Office of the Historian

94. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, June 12, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Laos

I attach a scenario prepared by Chet Cooper at John McCone’s suggestion, on a diplomatic track for Laos.2

Briefly, it proposes that we call an urgent Geneva Conference, confined to Laos, and insist that it last only two weeks. Its purpose would be to restore Geneva Accords. If the Conference failed, we should “take over physical control of that part of Laos most important to us.”

This suggestion has two major flaws, in my opinion. We could never convince our Asian allies that we could confine such a conference to a two-week discussion on Laos, and I think they would be right.

Our purpose heretofore has been to drag things out. I don’t think that bringing the situation to a military head in two or three weeks is what we want in this situation.

Lastly, how do we “take over” the Mekong Valley?

Mike
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos, 6/1/64–6/14/64. Top Secret.↩
  2. Attached, but not printed.↩