was vastly relieved to read first sentence Deptel 1176 and I believe our discipline in this helped very much to save the day; Phillips has my fullest sympathy and from reading Deptel 1178,⁵ I feel for his predicament. Souvanna’s statement to press this afternoon should take off good deal of heat on that score. I must absolutely insist, however, that we stick to our line with regard to questions about operations. If we are in real difficulties again from press, let me try bring Souvanna around but let us avoid going contrary his desires which, in many cases at least, can I believe be in due course modified.

I will get to work at once with ARMA,AIRA, CAS and others to map out program to get maximum benefit from T–28 program, perhaps expanded beyond present level. We have had to assume always that RLG forces incapable standing up to PL/Viet Minh if latter really meant to push through, conceivably air support can redress balance and permit at least reestablishment equilibrium. (There is of course always risk that Communists will also introduce aircraft.) As soon as possible we will be submitting our thoughts on what would be most effective type T–28 program.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC for POLAD, London, Paris, Saigon, USUN, the White House, CIA, JCS, and OSD.
2. Document 84.
3. In telegram 1176 to Vientiane, June 10, the Department suggested telling Souvanna that it was not a question of pressure from the press that compelled the United States to publicize escort operations, but “the necessity of maintaining basic credibility vis-à-vis American public.” This had become a problem in South Vietnam, and the Department wanted to avoid the problem in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
4. In telegram 1582 from Vientiane, June 10, Unger reported that he had delivered messages to Souvanna in Luang Prabang from Harriman and from him deploring the misunderstanding over the armed escorts. (Ibid., INT 6 PHOTO LAOS)
5. Telegram 1178 to Vientiane, June 10, contained the text of Department Spokesman Phillips’ press briefing on Laos reconnaissance, June 10. (Ibid.)